area handbook series 

Mauritania 

country study 



Mauritania 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Robert E. Handloff 
Research Completed 
December 1987 




On the cover: Pastoralists near 'Ayoun el 'Atrous 



Second Edition, First Printing, 1990. 

Copyright ®1990 United States Government as represented by 
the Secretary of the Army. All rights reserved. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Mauritania: A Country Study. 

Area handbook series, DA pam 550-161 
"Research completed June 1988." 
Bibliography: pp. 189-200. 
Includes index. 

Supt. of Docs. no. : D 101.22:000-000/987 

1. Mauritania I. Handloff, Robert Earl, 1942- . II. Curran, 
Brian Dean. Mauritania, a country study. III. Library of Congress. 
Federal Research Division. IV. Series. V. Series: Area handbook 
series. 

DT554.22.M385 1990 966.1— dc20 89-600361 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-161 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being 
prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Con- 
gress under the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program. The 
last page of this book lists the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Acting Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



111 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of Brian Dean 
Curran and Joann Schrock, who coauthored the earlier edition of 
Mauritania: A Country Study. Their work provided the organizational 
outline for the present volume as well as substantial portions of 
the text. The authors are also grateful to those individuals in vari- 
ous public and private agencies who contributed photographs, 
research materials, and invaluable time and expertise to the produc- 
tion of this book. 

The authors wish to thank members of the Federal Research Divi- 
sion staff who contributed directly to the preparation of the text. 
Thomas Collelo edited drafts, photographs, and maps; Richard F. 
Nyrop reviewed all drafts and provided guidance; Barbara Auer- 
bach, Sharon Costello, Barbara Dash, and Ruth Nieland edited 
the manuscript; Andrea T. Merrill performed the final prepubli- 
cation review; and Shirley Kessel prepared the index. Marilyn L. 
Majeska managed editorial production. Also involved in prepar- 
ing the text were Gwendolyn Brown Batts, Barbara Edgerton, and 
Izella Watson. Malinda B. Neale of the Library of Congress Com- 
posing Unit prepared the camera- ready copy, under the supervi- 
sion of Peggy Pixley. 

Lending timely and invaluable graphics support were Thomas 
Collelo, Carolina E. Forrester, and David P. Cabitto, who reviewed 
draft maps from which Greenhorn and O'Mara and Harriett R. 
Blood prepared the final maps. Additional thanks are due also to 
David P. Cabitto, who designed the cover artwork and the illus- 
trations on the title page of each chapter and who, assisted by 
Sandra K. Cotugno and Kimberly A. Lord, prepared charts and 
graphs. 

The authors also wish to thank several individuals who provided 
research and operational support. Meridel Jackson was instrumental 
in adapting software to the authors' word-processing needs. Naomi 
Greer helped prepare bibliographies and, with Patricia Rigsbee, 
assisted in research. 

Finally, the authors thank Madam Turkia Ould Daddah, cul- 
tural affairs officer of the Embassy of Mauritania in Washington, 
D.C., for providing photographs used in the text and for sharing 
her expertise. 



v 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xi 

Country Profile xiii 

Introduction xix 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Rachel Warner 

EARLY HISTORY 6 

SANHADJA CONFEDERATION 6 

ALMORAVIDS 7 

SUDANIC EMPIRES AND KINGDOMS 8 

ARAB INVASIONS 9 

EARLY EUROPEAN CONTACTS 11 

FRENCH COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION 12 

Pacification 14 

French Colonial Policy 15 

French Administration Through World War II 16 

Postwar Reforms 19 

The Road to Independence and the Quest 

for National Unity 21 

INDEPENDENCE AND CIVILIAN RULE 23 

Emerging Tensions 24 

Time of Radicalization 26 

CONFLICT IN THE WESTERN SAHARA , . 26 

Background to Mauritanian Policy 27 

Fighting the Desert War 30 

MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM THE 

WESTERN SAHARA 32 

DOWNFALL OF OULD SALEK 32 

THE HAIDALLA REGIME 33 

Consolidation of Power 34 

Political Disintegration 37 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment .... 39 

LaVerle Berry 

PHYSICAL SETTING 42 

Major Geographic and Climatic Zones 43 



vii 



Expansion of the Desert 47 

POPULATION 48 

ETHNIC GROUPS AND LANGUAGES 50 

Maures 52 

Black Africans 56 

RELIGIOUS LIFE 58 

Origins of Islam 59 

Tenets of Islam 60 

Brotherhoods and Saints 62 

CHANGING SOCIAL PATTERNS 65 

EDUCATION 69 

Traditional Islamic Education 69 

Modern Education 70 

HEALTH AND WELFARE 73 

Medical Care 73 

Housing 74 

Chapter 3. The Economy 77 

Peter D. Coats 

ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT 81 

FISHING 84 

MINING 90 

Iron 90 

Copper, Gypsum, Phosphates, and Oil 97 

THE RURAL ECONOMY 98 

Herding 98 

Farming 101 

MANUFACTURING AND INDUSTRY 106 

ENERGY 106 

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 108 

TRADE 109 

Exports Ill 

Imports Ill 

Direction of Trade 112 

BANKING AND GOVERNMENT FINANCES 112 

Banking 114 

Government Finances 114 

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, DEBT, 

AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 115 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 119 

Robert E. Handloff 

POLITICAL CULTURE 122 

Attitudes Toward the Political System 122 

Impediments to Change 124 



Vlll 



GOVERNMENTAL POWER 125 

Constitution 125 

Constitutional Charter 128 

Legal System 130 

Local Government 132 

Local Elections 135 

POLITICAL POWER IN THE MID-1980S 136 

INTEREST GROUPS 138 

Ethnic Minorities 138 

Traditional Elites 140 

Women 140 

Trade Unions 141 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 143 

Foreign Policy 143 

Relations with France 146 

Relations with Morocco 148 

Relations with Other States of the Maghrib 149 

Relations with Arab States 150 

Relations with Communist States 150 

Relations with the West 150 

Relations with Other African States 151 

International Organizations 152 

Chapter 5. National Security 155 

Kate Bullard 

EXTERNAL SECURITY PERCEPTIONS 

AND POLICIES 157 

War in the Western Sahara 157 

Regional Security Concerns 158 

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES 163 

The Preindependence Period 163 

The Independence Period and the French 

Military Legacy 164 

THE ARMED FORCES 165 

Organization and Strength 165 

Manpower and Military Training Schools 169 

Role of the Military in Society 171 

Defense Budget and the Economy 172 

Civic Action and Disaster Relief 172 

Foreign Military Assistance 172 

PUBLIC ORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY 176 

Internal Security Forces 176 

Law and Crime 177 

Internal Security Threats 178 



ix 



Appendix. Tables 183 

Bibliography 189 

Glossary 201 

Index 205 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Mauritania, 1987 xviii 

2 Almoravid and Sudanic Empires, Eleventh to 

Seventeenth Centuries 10 

3 Territorial Claims in Northwest Africa, 1987 28 

4 Topography and Drainage 44 

5 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, 

Fiscal Year (FY) 1984 80 

6 Economic Activity, 1987 86 

7 Iron Ore Exports, 1973-83 96 

8 Grain Production, 1973-85 102 

9 Transportation System, 1987 110 

10 Current Account Balance, 1973-85 116 

11 Nouadhibou and Vicinity, 1987 162 

12 Organization of National Security Forces, 1987 166 

13 Military Ranks and Insignia, 1987 170 

14 Organization of Internal Security Forces, 1987 176 



x 



Preface 



Mauritania: A Country Study replaces the edition published in 1972, 
twelve years after Mauritania became independent. Between 1960 
and 1972, Mauritania struggled to achieve political unity and eco- 
nomic independence. It also suffered a drought and an attendant 
economic dislocation that lasted through the 1970s. In the period 
between 1972 and 1987, intermittent drought, desertification, and 
the war in the Western Sahara further exacerbated Mauritania's 
political and economic problems. 

Like the earlier study, this edition seeks to provide a concise and 
objective account of the history and dominant social, political, eco- 
nomic, and military aspects of contemporary Mauritania. Sources 
of information included scholarly monographs and journals, official 
reports of governments and international organizations, periodi- 
cals, and foreign and domestic newspapers. Chapter bibliographies 
appear at the end of the book; brief comments on some of the more 
valuable sources appear at the end of each chapter. Measurements 
are given in the metric system; a conversion table to aid readers 
is included (see table 1, Appendix). A glossary is also included. 

The authors have spelled place-names in accordance with usage 
established by the United States Board on Geographic Names. In 
transliterating personal names, they have followed standard usage 
in official Mauritanian sources. 



XI 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Islamic Republic of Mauritania. 

Short Form: Mauritania. 

Term for Citizens: Mauritanians. 

Capital: Nouakchott. 

Geography 

Size: Total area of 1,030,700 square kilometers includes 400 square 
kilometers of water. 



Xlll 



Topography: Generally flat with vast, arid plains broken by oc- 
casional ridges and outcroppings. In center of country, series of 
scarps facing southwest longitudinally bisect plains; sandstone 
plateaus, some with isolated peaks, between scarps. Northeast a 
vast region of dunes. 

Climate: Desert climate across northern three-fourths of country 
with diurnal extremes in temperatures and meager and irregular 
rainfall. During rainy season (July to September), average rain- 
fall in far south 400 to 600 millimeters; in northern two- thirds, 
to 100 millimeters. Desert winds throughout year cause frequent 
sandstorms. 

Society 

Population: Census of 1979 enumerated population of over 1.4 
million, including nomadic population of approximately 513,000. 
In 1987 approximately 1 .8 million population with annual growth 
rate of 2.9 percent. At least 40 percent, and perhaps as much as 
80 percent, of population urban and concentrated in Nouakchott 
and Nouadhibou; remainder farmers or small town dwellers. Rural 
population densities ranged from 0. 1 per square kilometer in north 
to 35 per square kilometer in south, with overall average of 1.8 
per square kilometer. Over 46 percent of population under age 
fifteen. 

Ethnic Groups: Six ethnic groups; one primarily Arab-Berber 
(Maure), remainder black African (Toucouleur, Fulbe, Soninke, 
Wolof, and Bambara). Numerical proportions of each a source of 
contention; in 1978 government claimed 70 percent Maure; others 
said blacks constituted 50 percent or more. 

Languages: Official languages: Hassaniya Arabic, spoken primarily 
by Maures, and French, preferred by blacks for political reasons. 
Fulfulde, Azayr, Wolof, and Mande-kan spoken by black groups 
in south. 

Education: Secular education not compulsory; in 1985 approxi- 
mately 35 percent of primary-school-age children and 4 to 10 per- 
cent of secondary-school-age children enrolled. Secular schooling 
based on French system with six years of primary schooling fol- 
lowed by four-year lower cycle of secondary schooling and three- 
year upper cycle. One major secular university and various teacher 
training and vocational institutes, all government owned. Islamic 
education common throughout country; usually limited to rote 
learning of Quran. One Islamic institute of higher learning 



xiv 



providing instruction in Islamic subjects and teaching methods. 
Literacy rate estimated at 5 percent at independence, about 18 per- 
cent in 1985. 

Religion: Virtually entire population Sunni Muslims and adhere 
to Maliki rite. 

Health: Infectious and parasitic diseases, including malaria, en- 
demic. Health standards low and facilities woefully inadequate; se- 
vere shortages of equipment, supplies, and trained personnel. 

Economy 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): Real growth rate of GDP aver- 
aged 8 percent in 1960s, then fell to 2.3 percent from mid-1970s 
through mid-1980s, reflecting cumulative effects of drought, war 
in Western Sahara, and falling prices for iron ore. In 1986 GDP 
per capita US$410, same as in 1976. 

Mining: Until mid-1980s largest contributor to GDP and source 
of export earnings. In 1960s provided as much as one-third of GDP 
and 80 percent of export earnings. By mid-1980s mining accounted 
for about 10 percent of GDP and 40 percent of export earnings, 
as prices for iron and copper ores dropped in world markets. By 
1987 mining accounted for only 8.6 percent of GDP, although min- 
ing operations remained largest nongovernmental employer. 

Fishing: Mauritainia's offshore waters among richest in world but 
in danger of being overfished. Before 1975 fishing and fish process- 
ing accounted for 5 percent of GDP, mainly through licensing and 
royalties. After government began participating in 1979, fishing 
industry grew rapidly and by 1983 accounted for 54 percent of for- 
eign exchange and approximately 10 percent of GDP. 

Herding and Agriculture: Employed most workers but least 
productive sector because Mauritania has one of poorest agricul- 
tural bases in West Africa. In 1960s livestock and crop production 
35 to 45 percent of GDP. In mid-1970s 20 percent of total popula- 
tion farmed and 60 to 70 percent herded. From mid-1970s through 
mid-1980s, combined contribution to GDP approximately 25 per- 
cent, and 85 percent of nomadic herders moved into cities. In 1986 
Mauritania produced about one-third of its grain needs, up from 
3 to 8 percent during 1983-85 drought years. 

Imports: In 1986 approximately US$494 million. Major imports 
foodstuffs and other consumer goods, petroleum products, and cap- 
ital goods. 



xv 



Exports: In 1986 approximately US$400 million. Major exports 
fish, iron ore, and small amounts of gypsum and gum arabic. Also 
unrecorded but important export of cattle on the hoof to Senegal. 

Major Trade Partners: Western Europe, Japan, United States, 
and various African countries. 

Balance of Payments: By 1985 external public debt nearly 250 
percent of GDP, making Mauritania one of most deeply indebted 
nations in world. Depended extensively on foreign economic credits 
and grant aid, in particular from oil-producing Arab states and 
France. 

Exchange Rate: 73.7 ouguiyas to US$1.00 (September 1986). 

Transportation and Communications 

Roads: In late 1980s, only 1,500 kilometers of paved roadway out 
of a total 9,000 kilometers of roads. Unpaved roads generally tracks 
across the sand. Costs for maintaining sand-free roads exceeded 
budgetary means. 

Railroads: 650-kilometer standard-gauge single-track line linked 
Zouirat mines with port at Nouadhibou and carried only iron ore. 

Ports: Nouadhibou most important, with facilities for handling ore, 
processed fish, and commercial shipping. In late 1986, new Chinese- 
built Friendship Port with annual capacity of 500,000 tons inau- 
gurated at Nouakchott but not yet operational by late 1987 because 
it still lacked certain facilities and equipment. 

Airports: Nouakchott and Nouadhibou most important; both capa- 
ble of handling most commercial jet aircraft. Thirty regional air- 
fields served by Air Mauritanie, national airline. 

Communications: Barely adequate system of cable, open- wire 
lines, radiotelephone, and wireless telegraph linked Nouakchott to 
Paris, most regional capitals, and some other towns in Maurita- 
nia. Also linked to International Telecommunications Satellite 
Organization (INTELSAT) and Arab Satellite Telecommunica- 
tions Organization (ARABSAT) networks. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Following coup in 1984, governance by twenty-one- 
member Military Committee for National Salvation (Comite 
Militaire de Salut National— CMSN). CMSN members, military 
officers of varying rank and status, represented sometimes disparate, 



xvi 



sometimes overlapping corporate and ethnic interests; issues decided 
by consensus. President, elected by CMSN members, appointed 
a cabinet, which administered policies decided by CMSN. 

Administrative Divisions: Divided into twelve regions, each of 
which was both a judicial district and an administrative subdivi- 
sion headed by a governor. 

Foreign Affairs: Member of Nonaligned Movement; maintained 
friendly ties with East and West. As economy weakened and eco- 
nomic dependence deepened, developed closer ties with wealthier 
Middle Eastern and Maghribi states and strengthened relations with 
Soviet Union and China. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: In 1987 army 14,400; navy 320; and air force 150. 

Combat Units: In 1987 army consisted of one infantry battalion, 
two armored car squadrons, one parachute-commando company, 
three reconnaissance squadrons, two artillery batteries, one air- 
borne company, one engineering corps, and one antiaircraft bat- 
tery. Naval weapons included thirteen coastal patrol boats (eight 
of which were seaworthy), of which only two could be dispatched 
at a time. Air force included thirteen combat aircraft. 

Military Budget: In 1985 approximately US$43.3 million, about 
25 percent of central government's budget. 

Police and Internal Security Agencies: In 1987 single national 
police force with approximately 1,000 men performed routine police 
functions in cities; National Guard, numbering 1,400 men, respon- 
sible for rural areas. Both under supervision of Ministry of Interior, 
Telecommunications, and Information, which also responsible for 
Customs Corps and Presidential Guard. 



xvn 




w ouadhibou 

DAKHLET ) 
NOUADHldOU/ INCH1RI I 

y Akjoujt 





International boundary 

Region boundary 

® National capital 

• Region capital 

50 190 KI LOMETERS 
50 100 MILES 



WESTERN 

SAHARA 

(claimed by Morocco}! 



BRAKNA 



Nema 



y^- > / Ayoun el 

Aleg JT^ Kiffa ^ Atrous^ 

w^aedi^?ASSABAc HODH / 
^\GORGOL,M \ EL ( 

\ / U \ GHARB ljL | 

\yGUIDIMAKAV, ,/ ■ — ' 

Sefibaby 




MALI 



GUINEA 



Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative 



Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Mauritania, 1987 



xviii 



Introduction 



CONTEMPORARY OBSERVERS OF MAURITANIA, like the 
French colonizers of an earlier century, often have described the 
country as a bridge linking North Africa and West Africa. Cer- 
tainly individual groups within Mauritania have maintained strong 
cultural and economic ties with their neighbors — to whom they were 
often related — in both regions. Yet although the country served 
as a geographical bridge, crisscrossed by merchants transporting 
gold, salt, and slaves between the northern and southern edges of 
the Sahara, it also marked a cultural boundary between sedentary 
farmers of sub-Saharan Africa and the nomadic Arab-Berber herd- 
ers from the Maghrib (see Glossary). Throughout Mauritania's 
history, the interaction between the two cultures has been charged 
with social and political conflict that has defined and will continue 
to define Mauritanian politics. Even Islam, to which virtually the 
entire population adhered after the ninth century, provided but 
a veneer of unity (see Religious Life, ch. 2). 

The character of present-day Mauritania's population reflected 
the waves of immigration from north and south that had begun 
in the third century A.D. The first wave, Berbers from the north, 
migrated into what is now Mauritania in the third and fourth cen- 
turies and later in the seventh and eighth centuries. Local popula- 
tions either became vassals in service to the Berbers or migrated 
farther south. 

In the ninth century, three Berber groups — the Lemtuna, Mes- 
sufa, and Djodala — formed a loose confederation in order to bet- 
ter control the easternmost trans-Saharan trade route. The Sanhadja 
Confederation, as it came to be called, monopolized trade between 
the ancient empire of Ghana and the city of Sijilmasa. The histor- 
ically important towns of Koumbi Saleh, Aoudaghast, Oualata, 
Tichit, and Ouadane flourished during this epoch. 

In the eleventh century, following the breakup of the Sanhadja 
Confederation and a period of unrest and warfare among the San- 
hadja Berbers, a small group of Sanhadja zealots established a re- 
ligious center from which they preached a doctrine of Islamic reform 
and holy war. By 1090 the empire of the Almoravids — as the fun- 
damentalist revolutionaries came to be known — extended from 
Spain to Senegal. Within forty years, however, the fervor and zeal 
of the original Almoravid reformers waned, and, at the same time, 
their foes to the north and south grew stronger. 



xix 



The black Sudanic kingdoms of Ghana, Mali, and Songhai even- 
tually expanded over the next six centuries into what had been 
Berber strongholds and constituted the second wave of immigra- 
tion. A third wave, again from the north, saw various Yemeni Arab 
groups infiltrating southward, pushing the Berbers and Africans 
before them. By the late seventeenth century, one Yemeni group, 
the Bani Hassan, came to dominate all of what is now Maurita- 
nia. As the Berbers moved south, they forced the blacks toward 
the Senegal River Basin (see Black Africans, ch. 2). 

Mauritania's social structure in the late twentieth century dated 
from the late seventeenth century, when the Bani Hassan defeated 
a Berber force seeking to expel them. The nomadic Arab warrior 
groups subsequently dominated the Berbers, many of whom be- 
came clerics serving the Arabs. At the bottom of the social pyramid 
were the black slaves. All three groups spoke one language, Has- 
saniya Arabic, and became known as Maures. Meanwhile, free 
blacks, culturally related to Africans in the south, settled in the 
Senegal River Basin. 

Europeans became interested in Mauritania only in the second 
half of the sixteenth century. French traders at Saint Louis in what 
is now Senegal purchased gum arabic (see Glossary) from producers 
in southern Mauritania. Until the mid-nineteenth century, and then 
for only a short period when French forces occupied the Trarza 
and Brakna regions in southern Mauritania, Arabs and Berbers 
paid little heed to the Europeans. 

At the start of the twentieth century, French forces under Xavier 
Cappolani moved back into Mauritania and through brute force 
and co-optation pacified refractory Arab chiefs. But in contrast to 
its colonial administration elsewhere in West Africa, the French 
administered Mauritania indirectly, relying on existing Arab- 
dominated institutions (see French Colonial Administration, ch. 1). 
This laissez-faire attitude persisted until the 1940s. Following World 
War II, at a time when other French colonies were agitating for 
independence or at least substantial reform, there was only minimal 
political activity in Mauritania. France nonetheless implemented 
changes that corresponded to reforms demanded and accorded else- 
where in francophone West Africa. 

The new political freedom touched perhaps 10 percent of the 
population; yet even among this group, sharp divisions persisted 
and threatened the political independence of the colony. Some Arabs 
and Berbers with strong family ties in Morocco favored union with 
Morocco, while black Africans in the south wanted to join the na- 
scent Mali Federation, which joined Senegal and Mali. Only by 
co-opting the country's traditional leaders with vague promises was 



xx 



Mauritania's leading political figure and first president, Moktar 
Ould Daddah, able to achieve the pretense of unity as Mauritania 
celebrated its independence on November 28, 1960. 

During the first decades of independence, Mauritania remained 
deeply divided. Southern (non-Maure) blacks resented Maure 
domination of the political process, which led, among other things, 
to the disproportionate representation of Maures in the bureaucracy 
and officer corps of the armed forces, the imbalanced allocation 
of development funds, and the imposition of Hassaniya Arabic as 
the language of instruction in all secondary schools. With the sup- 
port of students, the Mauritanian Workers Union (Union des 
Travailleurs Mauritaniens — UTM), Mauritania's first trade union, 
protested a salary scale by which some West European expatriates 
received wages almost 1,000 times higher than their Mauritanian 
counterparts. Finally, Mauritania's costly involvement in the 
Western Sahara conflict was part of a Maure agenda and held lit- 
tle for southern blacks, who made up the bulk of the fighting force 
and suffered most of the casualties. 

In 1975 Mauritania allied with Morocco against the Polisario 
(see Glossary) guerrillas of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Repub- 
lic (SADR), ostensibly to obtain Tiris al Gharbiyya. But by 1978, 
after several surprise attacks by the Polisario guerrillas against 
Nouakchott and the iron ore mines at Zouirat, it had become ap- 
parent that Mauritania's military was no match even for the smaller 
guerrilla forces (see Conflict in the Western Sahara, ch. 1). Nonethe- 
less, the government continued its costly involvement, in part to 
stave off a possible invasion by Moroccan troops should Maurita- 
nia curtail its effort and in part to satisfy the Maures who saw the 
annexation of Tiris al Gharbiyya as the first step toward a rejuve- 
nated Greater Mauritania (see Glossary). Mauritania's blacks in 
particular opposed the war on several counts. First, it siphoned 
off scarce resources that might otherwise have supported greater 
agricultural development in the south; second, it paved the way 
for military officers, most of whom were Maures, to insinuate them- 
selves into the civilian government; and, finally, the majority of 
the enlisted men were black, although most officers were Maure. 

Pointing to the debilitating costs of the war and the subsequent 
political dissension in Mauritania, a group of military officers staged 
a coup in July 1978 that brought Colonel Mustapha Ould Salek 
to power as prime minister. Salek proved unable to extricate 
Mauritania from the conflict, and in April 1979 Colonel Ahmed 
Ould Bouceif and Colonel Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla seized 
power. Shortly thereafter, Bouceif was killed in airplane crash, and 
Haidalla became prime minister. 



xxi 



Ruling through the Military Committee for National Salvation 
(Comite Militaire de Salut National — CMSN), Haidalla arranged 
a cease-fire with the guerrillas and pledged to remain neutral in 
the Western Sahara conflict, although his government later accorded 
diplomatic recognition to the SADR. Meanwhile, Polisario guer- 
rillas continued to transit Mauritanian territory with impunity, in- 
viting cross-border reprisals from Moroccan troops. 

In response to alleged corruption in government and a discern- 
ible and apparently unwelcome political tilt toward the SADR, 
Colonel Maaouiya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya staged a palace coup 
in December 1984. Proclaiming itself reformist, the Taya govern- 
ment was as anxious to institute the forms of democracy as it was 
to deflect responsibility for its inability to implement necessary eco- 
nomic and political changes and to defuse ethnic conflict. Taya 
pledged to hold elections for municipal offices in thirteen cities 
(which he did in December 1987), free political prisoners, uphold 
civil rights, and end corruption. A second round of elections, this 
time for approximately 500 town councillors (conseillers) across the 
country, took place in December 1987 and January 1988. As im- 
portant as the elections were to Mauritanians, they did little to 
reduce the ethnic tensions interfering with development (see Political 
Culture, ch. 4). 

In the late 1980s, Mauritania had six major ethnic groups: 
Maure, Toucouleur, Fulbe, Soninke, Wolof, and Bambara. The 
Maures included the white Arab-Berber descendants of the origi- 
nal Maghribi immigrants and blacks called harratin (sing. , hartani — 
see Glossary), former slaves of white Maures who had assimilated 
Maure culture. The other ethnic groups consisted of black Afri- 
cans, who lived in the south along the Senegal River or in cities. 
Given the large number of black Maures, the significant cultural 
distinction in Mauritania was not white versus black but rather 
Maure (white and black) versus black. But even black Africans had 
divergent responses, often class linked, to Maure hegemony. 

The relative size of each group was in dispute both because cen- 
sus data were deficient and because the Maure-dominated govern- 
ment, to preserve its prerogatives, pretended to eschew ethnic 
labeling. According to Mauritanian government figures, however, 
Maures constituted 70 percent of the population, while blacks were 
said to be overrepresented in the bureaucracy and schooling. Others 
reported that blacks formed at least half the population but were 
intentionally undercounted and were underrepresented in high-level 
positions in the government. In any case, Maures openly discrimi- 
nated against the black population, which, well into the twentieth 
century, was considered a source of slaves. 



xxn 



The most outspoken and resentful opponents of the Maure- 
dominated government were the Toucouleur. They constituted the 
leadership of the African Liberation Forces of Mauritania (Forces 
de Liberation Africaine de Mauritanie — FLAM), an outlawed anti- 
government organization based in Dakar, Senegal. In September 
and October 1986, the government arrested between thirty and 
forty suspected FLAM members, including thirteen prominent 
Toucouleur who were charged with sowing ' 'hatred and confusion' ' 
and thereby "undermining the values and foundations of . . . so- 
ciety." Partly to protest those arrests as well as continued Maure 
domination of the government, a group of Toucouleur, some of 
whom had high-ranking positions in the military, reportedly plot- 
ted to overthrow the Taya government in October 1987. In all, 
51 persons were brought to trial for the plot, although FLAM 
claimed that the government detained more than 1,000 people. 
Three of the defendants, all army lieutenants, were found guilty 
of attempting to overthrow the government and were executed on 
December 3, 1987. Subsequently, students in Nouakchott report- 
edly demonstrated to protest government racism, and violent clashes 
between supporters and foes of the government occurred in the cap- 
ital and in Kaedi and Bogue. 

A more immediate cause of the disturbances concerned land- 
ownership along the Senegal River. By permitting the government 
to cede otherwise fallow land to those committed to improving it, 
the 1983 Land Reform Act seemingly accorded Maures preference 
in acquiring irrigated land (see Political Power in the Mid-1980s, 
ch. 4). Most blacks, and especially the Toucouleur, believed that 
wealthy Maures from Nouakchott or Nouadhibou would appropri- 
ate land along the river, displacing blacks whose families had lived 
in the area for generations. Complicating the issue was the fact 
that some wealthy black landowners living near the river supported 
the government's attempts to assemble large tracts of land for 
capital-intensive farming, even if the reforms dispossessed less for- 
tunate blacks. 

In the late 1980s, as other sectors of the economy stagnated or 
faded, irrigated agricultural land became extremely valuable. World 
prices for iron ore, long Mauritania's principal export, remained 
low. Fishing, which by 1983 had supplanted iron ore as the chief 
foreign exchange earner, appeared to be tapering off following years 
of overfishing by foreign fleets. Finally, as the worst effects of the 
drought attenuated, the government targeted agriculture for de- 
velopment. With encouragement and support from the World Bank 
(see Glossary) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF — see 
Glossary), the government raised producer prices by 40 percent 



xxiii 



and then expanded irrigation and flood control programs to bring 
more marginal land into production. 

To finance its domestic investment, Mauritania relied on for- 
eign assistance, which between 1980 and 1985 amounted to ap- 
proximately US$170 per capita. Mauritania's principal benefactors 
included wealthy Arab states, France, and Japan. By 1985 Maurita- 
nia's foreign debt amounted to US$1 .8 billion, or nearly 250 per- 
cent of its gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary), making 
Mauritania one of the most deeply indebted nations in the world 
(see Balance of Payments, Debt, and Foreign Assistance, ch. 3). 

One of the reasons for its dependence on foreign funding was 
the size of the military budget. As in many other Third World coun- 
tries experiencing domestic turmoil, the military absorbed a dis- 
proportionate share of the budget — 25 percent in 1985. Military 
spending distorted the economy by diverting funds from econom- 
ic development. At the same time, however, the military provided 
personnel with technical and administrative expertise that could 
be transferred elsewhere within the government. The military also 
participated in road building, public health campaigns, and dis- 
aster relief. Meanwhile, the hope that the armed forces might foster 
a sense of national unity transcending ethnic peculiarities proved 
illusory because most of the officers were Maure, whereas most 
recruits were black. The attempted coup in October 1987 aggra- 
vated that disparity; in its aftermath, approximately 500 noncom- 
missioned officers, most of whom were blacks, were dismissed from 
the army (see The Armed Forces, ch. 5). 

Mauritania in the late 1980s held little promise for its citizens. 
By 1987 desertification, perhaps Mauritania's greatest enemy, had 
claimed over 90 percent of the land that had been arable at indepen- 
dence. Competition for increasingly scarce resources — which might 
include land, education, or slots in the bureaucracy — intensified, 
pitting Mauritania's non-Maure blacks against Maures. In spite 
of its reformist intentions, the Taya regime perforce relied increas- 
ingly on coercion to maintain order. Only the prospect for a 
negotiated settlement between Algeria and Morocco in the Western 
Sahara afforded even the possibility of positive economic change. 
The redeployment of Moroccan troops from positions just north 
of Mauritania's border with the Western Sahara and the removal 
of SADR refugee camps from Tindouf in extreme western Algeria 
would allow Mauritania to reduce the size and cost of its military, 
thereby freeing additional funds for economic development. The 
savings would probably be slight, however, and the net effect unim- 
portant. Only an end to desertification, over which Mauritania had 



xxiv 



little control, would allow resources to expand to meet the needs 
of all Mauritanians, both Maures and blacks. 

November 16, 1988 

* * * 

In early April 1989, a minor border dispute involving Senega- 
lese farmers and Mauritanian herders escalated by the end of the 
month into the slaughter in Nouakchott and Dakar of hundreds 
of citizens. The rioting in Senegal, in which hundreds of small 
neighborhood shops belonging to Mauritanian retailers were also 
looted, followed a period of inflation, rising unemployment, and 
strikes, all of which aggravated discontent. The violence in Maurita- 
nia appeared to be one more chapter in the longstanding conflict 
between Maures and black Africans, many of whom farmed in the 
valuable irrigated lands along the Senegal River. To quell the vio- 
lence, several countries, including France and Morocco, arranged 
an airlift to repatriate nationals from the two countries back across 
their respective borders. 

Subsequently, Mauritania repatriated or expelled as many as 
100,000 people, many of whom had been born in Mauritania and 
had never lived in Senegal; Senegal repatriated a similar number 
that also included Maures, mainly the small shopkeepers, who had 
never lived in Mauritania. The elimination of the Mauritanian 
retailers was expected to exacerbate economic hardship among 
poorer Senegalese. Among those leaving Mauritania were perhaps, 
5,000 or more farmers and herders, all nominally Senegalese, who 
had been living for generations on the flood plain on the Maurita- 
nian side of the river (which, according to a French colonial docu- 
ment dating from 1933, belonged to Senegal). According to reports, 
their villages were burned and their assets confiscated. Presum- 
ably their lands will be appropriated by Maures. Observers specu- 
lated that the government of Mauritania — or elements within the 
government — were taking advantage of the situation to expel blacks, 
Toucouleur in particular, in order to obtain valuable agricultural 
land and at the same time eliminate the clamor of those seeking 
equal rights for blacks. It was all the more ironic that the govern- 
ment used harratin to carry out operations against the southern 
blacks. 



August 30, 1989 Robert E. Handloff 



XXV 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 




Architectural detail of an old mosque at Tichit 



THE SAHARA HAS LINKED rather than divided the peoples 
who inhabit it and has served as an avenue for migration and con- 
quest. Mauritania, lying next to the Atlantic coast at the western 
edge of the desert, received and assimilated into its complex soci- 
ety many waves of these migrants and conquerors. Berbers moved 
south to Mauritania beginning in the third century A.D. , followed 
by Arabs in the eighth century, subjugating and assimilating 
Mauritania's original inhabitants. From the eighth through the 
fifteenth century, black kingdoms of the western Sudan, such as 
Ghana, Mali, and Songhai, brought their political culture from 
the south. 

The divisive tendencies of the various groups within Maurita- 
nian society have always worked against the development of 
Mauritanian unity. Both the Sanhadja Confederation, at its height 
from the eighth to the tenth century, and the Almoravid Empire, 
from the eleventh to the twelfth century, were weakened by inter- 
necine warfare, and both succumbed to further invasions from the 
Ghana Empire and the Almohad Empire, respectively. 

The one external influence that tended to unify the country was 
Islam. The Islamization of Mauritania was a gradual process that 
spanned more than 500 years. Beginning slowly through contacts 
with Berber and Arab merchants engaged in the important caravan 
trades and rapidly advancing through the Almoravid conquests, 
Islamization did not take firm hold until the arrival of Yemeni Arabs 
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and was not complete until 
several centuries later. Gradual Islamization was accompanied by 
a process of arabization as well, during which the Berber masters 
of Mauritania lost power and became vassals of their Arab con- 
querors. 

From the fifteenth to the nineteenth century, European contact 
with Mauritania was dominated by the trade for gum arabic (see 
Glossary). Rivalries among European powers enabled the Arab- 
Berber population, the Maures (Moors), to maintain their indepen- 
dence and later to exact annual payments from France, whose 
sovereignty over the Senegal River and the Mauritanian coast was 
recognized by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Although penetra- 
tion beyond the coast and the Senegal River began in earnest under 
Louis Faidherbe, governor of Senegal in the mid- 1800s, European 
conquest or "pacification" of the entire country did not begin until 
1900. Because extensive European contact began so late in the 



3 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

country's history, the traditional social structure carried over into 
modern times with little change. 

The history of French colonial policy in Mauritania is closely 
tied to that of the other French possessions in West Africa, partic- 
ularly to that of Senegal, on which Mauritania was economically, 
politically, and administratively dependent until independence. The 
French policy of assimilation and direct rule, however, was never 
applied with any vigor in Mauritania, where a system that cor- 
responded more to Britain's colonial policies of association and in- 
direct rule developed. Colonial administrators relied extensively 
on Islamic religious leaders and the traditional warrior groups to 
maintain their rule and carry out their policies. Moreover, little 
attempt was made to develop the country's economy. 

After World War II, Mauritania, along with the rest of French 
West Africa, was involved in a series of reforms of the French colo- 
nial system, culminating in independence in 1960. These reforms 
were part of a trend away from the official policies of assimilation 
and direct rule in favor of administrative decentralization and in- 
ternal autonomy. Although the nationalistic fervor sweeping French 
West Africa at this time was largely absent in Mauritania, con- 
tinuous politicking (averaging one election every eighteen months 
between 1946 and 1958) provided training for political leaders and 
awakened a political consciousness among the populace. Neverthe- 
less, when Mauritania declared its independence in 1960, its level 
of political as well as economic development was, at best, em- 
bryonic. 

Mauritania's postindependence history has been dominated by 
regional politics. Morocco and Algeria, vying for regional domi- 
nance, have continually influenced Mauritanian politics and for- 
tunes. During the first nine years of independence, the regime of 
Moktar Ould Daddah was preoccupied with expansionist designs 
by Morocco, whose military strength constituted a perpetual threat 
to Mauritania's territorial integrity. This threat was intensified by 
the support of some of Mauritania's Maure population for unifi- 
cation with Morocco. In 1969, when Morocco finally recognized 
Mauritania's independence, the Daddah regime responded by 
breaking many of its extensive economic and military ties to France 
and establishing closer relations with Arab states, including both 
Morocco and Algeria. 

By 1975 Mauritania had entered the military conflict over the 
fate of the Western Sahara (see Glossary). Among the inhabitants 
of this former Spanish territory are the Sahrawis, a group that shares 
ethnic ties with some of Mauritania's Maure population. The war 
in the Western Sahara has become a struggle by the Sahrawi 



4 



Historical Setting 



liberation group, the Polisario (see Glossary), for national self- 
determination. Regionally, however, the war was and continued 
in 1987 to be a power struggle between Algeria, which supported 
the front militarily, and Morocco, which occupied the territory. 
Mauritania's participation in the war began with its claim to and 
occupation of a southern province in the Western Sahara, an 
action designed to prevent Morocco from occupying the en- 
tire territory. At the same time, the Daddah regime hoped to 
befriend Morocco by cooperating in the occupation of the Western 
Sahara. 

Politically, from independence until the overthrow of the Dad- 
dah regime in 1978, the leadership concentrated on consolidating 
the power of the ruling Mauritanian People's Party and moving 
toward a one-party state. The regime also sought to eliminate the 
friction that resulted from political and social differences between 
the Maure and black components of the population, which could 
impede the attainment of national unity. Economically, the Western 
Sahara war, which coincided with a period of severe drought, dealt 
a near-fatal blow to Mauritania's development and forced the coun- 
try to increasingly depend on foreign aid, mostly from conserva- 
tive Arab countries. 

The inability of the Daddah regime to extricate Mauritania from 
its economic problems and the war led to a military coup d'etat 
in July 1978. During the next six years, the country was ruled by 
military regimes whose efforts to remain outside the Western Sahara 
conflict were impeded by the continuing war between Morocco and 
the Polisario, which spilled over into Mauritania's northern regions. 
The most durable of the military regimes during that period was 
led by Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla, who assumed power in 
May 1979. It survived as long as it did because Haidalla skillfully 
balanced the factions in his government, which included nation- 
alists, adherents of the Western Sahara liberation cause, and propo- 
nents of close ties with Morocco. Toward the end of his regime, 
however, Haidalla began to arrogate authority at the expense of 
the other members of the ruling body, the Military Committee for 
National Salvation. Some of these decisions concerned highly 
charged political issues, such as the recognition of the Polisario 's 
governing arm, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. The rul- 
ing committee also accused Haidalla of corruption and nepotism 
and decided finally, in December 1984, to depose him. This act 
reflected Mauritania's delicate and vulnerable regional position and 
the necessity for its leaders to maintain a neutral position toward 
the Western Sahara. 



5 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

Early History 

The early history of the west Saharan (see Glossary) region is 
largely unknown. There are some written accounts by medieval 
Arab traders and explorers who reached the important caravan trad- 
ing centers and Sudanic kingdoms of eastern Mauritania, but the 
major sources of pre-European history are oral history, legends, 
and archaeological evidence. These sources indicate that during 
the millennia preceding the Christian Era, the Sahara was a more 
habitable region than it is today and supported a flourishing cul- 
ture. In the area that is now Mauritania, the Bafour, a proto-Berber 
people, whose descendants may be the coastal Imraguen fisher- 
men, were hunters, pastoralists, and fishermen. Valley cultivators, 
who may have been black ancestors of the riverine Toucouleur and 
Wolof peoples, lived alongside the Bafour. Climatic changes, and 
perhaps overgrazing and overcultivation as well, led to a gradual 
desiccation of the Sahara and the southward movement of these 
peoples. 

In the third and fourth centuries A.D., this southward migra- 
tion was intensified by the arrival of Berber groups from the north 
who were searching for pasturage or fleeing political anarchy and 
war. The wide-ranging activities of these turbulent Berber war- 
riors were made possible by the introduction of the camel to the 
Sahara in this period. This first wave of Berber invaders subjugated 
and made vassals of those Bafour who did not flee south. Other 
Berber groups followed in the seventh and eighth centuries, them- 
selves fleeing in large numbers before the Arab conquerors of the 
Maghrib (see Glossary). 

Sanhadja Confederation 

One of the Berber groups arriving in Mauritania in the eighth 
century was the Lemtuna. By the ninth century, the Lemtuna had 
attained political dominance in the Adrar and Hodh regions. 
Together with two other important Berber groups, the Messufa 
and the Djodala, they set up the Sanhadja Confederation. From 
their capital, Aoudaghast, the Lemtuna controlled this loose con- 
federation and the western routes of the Saharan caravan trade that 
had begun to flourish after the introduction of the camel. At its 
height, from the eighth to the end of the tenth century, the Sanhadja 
Confederation was a decentralized polity based on two distinct 
groups: the nomadic and very independent Berber groups, who 
maintained their traditional religions, and the Muslim, urban 
Berber merchants, who conducted the caravan trade. 

Although dominated by the Sanhadja merchants, the caravan 
trade had its northern terminus in the Maghribi commercial city 



6 



Historical Setting 

of Sijilmasa and its southern terminus in Koumbi Saleh, capital 
of the Ghana Empire. Later, the southern trade route ended in 
Timbuktu, capital of the Mali Empire. Gold, ivory, and slaves were 
carried north in return for salt (ancient salt mines near Kediet Ij ill 
in northern Mauritania are still being worked), copper, cloth, and 
other luxury goods. 

Important towns developed along the trade routes. The easiest, 
though not the shortest, routes between Ghana and Sijilmasa were 
from Koumbi Saleh through Aoudaghast, Oualata, Tichit, and 
Ouadane. These towns along the route grew to be important com- 
mercial as well as political centers. The eleventh-century Arab 
chronicler, Al Bakri, describes Aoudaghast, with its population of 
5,000 to 6,000, as a big town with a large mosque and several 
smaller ones, surrounded by large cultivated areas under irriga- 
tion. Oualata was a major relay point on the gold and salt trade 
route, as well as a chief assembly point for pilgrims traveling to 
Mecca. Koumbi Saleh was a large cosmopolitan city comprising 
two distinct sections: the Muslim quarter, with its Arab-influenced 
architecture, and the black quarter of traditional thatch and mud 
architecture, where the non-Muslim king of Ghana resided. Another 
important Mauritanian trade city of the Sanhadja Confederation 
was Chinguetti, later an important religious center. Although 
Koumbi Saleh did not outlive the fall of the Ghana Empire, 
Aoudaghast and particularly Oualata maintained their importance 
well into the sixteenth century, when trade began shifting to the 
European-controlled coasts. 

Almoravids 

By the eleventh century, Islam had spread throughout the west 
Sahara under the influence of Berber and Arab traders and occa- 
sional Arab migrants. Nevertheless, traditional religious practices 
thrived. The conquest of the entire west Saharan region by the 
Almoravids in the eleventh century made possible a more ortho- 
dox Islamization of all the peoples of Mauritania. 

The breakup of the Sanhadja Confederation in the early eleventh 
century led to a period of unrest and warfare among the Sanhadja 
Berber groups of Mauritania. In about 1039, a chief of the Djodala, 
Yahya ibn Ibrahim, returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca bring- 
ing with him a Sanhadja theologian, Abdallah ibn Yassin, to teach 
a more orthodox Islam. Rejected by the Djodala two years later, 
after the death of Ibn Ibrahim, Ibn Yassin and some of his San- 
hadja followers retired to a secluded place where they built a forti- 
fied religious center, a ribat, which attracted many Sanhadja. In 
1042 the murabitun (men of the ribat), as Ibn Yassin' s followers 



7 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

came to be called, launched a jihad, or holy war, against the non 
believers and the heretics among the Sanhadja, beginning what 
later become known as the Almoravid movement. The initial aim 
of the Almoravids was to establish a political community in which 
the ethical and juridical principles of Islam would be strictiy applied. 

First, the Almoravids attacked and subdued the Djodala, forcing 
them to submit to Islam. Then, rallying the other Berber groups 
of the west Sahara, the Almoravids succeeded in recreating the po- 
litical unity of the Sanhadja Confederation and adding to it a reli- 
gious unity and purpose. By 1054 the Almoravids had captured 
Sijilmasa in the Maghrib and had retaken Aoudaghast from Ghana. 

With the death of Ibn Yassin in 1059, leadership of the move- 
ment in the south passed to Abu Bakr ibn Unas, amir (see Glos- 
sary) of Adrar, and to Yusuf ibn Tashfin in the north. Under Ibn 
Tashfm, the Berbers captured Morocco and founded Marrakech as 
their capital in 1062. By 1082 all of the western Maghrib (to at least 
present-day Algiers) was under Almoravid domination (see fig. 2). 
In 1086 the Andalusian amirates, under attack from the Spanish 
Christian king Alfonso and the Christian reconquest of Spain, called 
on Ibn Tashfin and his Berber warriors to cross the Strait of Gibraltar 
and come to their rescue. The Almoravids defeated the Spanish 
Christians and, by 1090, imposed Almoravid rule and the Maliki 
(see Glossary) school of Islamic law in Muslim Spain. 

In Mauritania, Abu Bakr led the Almoravids in a war against 
Ghana (1062-76), culminating in the capture in 1076 of Koumbi 
Saleh. This event marked the end of the dominance of the Ghana 
Empire. But after the death of Abu Bakr in 1087 and Ibn Tashfin 
in 1 106, traditional rivalries among the Sanhadja and a new Mus- 
lim reformist conquest led by the Zenata Almohads (1 133-63) des- 
troyed the Almoravid Empire. 

For a short time, the Mauritanian Sanhadja dynasty of the 
Almoravid Empire controlled a vast territory stretching from Spain 
to Senegal. The unity established between Morocco and Maurita- 
nia during the Almoravid period continued to have some political 
importance in the 1980s, as it formed part of the basis for Moroc- 
co's claims to Mauritania. But the greatest contribution of the San- 
hadja and the Almoravids was the Islamization of the western 
Maghrib. This process would remain a dominant factor in the his- 
tory of the area for the next several centuries. 

Sudanic Empires and Kingdoms 

Although the Almoravids had substantial contacts with the 
Maghrib, influences from the black Sudanic kingdoms of Ghana, 
Mali, and Songhai played an important role in Mauritania's 



8 



Historical Setting 



history for about 700 years — from the eighth to the fifteenth cen- 
tury. Ghana, the first of the great West African Sudanic kingdoms, 
included in its territory all of southeastern Mauritania extending 
to Tagant. Ghana reached its apogee in the ninth and tenth cen- 
turies with the extension of its rule over the Sanhadja Berbers. This 
large and centralized kingdom controlled the southern terminus 
of the trans- Saharan trade in gold, ivory, and salt. 

The capture of Koumbi Saleh in 1076 by the Almoravids marked 
the end of Ghana's hegemony, although the kingdom continued 
to exist for another 125 years. The Mande, under the leadership 
of the legendary Sundiata, founded the second great Sudanic king- 
dom, Mali. By the end of the thirteenth century, the Mali Empire 
extended over that part of Mauritania previously controlled by 
Ghana, as well as over the remaining Sahelian (see Glossary) regions 
and the Senegal River Valley. Sundiata and his successors took 
over Ghana's role in the Saharan trade and in the administration 
and collection of tribute from vast stretches of the Sudan and the 
Sahel. 

The slow decline of the Mali Empire that started at the end of 
the fourteenth century came about through internal discord and 
revolts by the inhabitants of vassal states, including the Songhai 
of Gao. By the end of the fifteenth century, the Songhai Empire 
had replaced the Mali Empire and extended to Mauritania and 
the upper Senegal River Valley. At the end of the sixteenth cen- 
tury, a large Moroccan force defeated the Songhai, bringing to an 
end the seven centuries of domination of the western Sudan (and 
a large part of Mauritania) by strong, centralized black kingdoms. 

Arab Invasions 

Beginning with the Arab conquest of the western Maghrib in 
the eighth century, Mauritania experienced a slow but constant 
infiltration of Arabs and Arab influence from the north. The grow- 
ing Arab presence pressed the Berbers, who chose not to mix with 
other groups, to move farther south into Mauritania, forcing out 
the black inhabitants. By the sixteenth century, most blacks had 
been pushed to the Senegal River. Those remaining in the north 
became slaves cultivating the oases (see Black Africans, ch. 2). 

After the decline of the Almoravid Empire, a long process of 
arabization began in Mauritania, one that until then had been re- 
sisted successfully by the Berbers. Several groups of Yemeni Arabs 
who had been devastating the north of Africa turned south to 
Mauritania. Settling in northern Mauritania, they disrupted the 
caravan trade, causing routes to shift east, which in turn led to 
the gradual decline of Mauritania's trading towns. One particular 

9 



Mauritania: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from Charles Toupet (ed.), Atlas de la Republique Islamique de 
Mauritanie, Paris, 1977, 29. 



Figure 2. Almoravid and Sudanic Empires, Eleventh to Seventeenth Centuries 



10 



Historical Setting 



Yemeni group, the Bani Hassan, continued to migrate southward 
until, by the end of the seventeenth century, they dominated the 
entire country. The last effort of the Berbers to shake off the Arab 
yoke was the Mauritanian Thirty Years' War (1644-74), or Sharr 
Bubba, led by Nasir ad Din, a Lemtuna imam (see Glossary). This 
Sanhadja war of liberation was, however, unsuccessful; the Berbers 
were forced to abandon the sword and became vassals to the war- 
rior Arab groups. 

Thus, the contemporary social structure of Mauritania can be 
dated from 1674. The warrior groups or Arabs dominated the 
Berber groups, who turned to clericalism (see Glossary) to regain 
a degree of ascendancy. At the bottom of the social structure were 
the slaves, subservient to both warriors and Islamic holy men. All 
of these groups, whose language was Hassaniya Arabic, became 
known as Maures. The bitter rivalries and resentments characteris- 
tic of their social structure were later fully exploited by the French. 

Early European Contacts 

Despite the Almoravid domination of Spain in the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries, there seems to be little evidence of contact dur- 
ing that time between Mauritania and Europe. The inhospitable 
coastline of Mauritania continued to deter voyagers until the Por- 
tuguese began their African explorations in the fifteenth century. 
Lured by legends of vast wealth in interior kingdoms, the Por- 
tuguese established a trading fort at Arguin, southeast of Cap Blanc 
(present-day Ras Nouadhibou), in 1455. The king of Portugal also 
maintained a commercial agent at Ouadane in the Adrar in an 
attempt to divert gold traveling north by caravan. Having only 
slight success in their quest for gold, the Portuguese quickly adapted 
to dealing in slaves. In the mid-fifteenth century, as many as 1 ,000 
slaves per year were exported from Arguin to Europe and to the 
Portuguese sugar plantations on the island of Sao Tome in the Gulf 
of Guinea. 

With the merger of the Portuguese and Spanish crowns in 1580, 
the Spaniards became the dominant influence along the coast. In 
1638, however, they were replaced by the Dutch, who were the 
first to begin exploiting the gum arabic trade. Produced by the aca- 
cia trees of Trarza and Brakna and used in textile pattern print- 
ing, this gum arabic was considered superior to that previously 
obtained in Arabia. By 1678 the French had driven out the Dutch 
and established a permanent setdement at Saint Louis at the mouth 
of the Senegal River, where the French Company of the Senegal 
River (Compagnie Francaise du Senegal) had been trading for more 
than fifty years. 



11 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

The Maures, with whom the Europeans were trading, considered 
the constant rivalries between European powers a sign of weakness, 
and they quickly learned the benefits of playing one power against 
the other. For example, they agreed simultaneously to give monop- 
olies to the French and the Dutch. The Maures also took advan- 
tage of the Europeans whenever possible, so that when the French 
negotiated with the amir of Trarza to secure a monopoly on the 
gum arabic trade, the amir in exchange demanded a considerable 
number of gifts. Thus began the coutume, an annual payment ex- 
pected by the Maures for doing business with a government or a 
company. By 1763 the British had expelled France from the West 
African coast, and France recovered control only when the Con- 
gress of Vienna in 1815 recognized French sovereignty over the coast 
of West Africa from Cap Blanc south to Senegal. 

French Colonial Administration 

Before the nineteenth century, the European powers in West 
Africa were interested only in coastal trading; they attempted no 
important inland exploration and established no permanent set- 
tlements (except Saint Louis). The European mercantile compa- 
nies on the coast were charged with making the highest possible 
profit. Four such French companies enjoyed an official French- 
government monopoly of the Senegal River trade from 1659 to 
1798. Contact with the Maures and the black inhabitants of the 
valley came about only in the course of trade. From the beginning, 
French influence, competing with traditional trading partners north 
and east of Mauritania, came through Senegal. 

In 1825 the new amir of Trarza, Muhammad al Habib, sought 
to reassert his sovereignty over the French-protected Oualo King- 
dom to the south of the Senegal River by marrying the heiress to 
the kingdom. This action, which French authorities viewed as a 
hostile threat, combined with the amir's efforts to sell gum arabic 
to the British, brought a strong French reaction. Although the 
Maures were able to lay siege to Saint Louis, a large French ex- 
peditionary force defeated the amir's forces. The French concluded 
that to secure the continuing profitability of the gum arabic trade, 
they would have to forcibly occupy the northern bank of the Sene- 
gal River. 

Implementing this new policy was Louis Faidherbe, the French 
governor of Senegal from 1854 to 1861 and from 1863 to 1865. 
In 1840 a French ordinance had established Senegal as a perma- 
nent French possession with a government whose jurisdiction ex- 
tended over all settlements then effectively under French control, 
including those in Mauritania. By undertaking the governance of 



12 



Ancient mosque 
in Chinguetti 
Courtesy Mary Pecaut 




these Mauritanian settlements, French rulers directly challenged 
Maure claims of sovereignty. Under orders from the new govern- 
ment of Louis Napoleon to end the coutume, to secure the gum arabic 
trade, and to protect the sedentary populations of the southern bank 
from Maure raids, Faidherbe conquered the Oualo Kingdom. He 
then turned his attention to the amirates of Trarza and Brakna 
that had united against him. The Maures attacked Saint Louis in 
1855 and almost succeeded in reclaiming the settlement, but they 
were repulsed and defeated a year later, north of the Senegal River. 
The treaties ending the war extended a French protectorate over 
Trarza and Brakna, replaced the coutume with a 3 percent annual 
rebate on the value of gum arabic delivered, and recognized French 
sovereignty over the northern bank of the Senegal River. 

In addition to his military ventures, Faidherbe sponsored an 
active program to undertake geographic studies and establish 
political and commercial ties. In 1859 and 1860, Faidherbe spon- 
sored five expeditions, including one that mapped the Adrar, to 
all areas of western and southern Mauritania. 

Faidherbe' s successors were content to maintain his gains and 
did not embark on further military ventures. French colonial policy 
at this time can best be characterized by the warning given by the 
Colonial Ministry to the governor of Senegal in the late 1870s, ''Let 
us not hear from you. ' ' With France's virtual abandonment of Sene- 
gal, the relative calm created in the Chemama (see Glossary) and 



13 



Mauritania: A Country Study 



southern Mauritania through Faidherbe's efforts came to an end. 
The Maures resumed their traditional practices of internecine 
warfare and pillaging villages in the Chemama. In virtual control 
of the colonial administration, the commercial companies of Saint 
Louis sold arms to the Maures, while at the same time outfitting 
French punitive missions. Scientific expeditions into Mauritania 
became increasingly subject to attack, and their European leaders 
were killed or held for ransom. The obvious weakness of the French 
and their distraction with events elsewhere in the region embold- 
ened the amirs to demand and secure the reinstatement of the 
coutume. 

At the beginning of the twentieth century, after 250 years of 
French presence in Mauritania, the situation was little changed. 
The endemic warfare between different Maure groups may even 
have increased as French merchants made arms readily available 
and colonial forces defended camps north of the Senegal River 
against Maure pillagers. Though formally under the "protection" 
of the French, the Maures were as fiercely independent as ever. 

Pacification 

In 1901 the French government adopted a plan of "peaceful 
penetration" for the administrative organization of areas then under 
Maure suzerainty. The plan's author was Xavier Coppolani, a Cor- 
sican brought up in Algeria, who was sent to Mauritania as a 
delegate from the French government. Coppolani set up a policy 
not only to divide, weaken, and pacify the Maures but also to pro- 
tect them. Although he served in Mauritania for only four years 
(1901-05), the French called Coppolani the father of the French 
colony of Mauritania, and the Maures knew him as the "Pacific 
Conqueror" of the territory. 

During this period, there were three marabouts (see Glossary) 
of great influence in Mauritania: Shaykh Sidiya Baba, whose 
authority was strongest in Trarza, Brakna, and Tagant; Shaykh 
Saad Bu, whose importance extended to Tagant and Senegal; and 
Shaykh Ma al Aynin, who exerted leadership in Adrar and the 
north, as well as in Spanish Sahara and southern Morocco. By en- 
listing the support of Shaykh Sidiya and Shaykh Saad against the 
depredations of the warrior clans and in favor of a Pax Gallica, 
Coppolani was able to exploit the fundamental conflicts in Maure 
society. His task was made difficult by opposition from the adminis- 
tration in Senegal, which saw no value in the wastelands north of 
the Senegal River, and by the Saint Louis commercial companies, 
to whom pacification meant the end of the lucrative arms trade. 
Nevertheless, by 1904 Coppolani had peacefully subdued Trarza, 



14 



Historical Setting 



Brakna, and Tagant and had established French military posts 
across the central region of southern Mauritania. 

As Faidherbe had suggested fifty years earlier, the key to the 
pacification of Mauritania lay in the Adrar. There, Shaykh Ma 
al Aynin had begun a campaign to counteract the influence of his 
two rivals — the southern marabouts, Shaykh Sidiya and Shaykh 
Saad — and to stop the advance of the French. Because Shaykh Ma 
al Aynin enjoyed military as well as moral support from Morocco, 
the policy of peaceful pacification gave way to active conquest. In 
return for support, Shaykh Ma al Aynin recognized the Moroc- 
can sultan's claims to sovereignty over Mauritania, which formed 
the basis for much of Morocco's claim to Mauritania in the late 
twentieth century. In May 1905, before the French column could 
set out for Adrar, Coppolani was killed in Tidjikdja. 

With the death of Coppolani, the tide turned in favor of Shaykh 
Ma al Aynin, who was able to rally many of the Maures with 
promises of Moroccan help. The French government hesitated for 
three years while Shaykh Ma al Aynin urged a jihad to drive the 
French back across the Senegal. In 1908 a Colonel Gouraud, who 
had defeated a resistance movement in the French Sudan (present- 
day Mali), took command of French forces as the government com- 
missioner of the new Civil Territory of Mauritania (created in 
1904), captured Atar, and received the submission of all the Adrar 
peoples the following year. By 1912 all resistance in Adrar and 
southern Mauritania had been put down. As a result of the con- 
quest of Adrar, the fighting ability of the French was established, 
and the ascendancy of the French-supported marabouts over the 
warrior clans within Maure society was assured. 

The fighting took a large toll on the animal herds of the nomadic 
Maures, who sought to replenish their herds in the traditional 
manner — by raiding other camps. From 1912 to 1934, French secu- 
rity forces repeatedly thwarted such raids. The last raid of the par- 
ticularly troublesome and far-ranging northern nomads, the 
Reguibat, occurred in 1934, covered a distance of 6,000 kilometers, 
and netted 800 head of cattle, 270 camels, and 10 slaves. Yet, ex- 
cept for minor raids and occasional attacks — Port-Etienne (present- 
day Nouadhibou) was attacked in 1924 and 1927 — the Maures 
generally acquiesced to French authority. With pacification, the 
French acquired responsibility for governing the vast territory of 
Mauritania. 

French Colonial Policy 

From the time of the French Revolution in 1789, the two main 
characteristics of French colonial policy in West Africa were the 



15 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

quest for international prestige and the cultural assimilation of in- 
digenous populations. France's efforts to build a colonial empire 
may be considered a reaction to British imperial successes: colo- 
nies were a necessary burden the French took on to maintain their 
international stature. These efforts were always subordinate to the 
considerations of continental politics. As a result, litde attention 
was paid to the political, social, and economic development of the 
overseas territories. 

The policy of assimilation had its origins in the French Revolu- 
tion, when the Convention in 1794 declared that all people living 
in the colonies were French citizens and enjoyed all republican 
rights. Under Napoleon and the Consulate (1799-1804), the law 
was soon repealed. In 1848, at the outset of the Second Republic, 
citizenship rights were again extended, and representation in the 
National Assembly was provided for the four communes of Sene- 
gal (Saint Louis, Dakar, Rufisque, and Goree). Although these 
rights were retained by the Senegalese, they did not apply to 
Mauritania or other French territories in West Africa. Elsewhere 
in West Africa, although assimilation was the theoretical basis of 
administration, a policy evolved that shared elements of British 
colonial practice. For example, Africans were subjects of France, 
not citizens, and had no political rights or rights of representation. 
The centralized and direct administration embodied in the doc- 
trine of assimilation was maintained, however, and a functional 
collaboration between French rulers and an assimilated indigenous 
elite developed. Although by World War II colonial policy was still 
labeled assimilationist, only a very few Africans were assimilated. 
For the majority of Africans, the realities of French colonial policy 
were far from the spirit of French egalitarianism. 

French Administration Through World War II 

Mauritania, a long-time appendage of Senegal, was not consi- 
dered worth the expense necessary to pacify and develop it until 
Coppolani succeeded in changing the attitude of the French govern- 
ment. In 1904 France recognized Mauritania as an entity separate 
from Senegal and organized it as a French protectorate under a 
delegate general in Saint Louis. With the success of the first pacifi- 
cation attempts, the status of Mauritania was upgraded to that of 
a civil territory administered by a commissioner of government (first 
Coppolani, later Gouraud). Although formally separate from 
French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Francaise — AOF), which 
had been created in 1895, Mauritania was closely tied to its ad- 
ministrative structure and had its annual budget appended to that 
of the AOF. On December 4, 1920, by a decree of the Colonial 



16 



Historical Setting 



Ministry in Paris, Mauritania was officially included in the AOF 
with the six other French West African territories — Senegal, the 
French Sudan, Guinea, Ivory Coast (present-day Cote d'lvoire), 
Dahomey (present-day Benin), and Niger. 

The AOF was organized pyramidally under a centralized fed- 
eral structure in Dakar. Directly appointed by the president of the 
French Republic, the governor general of the AOF came to have 
a great deal of power because of the instability and short duration 
of Third Republic governments in Paris. The governor general was 
the head of a centralized administrative bureaucracy consisting of 
a lieutenant governor for each territory, the commandant of a cercle 
(a colonial administrative subdivision), and chiefs of subdivisions, 
cantons, and villages. The key figure in the system was the com- 
mandant in each cercle, who was almost always a European and 
who was closest to the indigenous population in his duties of col- 
lecting taxes, overseeing works projects, maintaining peace and 
security, and carrying out administrative decrees. Generally, the 
subdivisions subordinate to the commandant were manned by Afri- 
cans. For these positions, the French relied to a great extent on 
the traditional hierarchy of chiefs or their sons. In keeping with 
their policy of direct, centralized rule, the French made it clear 
that these African chiefs exercised authority not by virtue of their 
traditional position but by virtue of their status as modern colo- 
nial administrators. 

Before 1946 no legislative bodies existed in the AOF. The gover- 
nor general was assisted by the Grand Council in Dakar, Senegal, 
which since 1925 had represented the federation's major interest 
groups (military personnel, civil servants, and businessmen). But 
the council had only consultative status, and its members were all 
appointed by the governor general. Similar administrative coun- 
cils advised the lieutenant governors in all of the territories except 
Mauritania and Niger. 

Mauritania's administrative structure conformed generally with 
that of the rest of the AOF territories. There were, however, some 
very important differences. Unlike the other territories (with the 
possible exception of Niger), most of the cercles still had military 
commandants because of the late date of the territory's pacifica- 
tion. The resultant conflicts between military and civilian authorities 
caused frequent administrative changes and reorganizations, in- 
cluding shifts in boundaries that tended to create confusion. 

The importance of the role of the traditional Maure chiefs in 
the administration was the most significant difference between 
Mauritania and the other AOF territories and has probably had 
the greatest continuing impact. The extent to which administrative 



17 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

practice in Mauritania contradicted the French policy of direct rule 
and resembled British indirect rule is noteworthy. From the time 
of Coppolani, the administration had relied heavily on the 
marabouts for support and administration. In recognition of the 
support given by Shaykh Sidiya of Trarza, the French placed the 
school of Islamic studies at Boutilimit under his control. Tradi- 
tional administrators of Islamic justice, the qadis, were put on the 
French payroll without supervision, and administrative appoint- 
ments of chiefs were subject to the approval of the traditional jamaa 
(see Glossary). 

In an effort to maintain order throughout the turbulent territory, 
the French co-opted the leaders of certain warrior groups to serve 
the administration. Notable among these were the amirs of Trar- 
za, Brakna, and Adrar, the three most powerful men in the colony, 
who were aided by 50 heads of smaller groups and the more than 
800 chiefs of factions and subfactions. Although there was exten- 
sive French interference in the operations of the traditional authori- 
ties, the traditional social structure of Mauritania was maintained 
and thrust into the modern world. 

With the outbreak of World War II in 1939, France's African 
territories were called upon to supply troops and provisions for the 
war effort. After France fell in 1940, Vichy gained control of the 
AOF and replaced the official policy of assimilation with a policy 
of racial discrimination in shops, trains, and hotels. Existing 
democratic institutions were repressed, and the administrative coun- 
cils were abolished. Elements of French colonial policy, such as 
the indigenat (see Glossary) and forced labor, were abused. The 
chiefs, on whom the Vichy government in Dakar relied, were in- 
creasingly seen as collaborators by their people as war-related de- 
mands for agricultural production and forced labor besieged them. 
Sporadic resistance to these abuses was met with summary 
punishment. 

In recognition of the suffering of the people of the AOF territo- 
ries during the war and of the AOF's contribution to the war ef- 
fort of the Free French (at one time more than half the Free French 
forces were Africans), Free French officials convened a conference 
in Brazzaville, Congo, in June 1944 to propose postwar reforms 
of the colonial administration. The conference favored greater ad- 
ministrative freedom in each colony, combined with the main- 
tenance of unity through a federal constitution. It also recommended 
the abolition of the indigenat and forced labor, the establishment 
of trade unions, the rapid extension of education, and the grant- 
ing of universal suffrage. The conference was firmly opposed, 
however, to any concept of evolution outside the French bloc and 



18 



Historical Setting 



called for the full application of the assimilationist doctrine. The 
Brazzaville Conference was the beginning of great political and so- 
cial change that was to sweep Mauritania and other French Afri- 
can states to independence in less than seventeen years. 

Postwar Reforms 

Only slightly developed and long neglected, Mauritania played 
no role in the rising nationalism in the AOF after World War II. 
The 1946 constitution of the French Fourth Republic established 
the former colonies of the AOF as overseas territories of France 
integrally tied to the French Union. The French administration 
in Saint Louis retained jurisdiction in criminal law, public free- 
doms, and political and administrative organization; the Colonial 
Ministry could still rule by decree, if the decree did not violate a 
statute. The indigenat and forced labor were abolished, and French 
citizenship was extended to all inhabitants of French territories will- 
ing to renounce their local legal status. 

Elective representation existed on three levels: territorial, fed- 
eration (AOF), and national (French). A General Council (renamed 
Territorial Assembly in 1952) was established in each territory with 
extensive controls over the budget, but with only consultative powers 
over all other issues. The Mauritanian General Council comprised 
twenty-four members, eight elected by Europeans and sixteen 
elected by Mauritanians. Each territory had five representatives, 
elected from its General Council, on the AOF's Grand Council 
in Dakar, Senegal, which had general authority over budgeting, 
politics, administration, planning, and other matters for all of the 
AOF. Each territory also sent representatives to the National 
Assembly, the Council of the Republic, and the Assembly of the 
French Union in Paris. 

The franchise created by the 1946 French constitution was small 
and restricted to government officials, wage earners, veterans, 
owners of registered property, and members or former members 
of local associations, cooperatives, or trade unions. Consequently, 
in the Mauritanian elections of 1946, there were fewer than 10,000 
qualified voters. In 1947 individuals literate in French and Arabic 
were added to the electorate, and in 1951 heads of households and 
mothers of two children were made eligible. By 1956 suffrage had 
become universal. 

Before 1946 the territory of Mauritania formed one electoral unit 
with Senegal, which was represented by a single senator in the 
French Senate. The 1946 constitution, however, separated Maurita- 
nia from Senegal politically, giving it a deputy to the French 
National Assembly. At the same time, the bicameral General 



19 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

Council, which was reorganized into the unicameral Territorial 
Assembly in 1952, was established in Mauritania. Nonetheless, 
political activity in Mauritania was minimal. The territory's first 
party, the Mauritanian Entente, was headed by Horma Ould 
Babana, who served as the first Mauritanian deputy to the French 
National Assembly. 

The Mauritanian Entente was founded in 1946 under the auspices 
of Leopold Senghor and Lamine Gueye of the Senegalese section 
of the French Socialist Party. Formed specifically for the 1946 elec- 
tion, the Mauritanian Entente was neither well organized nor mass 
based. Yet on a platform calling for movement toward independence 
and elimination of chiefdoms, Babana easily defeated the candidate 
of the conservative French administration and the leading clerics. 
The new deputy, however, spent most of his five-year term in Paris, 
out of contact with politics in Mauritania. As a result, on his return 
for the 1951 elections, Babana was defeated by the Mauritanian 
Progressive Union, led by Sidi el Moktar N'Diaye and supported 
by the colonial administration and its allies, the traditional Maure 
secular and clerical ruling classes, who feared the Mauritanian En- 
tente's "socialist" program. In the 1952 election for members of 
the Territorial Assembly, the Mauritanian Progressive Union won 
twenty- two of the twenty-four seats. 

The reforms of 1956, or Loi-Cadre (see Glossary), were even 
more sweeping than those of 1946. In the face of growing nation- 
alism and the development of a political consciousness in the AOF, 
the Loi-Cadre ended the integrationist phase of French colonial 
policy and bestowed a considerable degree of internal autonomy 
on the overseas territories. Universal suffrage and the elimination 
of the dual college electoral system led to the creation of district 
and local representative councils and a great enlargement of the 
powers of the territorial assemblies. Each territory could now for- 
mulate its own domestic policies, although the territories continued 
to rely on France for decisions concerning foreign affairs, defense, 
higher education, and economic aid. 

The most important provision of the 1956 Loi-Cadre was the 
establishment of a council of government to assume the major execu- 
tive functions of each territory that until that time had been car- 
ried out by a Paris-appointed colonial official. The councils were 
composed of three to six ministers elected by the territorial assem- 
blies on the advice of the dominant party. Each minister was 
charged with overseeing a functional department of government. 
The head of the ministers became vice president of the council and, 
in effect, if not in title, prime minister. In Mauritania that person 
was Moktar Ould Daddah, the country's only lawyer and a member 
of a prominent pro-French clerical family. 



20 



Moktar Ould Daddah, 
Mauritania 's first 
head of state 



The Road to Independence and the Quest for National Unity 

Mauritania's first government was invested in May 1957 and 
symbolically chose as its new capital Nouakchott, which by design 
was situated almost exacdy between the Senegal River Valley, popu- 
lated primarily by black farmers, and the Maure stronghold in 
Adrar. The choice represented a compromise between these two 
competing areas. It also set the tone for Daddah 's approach to 
Mauritania's political conflicts: compromise and conciliation for 
the sake of national unity. 

The greatest challenge to national unity was Mauritania's hetero- 
geneous population. As in all the Sahelian states, Mauritania's 
southern regions were inhabited mainly by peasants who belonged 
racially and culturally to black Africa, while the population of its 
northern regions were desert nomads who identified with the Arab 
world. At independence, Mauritania's estimated 1.5 to 1.8 mil- 
lion people could be divided into three groups: one-third of the 
inhabitants were both racially and ethnically Maures; another third, 
although racially black or mixed Maure-black, were ethnically 
Maures (this group of black Maures was essentially a slave class 
until 1980, when slavery was abolished); and the remaining third 
were racially and ethnically black, resembling in many respects the 
populations in neighboring Senegal and Mali (see Ethnic Groups 
and Languages, ch. 2). 



21 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

Achievement of national unity was impeded by the desires of 
some Maures, mostly from the northern sections of the country, 
to unite with Morocco, and the countervailing wishes of many blacks 
to secede from Mauritania and join the Mali Federation. The defeat 
of the Mauritanian Entente and Babana by the Mauritanian 
Progressive Union in the elections of 1951 and 1956, which estab- 
lished the Mauritanian Progressive Union's dominance, led Babana 
and several of his followers in the summer of 1956 to flee to 
Morocco, where Babana became head of the National Council of 
Mauritanian Resistance. With the support of many Maures in- 
side Mauritania, this group supported Morocco's claims to Maurita- 
nia and, by extension, Morocco's opposition to Mauritanian 
independence. 

To counterbalance the pro-Moroccan sympathies of many 
Maures, southern minority groups formed a regional party, the 
Gorgol Democratic Bloc, committed to the prevention of a Maghribi 
union and to the maintenance of close ties with black African coun- 
tries. Intellectuals from various black minorities met in Dakar, Sene- 
gal, in 1957 and created the Union of the Inhabitants of the River 
Valley to fight for minority rights against Maure domination. 

Further impeding national unity was the inclusion of French offi- 
cials in the key ministries of finance and economic planning. Dad- 
dah was educated in France and, having just returned to Mauritania 
to form the government, had not been involved in the rivalries and 
struggle for power. His consequent congeniality toward the French 
alienated the Association of Mauritanian Youth, an important 
group that advocated total independence and strict anticolonialism. 

In this atmosphere of increasing fragmentation and political in- 
stability, Daddah, with the strong support of France, called for unity 
among all factions. At the Congress of Aleg in May 1958, the 
Mauritanian Regroupment Party was formed in a merger of the 
Mauritanian Progressive Union, elements of the Mauritanian 
Entente that had expelled Babana, and the Gorgol Democratic Bloc. 
This party was headed by Daddah as secretary general and Sidi 
el Moktar as president. Its platform called for Mauritania to join 
the French Community (francophone Africa) and to reject both 
Morocco's claim to Mauritania and a 1957 French proposal to unite 
Mauritania with francophone Saharan states in the joint French- 
dominated Common Saharan States Organization. The platform 
also proposed the systematic organization within the country of local 
party committees to involve all sectors of the population in the party. 
The party's program reflected the three main themes of Maurita- 
nian unity: the rejection of federation with Mali or Morocco under 
any terms, the principle of balance between Maures and blacks 



22 



Historical Setting 



within the party and government, and the preeminence of Dad- 
dah as the only person capable of holding the country together. 

The Mauritarian Regroupment Party represented a union of 
modern and traditional elements as well as a balance between north 
and south. The dominance of traditional elements favoring close 
ties with France led, however, to the end of unity. Progressive youth 
leaders, excluded from decision making at the party congress con- 
vened at Nouakchott in July 1958, defected and formed a new op- 
position party, the Mauritanian National Renaissance Party 
(Nahda) with Ahmed Baba Ould Ahmed Miske as secretary gen- 
eral. The Nahda platform called for total and immediate indepen- 
dence from France and a rapprochement with Morocco. Although 
the program was designed to rally diverse opposition to the tradi- 
tional Mauritanian Regroupment Party, the call for rapprochement 
with Morocco caused Nahda' s opponents to label it a Maure party, 
which cost it the support of the black minorities. But former 
Mauritanian Entente members, including Babana, supported 
Nahda. Its anticolonial nationalist platform also attracted many 
young Maures. 

Independence and Civilian Rule 

The political crisis in France that saw the birth of the French 
Fifth Republic in 1958 necessitated a new French constitution. Also 
adopted by the people of Mauritania in a referendum in Septem- 
ber 1958, this new constitution provided for a French Commu- 
nity whose members would be autonomous republics. But status 
as an autonomous member of the French Community quickly lost 
its appeal as Mauritania witnessed the wave of nationalism sweeping 
the African continent. As soon as the Islamic Republic of Maurita- 
nia was proclaimed in October 1958, the Territorial Assembly 
changed its name to the Constituent Assembly and immediately 
initiated work to draft a national constitution; the document was 
unanimously adopted by the Constituent Assembly in March 1959 
in place of the French constitution, and on November 28, 1960, 
Mauritania declared its independence. 

The molding of a new political entity was a challenge in a coun- 
try in which the gradual breakdown of a well-entrenched tribal 
hierarchy and its authority was still under way. Also, Mauritania's 
predominantly nomadic society did not lend itself to the establish- 
ment of administrative agencies; consequently, numerous politi- 
cal parties formed around those leaders who already exercised tribal 
authority. Most of the population, who observed democratic 
nomadic traditions — in which influence did not always pass direcdy 
from father to son, land was not owned by individuals, and material 



23 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

wealth was widely distributed rather than concentrated in a few 
hands — eventually accepted a centralized government. 

With the advent of independence, party leaders recognized the 
need to consolidate to ensure the establishment of a strong and inde- 
pendent government that also represented Mauritania's regional 
and ethnic diversity. Consequently, there was a tendency on the 
part of some to try to put aside their differences. Daddah was able 
gradually to gain the support of numerous opposition parties be- 
cause of his demonstrated willingness to include in his government 
those who previously had opposed him. Thus, even after Daddah 
charged Nahda with corruption, banned the party from participa- 
tion in the elections to Mauritania's first National Assembly in May 
1959, declared the party illegal, and placed five of its leaders under 
arrest, Nahda still responded to Daddah 's urgent appeal to preserve 
unity and independence. 

In a new election, held in accordance with provisions of the new 
constitution in August 1961, Nahda campaigned for Daddah, who 
won the election with the additional support of the black party, 
the Mauritanian National Union. The new government formed 
in September 1961 included representatives of both Nahda and the 
Mauritanian National Union in important ministries. This elec- 
toral, then governmental, coalition was formalized in October 1961 
with the consolidation of the Mauritanian Regroupment Party, 
Nahda, the Mauritanian National Union, and the Mauritanian 
Muslim Socialist Union into the Mauritanian People's Party (Parti 
du Peuple Mauritanienne — PPM). On December 25, 1961, the 
PPM was constituted as the sole legal party. Its policies included 
a foreign policy of nonalignment and opposition to ties with France. 

In accordance with the new government's objective of acquir- 
ing support from blacks, Daddah included two blacks in his cabi- 
net. Also, the National Assembly, headed by a black, comprised 
ten blacks and twenty Maures. As a final development in the emer- 
gence of a dominant single party, Daddah, the party's secretary 
general, further concentrated power in his hands. The PPM pro- 
claimed Mauritania a one-party state in 1964, and the National 
Assembly passed a constitutional amendment in 1965 that institu- 
tionalized the PPM as the single legal party in the state. Organized 
opposition was henceforth restricted to channels within the party. 

Emerging Tensions 

Tight control of political life by the PPM reinforced the highly 
centralized system. The imposition of single-party rule over a highly 
diverse population caused underlying tensions to emerge, especially 
among the southern black population, who feared Arab domination. 



24 




Chinese-built sports stadium in Nouakchott 
Courtesy Derwood Staeben 

Their fears were exacerbated by the 1966 decision to make the study 
of Hassaniya Arabic compulsory in secondary schools and the de- 
cision in 1968 to make Hassaniya Arabic, as well as French, an 
official language. Differences over linguistic and racial issues sub- 
sequently caused strikes and demonstrations by students and trade 
unionists in 1968, 1969, and 1971; all demonstrations were harshly 
repressed by the government, which in 1966 had banned discus- 
sion of racial problems. Other tensions existed among black Maures, 
who were still considered members of a slave class even though 
slavery had been outlawed under the French and by the Maurita- 
nian Constitution (see Maures, ch. 2). 

Political divisions within the trade union movement also erupted, 
causing the movement to split in 1969 into two factions, one favoring 
integration into the PPM and the other lobbying for an indepen- 
dent form of trade unionism. The PPM, ignoring the latter fac- 
tion, integrated the trade unions in 1972. Their action followed 
a series of strikes in late 1971, including a two-month shutdown 
of the iron mine operated by the Mauritanian Iron Mines Com- 
pany (Societe Anonyme des Mines de Fer de Mauritanie — 
MIFERMA). Soon after the integration of the trade unions, an 
unofficial trade union movement was formed, and in 1973 a clan- 
destine leftist political party, the Mauritanian Kadihine Party (see 
Glossary), was created. Another clandestine group, the Party 



25 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

of Mauritanian Justice, was formed in 1974 and called for more 
political freedom. 

Time of Radicalization 

In 1969 following Morocco's official recognition of Mauritania, 
the government pursued a more radical political agenda to reduce 
its economic dependence on France. The first major step toward 
this aim was taken in 1972, when the government announced that 
it would review the agreements signed with France at independence 
and would sign new, more stringent agreements on cultural, tech- 
nical, and economic cooperation in 1973. New agreements on mili- 
tary and monetary cooperation were pointedly eliminated, and 
Mauritania soon declared its intention of leaving the West Africa 
Monetary Union and its Franc Zone (see Glossary) and introduc- 
ing its own currency, the ouguiya, with the backing of Algeria and 
other Arab countries (see Banking and Government Finances, 
ch. 3). In 1974, MIFERMA, which was controlled by French in- 
terests and provided 80 percent of national exports, was national- 
ized and the name changed to National Mining and Industrial 
Company (Societe Nationale Industrielle et Miniere — SNIM). Also 
in 1974, Mauritania joined the League of Arab States (Arab 
League). Finally, during the August 1975 congress of the PPM, 
Daddah presented a charter calling for an Islamic, national, cen- 
tralist, and socialist democracy. The charter was so popular that 
both the Mauritanian Kadihine Party and the Party of Maurita- 
nian Justice withdrew their opposition to the Daddah government. 

In the early 1970s, the Daddah government made some progress 
toward achieving national unity and economic independence. These 
gains, however, were more than offset by the economic hardship 
caused by a Sahelian drought that lasted from 1969 to 1974. Thou- 
sands of nomads migrated to shanty towns outside the cities, in- 
creasing urban population from 8 percent of the total to 25 percent 
between 1962 and 1975 (see Changing Social Patterns, ch. 2). But 
other problems forced Mauritania's leaders to shift their focus from 
internal to external events: the decolonization of the neighboring 
Western Sahara at the end of 1975; the subsequent occupation of 
that former Spanish territory by Morocco and Mauritania; and 
the liberation struggle of the indigenous people of the Western 
Sahara, which embroiled Mauritania in a long and costly war. 

Conflict in the Western Sahara 

Until the late nineteenth century, the Western Sahara, a land 
inhabited by the nomadic Sahrawi people, had remained largely 
free of any central authority. But when competing European 



26 



Historical Setting 



colonial powers embarked on their division of Africa, Spain claimed 
the Western Sahara. Spain historically had had an interest in the 
territory, primarily because it lay near the Spanish-owned Canary 
Islands. In 1884 Spain occupied the Western Sahara and remained 
until 1976 (see fig. 3). 

For the first fifty years after the occupation, intermittent Sahrawi 
resistance to Spanish rule in what was then called the Spanish 
Sahara effectively forced the Spanish occupiers to limit their 
presence to several coastal enclaves. It was not until the 1950s, 
following the discovery of vast phosphate deposits at Bu Craa, that 
Sahrawi nationalism developed. For the first time, the Spanish 
Sahara appeared valuable to the indigenous population as well as 
to the governments of Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania. The 
discovery of the deposits also renewed the historic rivalry between 
Algeria and Morocco, both of which encouraged Sahrawi aggres- 
sion against the Spanish occupiers. In 1973 a number of in- 
digenous Spanish Sahara groups formed an organization called 
the Polisario, the purpose of which was to secure independence 
from Spain. 

By the mid-1970s, the government of Spain appeared willing 
to relinquish the territory, which was becoming more costly to ad- 
minister. In addition, the sudden collapse of Portugal's empire in 
Africa and the ensuing liberation of Mozambique and Angola had 
strengthened the determination of the Polisario to shake off Span- 
ish colonial rule, and attacks on Spanish settlements and forts had 
become more intense. Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria also 
orchestrated international opposition in the United Nations to con- 
tinued Spanish occupation. The Spanish government finally ter- 
minated its claim to the Spanish Sahara in February 1976 and 
bequeathed the territory — renamed the Western Sahara — jointly 
to Morocco and Mauritania, both of which consented to allow Spain 
to exploit the Bu Craa phosphates. Spain excluded Algeria from 
the withdrawal agreement, largely because Algeria intended to pre- 
vent Spain from exploiting the Bu Craa deposits, a decision which 
contributed considerably to the growing discord in an already trou- 
bled area. 

Background to Mauritanian Policy 

The Moroccan Factor 

Mauritania's role in the Western Sahara conflict was heavily in- 
fluenced by perceived and real threats of Moroccan expansionism. 
In the 1950s, Morocco advanced its concept of Greater Morocco, 
which included all Mauritanian territory, based on an historic (if 
currently moribund) allegiance to the Moroccan sultan as a political 



27 



Mauritania: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from Alasdair Drysdale and Gerald H. Blake, The Middle 
East and North Africa, New York, 1985. 

Figure 3. Territorial Claims in Northwest Africa, 1987 

and religious leader. To make matters worse, most of the Arab 
League states, the Soviet Union, several progressive African states, 
and groups within Mauritania, as well, supported that position. 
For example, Mauritanian Entente leader Babana had claimed that 
a union with Morocco would protect the rights of the Maures from 
encroachments by the black population. 

Even after Morocco finally had recognized Mauritanian indepen- 
dence in 1969— nine years after it had been granted by France — 
and had withdrawn its claim to Mauritanian territory, the Dad- 
dah government remained suspicious of Moroccan intentions. Thus, 
Mauritania favored using the Western Sahara as a buffer between 
it and Morocco, either by controlling all or part of the Western 
Sahara or by creating an independent state. 



28 



Historical Setting 



Internal Factors 

From independence until the mid-1970s, Mauritania's policy on 
the Western Sahara vacillated as the government sought to balance 
its own interests against those of a more powerful Morocco. Until 
1974 the Daddah government supported self-determination for the 
Western Sahara, to be exercised by means of a referendum, un- 
der the assumption that the Sahrawis would choose to join with 
Mauritania. This assumption was reasonable: there were close eth- 
nic ties between the Sahrawis and the Maures; a large number of 
Sahrawi nomads had migrated into Mauritania; and many Maures 
were living in the Western Sahara. During the period from 1974 
to 1975, however, after Morocco had made clear its intention of 
occupying the Western Sahara, Mauritania pursued policies fraught 
with contradictions. To please the international community, on 
which Mauritania depended for economic aid, Daddah continued 
to support a policy of self-determination for the Sahrawi popula- 
tion. But to please the dominant Maures of Mauritania, the govern- 
ment reintroduced the concept of Greater Mauritania (see 
Glossary), asserting the country's rights over all of the Western 
Sahara. A third policy, acknowledging the reality of Moroccan 
power, called for a partition of the Western Sahara, which led 
Mauritania into a long and costly guerrilla war with the Polisario. 

The Mauritanian campaign to annex Tiris al Gharbiyya (the 
southern province of the Western Sahara) did not have much sup- 
port within Mauritania. Some Mauritanians favored instead the 
full integration of the Western Sahara, while others, who identi- 
fied themselves as Sahrawi refugees, supported independence. 
Adamantly opposing absorption was Mauritania's southern black 
population, which viewed the resultant increase in the number of 
Maures as a threat. To the blacks, the Western Sahara conflict was 
an Arab war. 

Madrid Agreements 

In early 1975, both Morocco and Mauritania agreed to abide 
by the decision of the International Court of Justice on the status 
of the Spanish Sahara, but when the court ruled in October 1975 
that neither country was entitled to claim sovereignty over the ter- 
ritory, both governments chose to ignore the decision. In Novem- 
ber 1975, they concluded the Madrid Agreements with Spain under 
which Morocco acquired the northern two- thirds of the territory, 
while Mauritania acquired the southern third. The agreement also 
included the proviso that Spain would retain shares in the Bu Craa 
mining enterprise. Mauritania acquiesced to the agreements under 



29 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

the assumption, probably correct, that Morocco, with its superior 
military power, would otherwise have absorbed the entire territory. 

Fighting the Desert War 

In 1976, when Mauritanian troops occupied the Western Sahara 
province of Tiris al Gharbiyya, as per terms of the Madrid Agree- 
ments, they were immediately challenged in fierce fighting with 
Polisario guerrillas. The fighting would drag on for two years, drain- 
ing an already impoverished economy, provoking ethnic conflict, 
and causing large numbers of casualties. The direct cost of Maurita- 
nia's colonial venture proved exorbitant. Mauritania rapidly in- 
creased its armed forces from only 3,000 at the beginning of 1976 
to about 12,000 at the beginning of 1977; by mid-1978 the Maurita- 
nian armed forces numbered between 15,000 and 17,000. Between 
1975 and 1977, the government's expenditures increased by 64 per- 
cent, most of which was allotted for defense (see Defense Budget 
and the Economy, ch. 5). This military buildup placed a heavy 
burden on the weak economy and diverted funds badly needed for 
development projects. Further alienating the population was a spe- 
cial defense tax, which the government levied against the entire 
population; despite the tax, the country was on the verge of 
bankruptcy by late 1977. Moreover, as the war progressed, the 
power of the Mauritanian military grew, contributing to internal 
disunity and a weak civilian government unable to solve the 
problems of nation building. 

Having more than 6,400 kilometers of undefended borders with 
Mali and Algeria, Mauritania was highly vulnerable to attacks by 
Polisario guerrillas, who were armed and supported by Algeria. 
The government's inability to protect Mauritania's major towns, 
even Nouakchott, which was attacked in June 1976, raised fears 
that Moroccan troops would move into Mauritania, ostensibly to 
interdict the guerrillas but also as an expansionist vanguard. There 
was also fear of a possible plan on the part of Morocco's enemy, 
Algeria, to replace the Daddah government with a puppet regime. 

Involvement of Foreign Countries 

For their part, Polisario strategists sought first to remove Maurita- 
nia from the conflict and then to direct their efforts against the far 
stronger Moroccan forces. In mid- 1977 the Polisario launched a 
general offensive against Mauritania to cripple its economy and 
incite internal opposition to the war, hoping thereby that the govern- 
ment either would withdraw from the conflict or would be over- 
thrown by one more sympathetic to the Polisario cause. In May 
Polisario guerrillas attacked the SNIM operations at Zouirat, killing 



30 



Historical Setting 



two French technicians and capturing another six. The remaining 
expatriates at Zouirat immediately left, and Mauritania promptly 
requested aid from Morocco. In June 1977, Morocco's military 
command merged with Mauritania's in the Supreme Defense 
Council, and 600 Moroccan troops arrived to protect Zouirat. Fol- 
lowing further attacks against the railroad linking the SNIM iron 
ore mines with the port at Nouadhibou, the Mauritanian govern- 
ment reversed an earlier position and requested — and received — 
military aid from France. In December 1977, French aircraft, in 
their first action, attacked Polisario guerrillas returning from raids 
into Mauritania. 

Several wealthy Arab oil-producing states, such as Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi, also provided Mauritania with signifi- 
cant aid to contain the revolutionary fervor advocated by the 
Polisario. Between 1976 and 1978, Saudi Arabia, in particular, 
provided funds amounting to twice Mauritania's annual budget. 

In spite of the military aid it received, Mauritania was not able 
to prevent the Polisario from bombarding Nouakchott for a second 
time, in July 1977. The rocket attack against the capital stunned 
Daddah, who immediately reorganized both the army and the 
government, appointing for the first time a military officer to the 
post of minister of defense. Daddah previously had resisted bring- 
ing the military into his civilian government for fear of a military 
takeover (see Role of the Military in Society, ch. 5). 

By the end of 1977, Daddah faced growing opposition to the war 
and to his administration. In the military, black recruits from the 
south, who had joined the army because they lacked other employ- 
ment opportunities and who formed a majority of the ground troops, 
had little interest in fighting Polisario guerrillas in the north. 
Moreover, black civilians resented having to pay a tax to support 
a war between Arabs. In addition, many Maure soldiers sym- 
pathized with the objectives of the Polisario, with whom they shared 
ethnic ties. Finally, anti-Moroccan nationalists within the PPM 
opposed the war on the grounds that it afforded Morocco oppor- 
tunities to expand its influence. 

Overthrow of the Ould Daddah Regime 

Economic hardship also weighed heavily on the Daddah regime. 
During 1977, defense expenditures increased as international 
demand for iron ore (Mauritania's major source of foreign ex- 
change) fell. Drought conditions that devastated crops and herds 
further strained the economy. Mauritania survived only with the 
help of grants and loans from Saudi Arabia, France, Morocco, and 
Libya. 



31 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

In January 1978, during a special congress of the PPM, Dad- 
dah unsuccessfully tried to seek a path out of the Western Sahara 
war; however, the increasingly isolated leader proved unable to 
undertake any diplomatic or political initiatives. In addition, rela- 
tions between Daddah and senior army officers were strained be- 
cause the president constantly shifted senior officers from posting 
to posting to guard against a possible coup. 

In February 1978, in a desperate move, Daddah appointed 
Colonel Mustapha Ould Salek to be army commander. In the late 
1960s, Daddah had relegated Salek, who was suspected of pro- 
French leanings, to the reserve corps. (Salek had reentered active 
duty only in 1977, when he was made commander of the Third 
Military Region, at Atar, and relations between Daddah and Salek 
were still strained.) On July 10, 1978, the newly appointed army 
commander led a group of junior officers in the bloodless over- 
throw of the eighteen-year-old Daddah government. 

Military Withdrawal from the Western Sahara 

Under Salek, a twenty-man junta calling itself the Military Com- 
mittee for National Recovery (Comite Militaire de Redressement 
National — CMRN) assumed power. The CMRN was a centrist, 
moderate, pro-French and pro-Moroccan regime, whose first man- 
date was to bring peace to Mauritania. The Polisario, which believed 
Mauritania would withdrew from the war if given the opportunity, 
declared a unilateral cease-fire, which the CMRN accepted at once. 

Salek and the CMRN then directed its collective diplomatic 
attention to Morocco, whose troops were still thought necessary 
to protect SNIM operations and thus enable the Mauritanian econ- 
omy to recover. Following Morocco's lead, the CMRN opposed 
the creation of a new, independent state in the Western Sahara, 
although Salek did not rule out the possibility of a federated state 
with limited autonomy. In the meantime, while Polisario guerrillas 
and Moroccan troops continued to fight, the Mauritanian Army 
withdrew from active participation in the war, although the CMRN 
was constrained from signing a peace treaty in order to placate 
Morocco. Within a short time, however, Polisario leaders had be- 
come increasingly impatient with Mauritania's inability to make 
a conclusive commitment to peace, and in April 1979 they de- 
manded the evacuation of Mauritanian troops from Tiris al Ghar- 
biyya as a precondition for further talks. 

Downfall of Ould Salek 

The difficulties facing the Salek government multiplied and soon 
proved to be insurmountable. His regime failed to overcome 



32 




Victims of drought in Mauritania 
Courtesy United Nations (Purcell) 

Morocco's resistance to any settlement of the Western Sahara con- 
flict. The death of Algerian president Houari Boumediene in 
December 1978 further heightened tensions. Also, Senegalese presi- 
dent Leopold Senghor, who was displeased with Salek's ties with 
Morocco, instigated a press campaign that highlighted racial 
problems in Mauritania. Salek did little to ease the racial problem 
when, in March 1979, he named eighty-one Maures and only seven- 
teen blacks to his new national advisory committee. Finally, the 
French government lost confidence in Salek's ability to extricate 
Mauritania from both the Western Sahara war and Moroccan in- 
fluence. Isolated and weak, Salek's government was overthrown 
on April 6, 1979, by Colonel Ahmed Ould Bouceif and Colonel 
Mohamed Khouna Haidalla, who formed the Military Commit- 
tee for National Salvation (Comite Militaire de Salut National — 
CMSN). Salek, however, was permitted to remain in the govern- 
ment as a figurehead president. In late May, Bouceif was killed 
in an airplane crash; Haidalla was designated prime minister, and 
Colonel Mohamed Louly was named president. 

The Haidalla Regime 

Like its predecessor, the CMSN sought first to negotiate peace 
with the Polisario without sacrificing its friendly ties with Morocco 
and France. In its domestic policies, the Maure-dominated CMSN 



33 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

embittered both black and Maure civilians because it refused to 
share power with either group. In addition, the government in- 
sisted on using Arabic exclusively in the secondary schools, provok- 
ing a wave of student protests in April 1979 (see Education, ch. 2). 

In July 1979, its patience exhausted, the Polisario ended its cease- 
fire. Confronted with endless warfare and total economic collapse, 
the CMSN on August 5 signed a peace treaty in Algeria with the 
Polisario, according to which Mauritania renounced all territorial 
and other claims over the Western Sahara. The Polisario, in return, 
renounced all claims regarding Mauritania. Most significant, 
Mauritania recognized the Polisario as the sole legitimate represen- 
tative of the people of the Western Sahara, although in an effort 
to convince Morocco of its neutrality in the conflict, it did not recog- 
nize the Polisario 's governing arm, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic 
Republic (SADR). The CMSN government also agreed to with- 
draw from Tiris al Gharbiyya. However, just a few days after the 
signing of the peace treaty, Morocco occupied Tiris al Gharbiyya, 
rendering the issue moot and threatening the peace. 

Consolidation of Power 

In Mauritania, Haidalla was faced with the daunting task of con- 
solidating power. To his credit, in January 1980 he proclaimed 
Mauritanian neutrality in the Western Sahara conflict and con- 
vinced Morocco to evacuate all its troops from Mauritanian soil. 
From the beginning of his regime, however, Haidalla was viewed 
with hostility by the southern black population; a native of the 
Western Sahara, he was perceived by the blacks as an Arab and 
a northerner. He was also mistrusted by pro-Moroccan political 
groups because he had signed the peace treaty with the Polisario. 
To ensure strict Mauritanian neutrality in the ongoing conflict, 
he reshuffled the top echelons of the government, removing both 
pro-Moroccan and staunchly pro-Polisario factions. He also as- 
sumed the title of president and removed Louly and CMSN vice 
president Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi from office, thereby eliminat- 
ing all serious political competitors. 

Haidalla initiated several important policy changes to broaden 
his base of support. In 1980, to further strengthen his position with 
Mauritania's blacks and to undercut black opposition groups in 
Senegal, he officially abolished slavery. In December 1980, in the 
face of growing apprehension among CMSN members, he formed 
a civilian government, naming Ahmed Ould Bneijara prime 
minister. He also initiated steps to draft a constitution establish- 
ing a multiparty, democratic state. 



34 



Historical Setting 



Among Mauritanians both inside and outside the country, 
however, political opposition to Haidalla grew. In May 1980, fol- 
lowing Haidalla's dismissal of Louly and Sidi, a number of foreign- 
based opposition movements joined together in France to form an 
opposition group called the Alliance for a Democratic Mauritania 
(Alliance pour une Mauritanie Democratique — AMD). The AMD 
wanted to restore civilian rule and introduce a multiparty democracy 
in Mauritania. Its principal political supporter was former Presi- 
dent Daddah, who as a result of French pressure had been released 
from prison in August 1979. Also joining the AMD was former 
Vice President Sidi. The AMD received financial support from 
those Arab states of the Persian Gulf that opposed Haidalla's anti- 
Moroccan leanings — he had moved to eliminate pro-Moroccan 
members of the CMSN — and his support of self-determination for 
the radical SADR. The same Arab states also reduced their aid 
to Mauritania, which only encouraged Haidalla to strengthen ties 
to more radical Arab countries like Libya and Iraq. 

Meanwhile, relations with Morocco continued to deteriorate (see 
Relations with Morocco, ch. 4). Discord between the two coun- 
tries had been mounting since early 1981 , when Morocco accused 
Mauritania of sympathizing with the Polisario and harboring its 
fighters. Morocco was also responsible for rumors suggesting that 
Libya was shipping arms to the guerrillas via a landing strip at 
Chegga in northeastern Mauritania. On March 18, 1981, pro- 
Moroccan members of the AMD led by Sidi and former air force 
commander Mohamed Abdelkader attempted to topple the govern- 
ment. The coup failed, and both were subsequently executed. In 
April, following the attempt, Haidalla and the CMSN decided to 
abandon civilian rule and replaced the fledgling constitutional 
government with a six-member military government headed by 
Colonel Maaouiya Ould Sid Ahmed Ould Taya. 

As Mauritania's relations with Morocco worsened, its ties with 
Algeria improved (see Relations with Other States of the Maghrib, 
ch. 4). Algeria cultivated a friendship with Haidalla and supplied 
him with sophisticated military equipment, ostensibly to deter in- 
vasion from Morocco. In June 1981, in an effort to restore diplo- 
matic relations with Morocco, Haidalla agreed to a summit meeting 
to be arranged and hosted by Saudi Arabia, one of Mauritania's 
largest aid donors. At the summit, Morocco's King Hassan II and 
Haidalla signed an agreement restoring diplomatic relations and 
prohibiting the transit through either country of forces hostile to 
the other. This last provision alluded to both the Polisario and the 
Moroccan branch of the AMD. The reconciliation, however, was 
short lived. On the one hand, Morocco refused to expel AMD 



35 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

members, and on the other hand King Hassan accused Maurita- 
nia of allowing Polisario guerrillas to launch attacks against Morocco 
from Mauritanian base camps. Subsequently, Moroccan aircraft 
bombed the Mauritanian city of Bir Aidiat near the border with 
the Western Sahara, where Polisario guerrillas had taken refuge, 
and threatened further reprisals against Mauritania. 

In February 1982, former CMSN president Salek and former 
Prime Minister Bneijara, among others, tried unsuccessfully to oust 
Haidalla. Having survived a second coup attempt, Haidalla re- 
lied on his forceful personality, self-discipline, and integrity to gain 
the respect of many of his countrymen. The eleven-month period 
between February 1982 and January 1983 gave the regime the op- 
portunity to politicize the population. Haidalla hoped that by es- 
tablishing a working foundation of civilian politics he could abolish 
the military regime and be elected to office as a civilian. Accord- 
ingly, in 1982 the government organized what were labeled Struc- 
tures for Educating the Masses (Structures pour 1' Education des 
Masses — SEM), which acted on a range of public issues through 
elected delegates. Haidalla also pursued his goal of national recon- 
ciliation by releasing some of the political prisoners incarcerated 
since the overthrow of the Daddah regime. 

Domestic peace was shattered briefly in January 1983, first when 
Haidalla discovered a coup plot supported by Libya and, later, when 
a Moroccan gunboat attacked a Mauritanian garrison near La 
Guera, the only Western Sahara territory still occupied by Maurita- 
nia (see fig. 11). Although neither incident caused any casualties 
or serious diplomatic repercussions, the Moroccan attack demon- 
strated Mauritania's continuing vulnerability (see Relations with 
Other States of the Maghrib, ch. 4). Haidalla responded to these 
incidents by strengthening relations with France; the latter had al- 
ready been instrumental in reestablishing communication between 
the Mauritanian and Moroccan governments following their 1981 
break (see Regional Security Concerns, ch. 5). The more signifi- 
cant diplomatic movement, however, saw Haidalla develop warmer 
relations with Algeria and the SADR. During the June 1983 sum- 
mit meeting of the Organization of African Unity in Ethiopia, 
Haidalla joined Senegalese president Abdou Diouf and Ethiopian 
leader Mengistu Haile Mariam in drafting a resolution calling for 
a cease-fire and peace negotiations in the Western Sahara. Morocco 
failed to comply with the resolution by the end of the year, and 
Haidalla recognized the SADR in February 1984. 

The January 1983 Libyan- supported coup plot had soured re- 
lations between Mauritania and Libya; however, Libyan leader 
Muammar al Qadhafi, a strong supporter of the Polisario, took 



36 



Historical Setting 



advantage of Mauritania's break with Morocco and began a new 
campaign to reestablish cordial ties with Haidalla. Haidalla' s warm- 
ing relations with Libya, Algeria, and the Polisario, however, 
alienated the conservative Arab countries on which Mauritania de- 
pended for most of its economic aid and also factions in his own 
government, which favored ties to Morocco, and those who op- 
posed the existence of the SADR. Moreover, Haidalla angered 
many CMSN members by his decision to recognize the SADR 
without consulting them. 

More ominous was Morocco's movement of troops toward 
Mauritania's northern border in the aftermath of Mauritania's 
recognition of the SADR. The presence of thousands of Moroc- 
can soldiers on the Mauritanian border, only four kilometers from 
Mauritania's key economic center at Nouadhibou, again raised the 
possibility of another Moroccan attack on La Guera. In addition, 
Morocco had begun to construct a berm (see Glossary) near the 
Mauritanian border that would restrict Polisario guerrillas to 
Mauritanian territory for their rear bases, thus providing Morocco 
with justification for attacking northern Mauritania. 

Political Disintegration 

By 1984 the Haidalla regime was under siege not only for its 
regional policies but also for corruption and mismanagement, es- 
pecially within the SEMs, which were viewed by the population 
as vehicles for advancing the president's own interests. Further- 
more, upheavals in the military compromised the loyalty of key 
officers, particularly at a time when the army was being asked to 
perform the impossible task of protecting Mauritania's vast northern 
regions from Morocco's attacks across the border. A severe drought 
compounded the regime's difficulties, forcing much of the popu- 
lation into the country's few urban areas and increasing Maurita- 
nia's dependence on foreign economic aid (see Balance of Payments, 
Debt, and Foreign Assistance, ch. 3). 

In the third ministerial purge in six months, Haidalla named 
himself prime minister in March 1984 and took over the defense 
portfolio. Taya, who had held both positions, was demoted to chief 
of staff of the armed forces. The move infuriated Taya's allies on 
the CMSN. As chairman of the CMSN, Haidalla was supposed 
to represent a collective body. Instead, he attempted to amass con- 
siderable personal power and alienated many in the top echelons 
of government. On December 12, 1984, while Haidalla was out 
of the country, Taya, in a quiet and bloodless coup d'etat, became 
Mauritania's president, a position he continued to hold in late 1987. 



37 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

Detailed accounts of Mauritania's early history can be found in 
Alfred G. Gerteiny's Mauritania and Jamil M. Abun-Nasr's^l History 
of the Maghrib. More recent literature, however, especially concern- 
ing post- World War II Mauritania, is more difficult to obtain. The 
best resources available on general postindependence political events 
are Africa South of the Sahara, Colin Legum's Africa Contemporary Record, 
and the periodical Africa Confidential, although the latter does not 
always contain the most accurate data. Two articles of special value 
for their depth of analysis are "The Islamic Republic of Maurita- 
nia" by William Eagleton, Jr., and "One-Partyism in Maurita- 
nia" by Clement H. Moore. 

A wealth of material about the conflict in the Western Sahara, 
including Mauritania's role in it, is available. One of the best 
sources for both those with a limited knowledge of the region and 
those with a more extensive background in North African studies 
is Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff s The Western Saharans. 
In addition, John Damis's Conflict in Northwest Africa provides an 
in-depth analysis of the conflict and the roles of all those involved. 
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



38 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 




Laborer at Oualdta digging slabs of salt, for centuries a valuable commodity 
of West African trade 



MAURITANIA'S NINETEENTH-CENTURY French colo- 
nizers envisioned the country as a geographic and cultural bridge 
linking North Africa and West Africa. In the late 1980s, however, 
Mauritania bore little resemblance to this vision. Instead, it was 
a society undergoing profound transformation, torn between two 
cultural and linguistic traditions. The process of compelling nomads 
to settle that was begun by the colonial government earlier in the 
twentieth century was accelerated by the severe drought that began 
in the mid-1960s. For the next two decades, the rate of urbaniza- 
tion was unprecedented; Mauritania was transformed from a 
nomadic pastoral society to a predominantly urban one. Large 
pastoral populations were forced to leave land that could no longer 
support them. The already-overpopulated cities, almost all of which 
were located in the far south, were unprepared to receive these dis- 
placed populations. 

The drought had begun in the mid-1960s, largely as a result of 
shifting continental rainfall patterns. Of all Sahelian (see Glossary) 
countries, Mauritania was the most vulnerable because about 75 
percent of its land was desert or semidesert under the best con- 
ditions. 

Although partially offset by continuing high infant mortality rates, 
population growth during the 1970s and 1980s exacerbated prob- 
lems of urbanization. Combined with a depressed economy, urbani- 
zation and overpopulation contributed to a generally low standard 
of living. In the 1980s, the government used its meager resources 
to increase investment in education, housing, and health care ser- 
vices, hoping to reduce the effects of widespread poverty. 

In the late 1980s, Mauritania's population continued to be 
divided along ethnic and regional lines. Maures from the north — 
whites and black descendants of former slaves who identified with 
Maure values — made up a traditional elite. The other major group 
was composed of people of black African ancestry, most of whom 
lived in the south and identified with the cultural and social values 
of black Africa. The legacy of Maure domination and enslavement 
of blacks had been blurred by intermarriage and assimilation into 
Maure culture; still, the gap between these two groups remained 
wide, reflecting the weak basis for social cohesion or national con- 
sciousness. Social tensions were evident in frequent clashes over 
state policy, political appointments, and charges of domination, 
all based on deep-seated cultural antipathies. 



41 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

In the late 1980s, ethnic tensions further contributed to an 
unstable social environment. Even the similarities that linked 
Maures with peoples of African descent were relatively superficial. 
Religious unity within Islam, for example, masked wide differences 
in religious observances among Maures and blacks. Government 
officials hoped that the nation's rapid urbanization might increase 
social and cultural interaction and reduce prejudices, but most ad- 
mitted that the task of developing a true national identity and a 
unified society promised to be long and difficult. 

Physical Setting 

Mauritania is generally flat, its 1,030,700 square kilometers form- 
ing vast, arid plains broken by occasional ridges and clifflike out- 
croppings. A series of scarps face southwest, longitudinally bisecting 
these plains in the center of the country. The scarps also separate 
a series of sandstone plateaus, the highest of which is the Adrar 
Plateau, reaching an elevation of 500 meters. Spring-fed oases lie 
at the foot of some of the scarps. Isolated peaks, often rich in min- 
erals, rise above the plateaus; the smaller peaks are called guelbs 
and the larger ones kedias. The concentric Guelb er Richat is a 
prominent feature of the north-central region. Kediet Ijill, near 
the city of Zouirat, has an elevation of 1,000 meters and is the 
highest peak (see fig. 4). 

Approximately three-fourths of Mauritania is desert or semi- 
desert. As a result of extended, severe drought, the desert has been 
expanding since the mid-1960s. The plateaus gradually descend 
toward the northeast to the barren El Djouf, or "Empty Quarter," 
a vast region of large sand dunes that merges into the Sahara Desert. 
To the west, between the ocean and the plateaus, are alternating 
areas of clayey plains (regs) and sand dunes (ergs), some of which 
shift from place to place, gradually moved by high winds. The dunes 
generally increase in size and mobility toward the north. 

The climate is characterized by extremes in temperature and 
by meager and irregular rainfall. Annual temperature variations 
are small, although diurnal variations can be extreme. The har- 
mattan, a hot dry wind, blows from the Sahara throughout most 
of the year and is the prevailing wind, except along the narrow 
coastal strip, which is influenced by oceanic trade winds. Dur- 
ing the short rainy season (hivernage), from July to September, 
average annual precipitation varies from 500 to 600 millimeters 
in the far south to to 100 millimeters in the northern two-thirds 
of the country. Belts of natural vegetation, corresponding to the 
rainfall pattern, extend from east to west and range from traces 
of tropical forest along the Senegal River to brush and savanna 



42 



The Society and Its Environment 



in the southeast. Only sandy desert is found in the center and north 
of the country. 

Major Geographic and Climatic Zones 

Mauritania has four ecological zones: the Saharan Zone, the 
Sahelian Zone, the Senegal River Valley, and the Coastal Zone. 
Although the zones are markedly different from one another, no 
natural features clearly delineate the boundaries between them. 
Sand, varying in color and composition, covers 40 percent of the 
surface of the country, forming dunes that appear in all zones ex- 
cept the Senegal River Valley. Fixed sand dunes are composed of 
coarse, fawn-colored sand, while shifting (''mobile") dunes con- 
sist of fine, dustlike, reddish-colored sands that can be carried by 
the wind. Plateaus generally are covered with heavier blue, gray, 
and black sands that form a crusty surface over layers of soft, loose 
sand. 

Saharan Zone 

The Saharan Zone makes up the northern two-thirds of the coun- 
try. Its southern boundary corresponds to the isohyet (a line on 
the earth's surface along which the rainfall is the same) that 
represents annual precipitation of 150 millimeters. Rain usually 
falls during the hivernage, which lasts from July to September. Often, 
isolated storms drop large amounts of water in short periods of time. 
A year, or even several years, may pass without any rain in some 
locations. 

Diurnal variations in temperature in the Saharan Zone may be 
extreme, although annual variations are minimal. During Decem- 
ber and January, temperatures range from an early morning low 
of 0°C to a midafternoon high of 38°C. During May, June, and 
July, temperatures range from 16°C in the morning to more than 
49 °C by afternoon. Throughout the year, the harmattan often 
causes blinding sandstorms. 

The administrative regions (formerly called cercles) of Tiris Zem- 
mour in the north, Adrar in the center, and northern Hodh ech 
Chargui in the east, which make up most of the Saharan Zone, 
are vast empty stretches of dunes alternating with granite outcrop- 
pings. After a rain, or in the presence of a well, these outcroppings 
may support vegetation. In the populated Adrar and Tagant 
plateaus, springs and wells provide water for pasturage and some 
agriculture. In the western portion of the Saharan Zone, extend- 
ing toward Nouakchott, rows of sand dunes are aligned from north- 
east to southwest in ridges from two to twenty kilometers wide. 
Between these ridges are depressions filled with limestone and clayey 



43 



Mauritania: A Country Study 




Figure 4. Topography and Drainage 

sand capable of supporting vegetation after a rain. Dunes in the 
far north shift with the wind more than those in the south. 

The Saharan Zone has little vegetation. Some mountainous 
areas with a water source support small-leafed and spiny plants 
and scrub grasses suitable for camels. Because seeds of desert 
plants can remain dormant for many years, dunes often sprout 
sparse vegetation after a rain. In depressions between dunes, 
where the water is nearer the surface, some flora — including 
acacias, soapberry trees, capers, and swallowwort — may be 
found. Saline areas have a particular kind of vegetation, mainly 
chenopods, which are adapted to high salt concentrations in the 



44 



The Society and Its Environment 



soil. Cultivation is limited to oases, where date palms are used to 
shade other crops from the sun. 

Sahelian Zone 

The Sahelian Zone extends south of the Saharan Zone to within 
approximately thirty kilometers of the Senegal River. It forms an 
east-west belt with its axis running from Boutilimit through 'Ayoun 
el 'Atrous to Nema, made up of steppes and savanna grasslands. 
Herds of cattle, sheep, and goats move across this zone in search 
of pasturage. 

The hivernage begins earlier in the Sahelian Zone than in the 
Saharan Zone, often lasting from June until October. Because farm- 
ers and herders depend on annual rains, a delay of one month in 
the beginning of the rainy season can cause large losses and lead 
to mass migrations from Hodh ech Chargui and Hodh el Gharbi 
into Mali. Although temperature extremes are narrower than in 
the Saharan Zone, daily variations range from 16°C to 21 °C. The 
harmattan is the prevailing wind. 

In the northern Sahel, dunes are covered with scrub grasses and 
spiny acacia trees. Farther south, greater rainfall permits more dense 
vegetation. Sands begin to give way to clay. Large date palm plan- 
tations are found on the Tagant Plateau, and savanna grasses, 
brushwood, balsam, and spurge cover fixed dunes. Occasional 
baobab trees dot the flat savanna grasslands of the southern Sahel. 
Forest areas contain palm trees and baobabs. Before the droughts, 
vast forests of gum-bearing acacia grew in Trarza and Brakna 
regions. Farther south, particularly in Assaba and the northern por- 
tion of Guidimaka regions, rainfall is high enough to support forms 
of sedentary agriculture. 

Senegal River Valley 

The Senegal River Valley, sometimes known as the Ghemama 
(see Glossary) or the pre-Sahel, is a narrow belt of land that extends 
north of the Senegal River. Before the droughts of the 1960s, 1970s, 
and 1980s, the belt ranged from sixteen to thirty kilometers north 
of the river. By the late 1980s, desertification had reached the north- 
ern bank of the river in some parts of the valley. The valley is wider 
in Guidimaka Region and is completely dominated by the seasonal 
cycle of the river. Almost all of the valley's economically active 
population engages in sedentary agriculture or fishing along the 
Senegal River and its main tributaries — the Karakoro and the 
Gorgol. This area supplies most of the country's agricultural 
production. 



45 



Mauritania: A Country Study 



The climate of the Senegal River Valley contrasts with that of 
the Saharan and Sahelian zones. Rainfall is higher than in other 
regions, ranging from 400 millimeters to 600 millimeters annually, 
usually between May and September. This rainfall, combined with 
annual flooding of the river, provides the basis for agriculture. Tem- 
peratures are cooler and subject to less annual and diurnal varia- 
tion than in other regions. 

The Senegal is the only permanent river between southern 
Morocco and central Senegal. From its source in Guinea, it flows 
north and west 2,500 kilometers, reaching the Atlantic Ocean at 
Saint Louis, Senegal. From its mouth, the river is navigable as 
far as Kayes, Mali, during the rainy season and Podor, Senegal, 
during the rest of the year. Heavy rains, beginning in April in 
Guinea and May and June in Senegal and Mali, bring annual 
floods. These floods cover the entire valley up to a width of twenty- 
five to thirty-five kilometers, filling numerous lakes and sloughs 
(marigots) that empty back into the river during the dry season. 
When the waters recede from the bottomlands, planting begins. 

The Senegal River Valley, with its rich alluvial and clayey soil, 
is comparatively abundant in flora. Moreover, higher rainfall, irri- 
gation, and abundant side channels and sloughs tend to produce 
a lush, near-tropical vegetation, with baobab and gonakie trees and 
abundant rich grasses. Ddounm and barussus palms are also found 
here. Much of the flood plain is cultivated. 

Coastal Zone 

The Coastal Zone, or Sub-Canarian Zone, extends the length 
of the approximately 754-kilometer-long Atlantic coast. Prevail- 
ing oceanic trade winds from the Canary Islands modify the in- 
fluence of the harmattan, producing a humid but temperate climate. 
Rainfall here is minimal; in Nouadhibou it averages less than three 
centimeters annually and occurs between July and September. 
Temperatures are moderate, varying from mean maximums of 
28°C and 32°C for Nouadhibou and Nouakchott, respectively, to 
mean minimums of 16°C and 19°C. 

Battering surf and shifting sand banks characterize the entire 
length of the shoreline. The Ras Nouadhibou (formerly Cap Blanc) 
peninsula, which forms Dakhlet Nouadhibou (formerly Levrier Bay) 
to the east, is fifty kilometers long and up to thirteen kilometers 
wide. The peninsula is administratively divided between Western 
Sahara (see Glossary) and Mauritania, with the Mauritanian port 
and railhead of Nouadhibou located on the eastern shore (see 
fig. 11). Dakhlet Nouadhibou, one of the largest natural harbors 
on the west coast of Africa, is forty-three kilometers long and 



46 



An oasis at the foot of a steep escarpment 
Courtesy Mary Pecaut 

thirty-two kilometers wide at its broadest point. Fifty kilometers 
southeast of Ras Nouadhibou is Arguin. In 1455 the first Portuguese 
installation south of Cape Bojador (in the present-day Western 
Sahara) was established at Arguin. Farther south is the coastline's 
only significant promontory, seven-meter-high Cape Timiris. From 
this cape to the marshy area around the mouth of the Senegal River, 
the coast is regular and marked only by an occasional high dune. 

On coastal dunes, vegetation is rare. At the foot of ridges, 
however, large tamarisk bushes, dwarf acacias, and swallowworts 
may be found. Some high grass, mixed with balsam, spurge, and 
spiny shrubs, grows in the central region. The north has little vege- 
tation. 

Expansion of the Desert 

The climate has altered drastically since the onset of the prolonged 
drought in the 1960s, part of a recurrent pattern of wet and dry 
cycles common to Sahelian Africa. Experts agree, however, that 
overgrazing, deforestation, denuding of ground cover around wells, 
poor farming methods, and overpopulation have aggravated the 
drought. In Mauritania the isohyet indicating annual rainfall of 
150 millimeters — considered the minimum for pastoralism — has 
shifted southward about 100 kilometers to a point well south of 
Nouakchott. During the 1980s, the desert was advancing southward 



47 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

at an estimated rate of six kilometers a year. Each major climatic 
zone had shifted southward, and in some cases near-desert condi- 
tions had reached the banks of the Senegal River. 

By the late 1980s, desertification had fundamentally altered agro- 
pastoral and human settlement patterns (see Population, this ch.). 
Loss of ground cover in the Sahelian Zone had driven animals and 
people southward in search of food and water and had given rise 
to new fields of sand dunes. The advancing dunes threatened to 
engulf wells, villages, and roads; they had even invaded Nouak- 
chott on their march to the sea. The government secured interna- 
tional help to stabilize the dune field around Nouakchott and planted 
250,000 palm trees to create a barrier against the encroaching 
desert. To further combat desiccation, the government constructed 
dams on the Senegal River and its tributaries to increase the amount 
of cultivable acreage (see Farming, ch. 3). 

Population 

Like many developing countries, Mauritania was unable to com- 
pile accurate demographic statistics during its first decades of inde- 
pendence. The official census of December 1976 enumerated over 
1.4 million people, including a nomadic population of about 
513,000. Based on these figures, the 1987 population was estimated 
at 1.8 million, of which about 50.25 percent were females and 49.75 
percent were males. The government estimated annual population 
growth at 1.6 percent during the 1970s, but United Nations (UN) 
estimates placed growth at 2.9 percent between 1975 and 1985. 
The 2.9 percent rate projected Mauritania's population size in the 
year 2000 to be nearly 2.5 million people. This rate of growth, 
although lower than that of many other African countries, was ex- 
pected to rise during the 1990s. 

The crude birth rate for the years 1980 through 1985 was 50.1 
per 1 ,000 population according to UN estimates, an increase over 
the 45.1 per 1,000 ratio observed in 1965. The crude death rate 
declined from 28 per 1,000 population in 1965 to 20.9 per 1,000 
population in 1980. Infant mortality was estimated at 137 deaths 
per 1 ,000 births. Life expectancy was 42.4 years for men and 45.6 
years for women. Infant mortality was higher and life expectancy 
lower than the average for Third World countries in the mid-1980s. 
Like many developing countries, Mauritania's population was 
young: in 1985 an estimated 72 percent was under thirty years of 
age, and 46.4 percent was under fifteen years of age. 

Based on UN estimates, average population density in 1987 was 
1.8 people per square kilometer — by far the lowest level in West 
Africa. The population also was unevenly distributed. The 1976 



48 



Village buried by sand in 1973 
Courtesy UNICEF (Maggie Murray -Lee) 

census showed that 85 percent of all Mauritanians lived south of 
18° north latitude — a line running roughly east from Nouakchott. 
Migration toward the south continued throughout the 1980s. Popu- 
lation density varied from 0.1 per square kilometer in the Saha- 
ran Zone to more than 35 per square kilometer in densely settled 
parts of the Senegal River Valley. 

Mauritania's population underwent dramatic changes as a con- 
sequence of drought and migration during the 1960s and 1970s. 
In the 1960s, pastoral nomads (mostly Maures) and sedentary 
agriculturists (mostly blacks) constituted more than 90 percent of 
the population. At that time, urbanization was at a very low level. 
By the mid-1980s, however, observers estimated that less than 25 
percent of the population was still nomadic or seminomadic, 
whereas the urban population was about 30 percent and the re- 
mainder, sedentary farmers or small town dwellers. Many other 
factors also contributed to this shift in setdement patterns and liveli- 
hood, including long-term efforts by colonial and independent 
governments to settle the nomads and new employment opportu- 
nities associated with mining and export industries. 

These trends, accelerated in the 1980s, fostered rates of urbani- 
zation that the World Bank (see Glossary) placed among the highest 
in Africa. In 1984 observers estimated that at least 30 percent of 
the population (more than 500,000 people) were urban dwellers, 



49 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

not counting temporary residents displaced by drought. In mid- 1985 
the World Bank raised this estimate to 40 percent, following a fur- 
ther two-year period of extreme drought. Counting both resident 
and temporary urban dwellers, some sources in the late 1980s placed 
Mauritania's urban population at or above 80 percent. 

In the mid-1980s, Nouakchott was home to an estimated 400,000 
to 500,000 inhabitants. Nouadhibou's population numbered 50,000 
to 70,000; Zouirat's, about 50,000. Other cities, such as Atar, 
Kaedi, Rosso, and Nema, had doubled or tripled in size between 
1970 and 1985. 

More than any other locale, Nouakchott illustrated the problems 
brought about by rapid and uncontrolled urbanization. Originally 
a small administrative center, it had about 30,000 inhabitants in 
1959 and more than 40,000 by 1970. During the 1970s, the city 
grew at a rate of 15 to 20 percent a year; rapid expansion persisted 
into the mid-1980s. Only about one-tenth of the city's population 
had access to adequate housing and services. Water and housing 
shortages were especially severe. Many of the recent arrivals lived 
in the kebes (shantytowns) that sprang up around the capital. In 
1983 a French researcher calculated that 40 percent or more of 
Nouakchott's population lived in kebes; by 1987 that percentage 
had increased. 

The Mauritanian government sought international assistance to 
cope with the population problem. It also attempted to reverse the 
influx of people to the cities by offering land, seeds, and transport 
to families willing to return to the countryside and resume farm- 
ing. A relocation incentive program was launched in 1985, but be- 
cause of persistent drought its prospects were difficult to gauge. 

Despite massive unemployment, a substantial number of for- 
eigners — as much as 15 percent of the modern sector work force — 
were needed to meet the demand for skilled labor. At the same 
time, at least 600,000 Mauritanians sought work outside their 
homeland, mainly in West Africa, the Middle East, and Western 
Europe. Mauritanian traders, for example, were involved in petty 
commerce in Senegal and Cote d'lvoire and sometimes traded as 
far away as Central Africa. Maures sometimes sought employment 
in the Arab petroleum-producing states, whereas black Maurita- 
nians most often sought work in France. Each year from January 
to July, when there was little need for cultivators and harvesters 
in Mauritania, large numbers of workers (mostly blacks) sought 
jobs in Senegal and Mali. 

Ethnic Groups and Languages 

In 1987 six ethnic groups inhabited Mauritania: one of primar- 
ily Arab-Berber (Maure) descent and the others of black African 



50 



The Society and Its Environment 



descent. In 1978 the government estimated that 70 percent of the 
population was of Arab or Berber descent and 30 percent of black 
African descent. Blacks, however, rejected the government's figures, 
claiming their number was much higher. In any case, the lack of 
reliable demographic data and a long tradition of interracial mar- 
riage had blurred ethnic boundaries and made attempts at ethnic 
identification imprecise. 

The Arab-Berber population encompassed peoples of North Afri- 
can origins, most of whom were nomadic or seminomadic and who 
were unified primarily through the use of various dialects of Has- 
saniya Arabic. Hassaniya is derived from the beduin Arabic spoken 
by the Bani Hassan tribe, which extended its authority over most 
of the Mauritanian Sahara between the fifteenth and seventeenth 
centuries (see Arab Invasions, ch. 1). Hassaniya is not closely related 
to other North African variants of Arabic, probably because the 
Arab invaders of this southwestern portion of the Sahara remained 
relatively isolated from the great Berber tribes of the northern 
Sahara. The primary differences among the numerous dialects of 
Hassaniya are phonetic. 

The remainder of the population in 1987 comprised several 
groups of varied African ancestry. Most were sedentary agricul- 
turists who spoke African languages. Family and kinship groups 
were the predominant social units. As elsewhere in Africa, kinship 
groups were preserved by interaction and social support, shared 
religious observances, and rituals celebrating stages of the life cycle 
of individuals. The sharing of rituals reinforced group solidarity 
and the values the kinship system embodied. 

Traditionally, one of the most common kinship groups through- 
out Mauritania was the lineage, or descent group. Lineage organi- 
zation is based on the belief that relationships traced through males 
differ substantially from those traced through females. The patri- 
lineage, which traces descent through male forebears to a male an- 
cestor, is the most common unit of social organization in Africa; 
matrilineages trace descent through female forebears to one female 
ancestor. Both types of lineages include men and women, some- 
times five or six generations removed from the founding ancestor, 
but the linking relatives are of one gender. 

Lineages generally share responsibility for socializing the young 
and maintaining conformity to social norms. Lineage elders often 
meet to settle disputes, prescribe or enforce rules of etiquette and 
marriage, discuss lineage concerns, and preserve the group itself. 

Lineage ties emphasize the unity of living and deceased relatives 
by descent through ritual observances and ceremonies. At times, 
however, lineages break apart, either because of interpersonal 



51 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

rivalries or because they become too large to maintain close ties. 
When such fission occurs, related lineages usually maintain some 
ties and celebrate some occasions together. If their alliance is im- 
portant enough to be preserved for several generations, the result- 
ing confederation of lineages, usually termed a clan, often includes 
thousands of individuals and may become a powerful interest group 
in the context of a nation. In Mauritania, many aspects of lineage 
behavior and expectation are important, providing lineage mem- 
bers with a sense of history and social responsibility and defining 
the role of the individual in society. 

Maures 

Maures trace their ancestry to Arab-Berber origins, although 
many have intermarried among African populations over the cen- 
turies. Maures occupy scattered areas across West Africa from 
southern Morocco to Gambia and from the Atiantic Ocean to Mali. 
The greatest concentration of this group is in Mauritania, which 
took its name from this dominant segment of its population. 

Maure society's complex social relationships are based on rigid 
hierarchical social and ethnic divisions. Social distinctions reflect 
the interplay of heritage, occupation, and race. Broadly speaking, 
Maures distinguish between free and servile status on the one hand 
and between nobles, tributaries, artisans, and slaves on the other 
hand. Non-Maure populations, termed "black Africans" in this 
context, are not included in this ranking system. 

Two strata, the warriors {hassani) and the religious leaders 
(zawaya), dominate Maure society. The latter are also known as 
marabouts (see Glossary), a term applied by the French. These 
two groups constitute the Maure nobility. They are more Arab than 
Berber and have intermarried little with black African populations. 
Tributary vassals (zenaga) are below the hassani and zawaya in sta- 
tus but nevertheless are considered among the elite. They are 
descendants of Berbers conquered by Arabs, and their Hassaniya 
Arabic dialect shows a greater Berber influence. Although these 
three social strata are termed "white" Maures (bidan), the zenaga 
have intermarried with other groups to a greater degree than have 
the hassani and zawaya. 

Craftsmen and artisans in Maure society are described as mem- 
bers of "castes" because they form closed groups whose members 
tend to intermarry and socialize only among themselves. Bards or 
entertainers, called ighyuwa in Mauritania and griots elsewhere in 
West Africa, are also considered to be members of a caste. At the 
bottom of the social order are the so-called "black" Maures, previ- 
ously the servile stratum within Maure society. 



52 



People on the street in Nouakchott 
Courtesy Larry Barrie 




Mauritania: A Country Study 

Myths of origin are used to reinforce perceptions of social sta- 
tus and justify elements of this elaborate system of stratification. 
Craftsmen and musicians in Maure society are said to be of Semitic 
(Arab) rather than Berber or African ancestry. Imraguen fisher- 
men, a caste group living in the vicinity of Nouadhibou, are thought 
to be descended from the Bafour, the aboriginal black population 
who migrated south ahead of the expanding desert. Small hunting 
groups are considered to be the remnants of an earlier Saharan 
people and may be of Berber origin. 

White Maure Nobility 

In Mauritania the warrior and marabout elites have developed 
a symbiotic relationship. Traditionally, warrior tribes protected the 
unarmed religious leaders, while the marabouts provided politi- 
cal, spiritual, and moral support for the warriors (see Arab Inva- 
sions, ch. 1). Under French rule, most warrior tribes were pacified 
and became cattle herders and traders. Even though the warriors' 
role changed gradually from one of physical protection to one of 
political and economic control, the alliance of traditional warrior 
groups with associated religious tribesmen survived. 

Zenaga 

The zenaga, now the descendants of tributary vassals of the no- 
bility, tend to be ethnically and culturally more Berber than the 
hassani and zawaya. They, too, are divided into warrior and reli- 
gious tribes; but they traditionally were assistants to the nobles, 
often as slaves. The zenaga still work for the nobility, raising their 
livestock and looking after their families. 

Traditionally, the zenaga paid both individual and group tribute 
to their noble patrons. Although the French colonial administra- 
tion banned tribute (coutume), in some areas payment survived as 
late as the 1960s. Individual tribute took the form of military or 
educational services; group tribute was in the form of goods. 

Artisans and Entertainers 

The two most prominent occupational castes in Maure society 
are skilled craftsmen (or artisans) and entertainers (or storytellers). 
Artisans practice blacksmithing and ironworking, jewelrymaking, 
woodworking, tanning and leatherworking, potterymaking, shoe- 
making, weaving, and tailoring. All crafts but weaving and tailor- 
ing are performed by men. Although the hassani, zawaya, and zenaga 
regard artisans as their inferiors, the elite values their products and 
services, and craftsmen are sometimes allowed to live among the 
elite on a nearly equal basis. 



54 



The Society and Its Environment 



Entertainers, poets, and musicians constitute a special group. 
Maure society, like most Islamic societies, places a high value on 
poetry and music. At the same time, some Maures fear poets and 
musicians, to whom they attribute occult knowledge and mystical 
powers that can be physically or politically threatening. Accord- 
ingly, noble families often become the patrons of entertainers; thus, 
the nobles are able to demonstrate their elite status while obtain- 
ing both entertainment and protection. Fishermen, salt miners, and 
nomadic hunters are economically and socially marginal to Maurita- 
nian society and are generally considered outside the caste system. 

Black Maures 

Black Maures distinguish themselves from "black Africans" to 
emphasize their cultural affinities with white Maures and their cul- 
tural distance from sub-Saharan Africa. In most cases, their fore- 
bears were incorporated into Maure society as slaves. Maure society 
continued to accept the institution of slavery even after indepen- 
dence in 1960, but it customarily distinguished among three types 
of servile status: full slaves, part-slaves, and former slaves now freed, 
called harratin (sing., hartani — see Glossary). Conditions of servi- 
tude varied from benevolent to callous and cruel. White Maures 
had full rights over their slaves, including the right to sell or relo- 
cate them. Slaves sometimes earned or were granted their freedom. 

Slavery has been outlawed several times, most recently in 1980 
(see The Haidalla Regime, ch. 1). The term for slave, abd, was 
officially replaced with the term for freedman, hartani, but black 
Maures continued to be considered a slave class. Their status and 
role in Maure society have changed little. Many Maures continued 
to hold slaves and exercise their traditional prerogatives even after 
official decrees outlawed these practices. 

Islamic law requires Muslim slaveholders to free their slaves by 
the fifth generation. Freedmen, however, usually remained in the 
camp of their former master and filled the same servile role. 
Whether as slaves or freedmen, black Maures tended their masters' 
animals, acted as household servants, worked in the palm groves 
or millet fields, or gathered the crop of gum arabic (see Glossary). 

Maure Kinship and Marriage 

The principal Maure kinship group is the patrilineage. Among 
sedentary Maures, the smallest segment of the patrilineage is a 
group of related males who, with their wives, sons, and unmar- 
ried daughters, constitute the extended family. Among nomadic 
groups, the significant unit is the camp group, consisting of sev- 
eral related lineage units and their extended families. The clan, 



55 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

the subtribe, and the tribal unit are groups of increasingly greater 
inclusiveness, each of which in principle is organized on the basis 
of patrilineal descent. 

Marriage is almost always within the same clan, and lineages 
are endogamous as well. Islamic marriage prescriptions are gener- 
ally followed, with the preferred marriage pattern between first cou- 
sins and strict prohibitions on marriage between other, specified 
relatives. In general, tradition emphasizes marriage within the lin- 
eage first, then within one's social level. 

Polygyny is accepted among most Maure groups, but relatively 
few Maures actually have more than one wife at a time. Succes- 
sive marriages are common, however, especially among elite. Mar- 
riage to a widow or a divorced woman entails a lower bride-price 
than a first marriage. Although levirate (marriage of a widow to 
her deceased husband's brother) is permitted, widows generally 
live with one of their sons rather than remarry. 

Black Africans 

Of the five major black African ethnic groups in Mauritania, 
the largest is the Toucouleur, an offshoot of the Fulbe. The Fulbe 
are the second largest black African group in the country. Other 
significant black African groups include the Soninke, Wolof, and 
Bambara. Small groups of other ethnic Africans also live in the 
far south of Mauritania. 

Like Maures, most Fulbe are nomadic. Most other African 
groups practice sedentary agriculture in the Senegal River Val- 
ley. Almost all have kin in Senegal or Mali. They speak Fulfulde 
or West Atlantic languages within the Niger-Congo language 
family. 

Black African society, like Maure society, is highly stratified. 
The overall system of social stratification is nearly identical for all 
black groups. Three classes predominate: nobles, endogamous 
castes, and a servile class. Further social distinctions are recognized 
on the basis of livelihood, prestige, and power. Castes of skilled 
craftsmen are organized on the same occupational basis as among 
the Maures. Slaves and former slaves compose the servile group, 
but as within Maure society, they are accepted as part of a family 
and enjoy relatively humane treatment. 

Toucouleur 

The Toucouleur, also called the Halpularen, differ from the Fulbe 
primarily in terms of livelihood and dialect. Most Toucouleur live 
along the Senegal River in Mauritania and Senegal. As founders 
of the ancient kingdom of Takrur, they incorporated a number of 



56 



The Society and Its Environment 



local peoples, including the Wolof and Soninke, into their society. 
The Toucouleur speak Fulfulde, a dialect of Pulaar (the language 
of the Fulbe) that includes many borrowings from their neighbors 
and differs from Pulaar in pronunciation, vocabulary, and syn- 
tax. Most Toucouleur are sedentary farmers, in contrast with the 
nomadic Fulbe. 

In addition to nobles, freemen, artisans, and slaves or former 
slaves, the Toucouleur also recognize social groupings based on 
age. Called fedde, these age-groups are involved in a number of 
rituals designed to ensure solidarity and pledges of friendship be- 
tween families. Descent is patrilineal, and the patrilineage is the 
most important kinship group. Nonetheless, maternal kin also play 
important roles at critical points in an individual's life. 

The Toucouleur are Muslim, and, like many of their neighbors, 
they believe in divination and supernatural power (baraka) associated 
with Islamic holy men. They are members of the Tijaniya Islamic 
brotherhood (see Religious Life, this ch.). 

Fulbe 

The Fulbe of Mauritania are part of the larger Fulbe popula- 
tion that inhabits scattered areas across the African savanna from 
Senegal to Sudan. They are thought to have originated in Senegal 
and to have slowly migrated eastward to their present locations over 
the last 800 years. Known by a variety of names, including "Peul" 
in Senegal and "Fulani" in Nigeria, they call themselves "Pullo" 
(sing.) or "Fulbe" (pi.) in Mauritania. Their Fulfulde dialect be- 
longs to the West Atlantic subfamily of the Niger-Congo language 
family. It is a rich and flexible language with a well-developed body 
of oral literature. The Fulbe are Muslims, but the manner in which 
they observe Islam varies. 

Pastoral Fulbe are famed for their herds of cattle and dairy 
produce. Much of their culture centers on their pastoral life- style. 
The basic social unit is the nuclear family; the nuclear families are 
organized into lineages and clans. Descent is patrilineal, and the 
household unit is usually the patrilocal extended family. Marriage 
is legitimized by the payment of a bride-price, and great value and 
prestige are placed upon childbearing. 

Soninke 

The Soninke in Mauritania are the westernmost branch of the 
large and widely dispersed Soninke people (also called the Sarakole), 
most of whom live in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Cote dT voire. They 
inhabit the banks of the Senegal River in south-central Maurita- 
nia, where they engage in agriculture and trading. Their ancestors 



57 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

were the founders of the ancient kingdom of Ghana. Some Maurita- 
nian Soninke speak Azayr, a Soninke dialect heavily influenced 
by Berber; however, most speak the languages of the peoples among 
whom they live. They are fervent Muslims. 

Soninke society is rigidly stratified, allowing for little social mo- 
bility. Descent, inheritance, and succession to kin-group and fam- 
ily authority are all patrilineal, and the household unit is the 
patrilocal extended family. Polygyny is permitted, but the extent 
to which it is practiced among the Soninke in Mauritania is not 
clear. Bride-price is a well-established custom, and folklore and 
ritual are integral to Soninke life. 

Wolof 

A relatively small number of Wolof live in Mauritania. Most 
live in Senegal, where they are the dominant group. The Wolof 
language comprises several dialects and has borrowed many words 
from Arabic and various European languages. Almost all Wolof 
are Muslims, and nearly all belong to one of several Islamic brother- 
hoods. Farming and trading are the basis of their livelihood. 

Descent is reckoned patrilineally, but close ties also are main- 
tained with maternal kin. The basic social unit is the extended fam- 
ily. Perhaps one-fourth of all Wolof households are polygynous. 
Social stratification is fairly rigid, intermarriage across ethnic 
boundaries at the same stratum being far more common than in- 
termarriage across strata. 

Bambara 

Only a small number of Bambara live in Mauritania; most re- 
side in Mali. They are thought to be descended from the founders 
of the thirteenth-century kingdom of Mali. Their language, Mande- 
kan, is closely related to nearby languages. Many are Muslims, 
the number of adherents varying widely by group and locale. Most 
Bambara are farmers. 

The Bambara recognize occupational castes and the institution 
of domestic slavery, as do their West African neighbors. They recog- 
nize patrilineal descent, and they practice polygyny. The normal 
household unit is the extended family. 

Religious Life 

Virtually all Mauritanians are Sunni Muslims. They adhere to 
the Maliki (see Glossary) rite, one of the four Sunni schools of law. 
Since independence in 1960, Mauritania has been an Islamic repub- 
lic. The Constitutional Charter of 1985 declares Islam the state 
religion and sharia the law of the land (see Governmental Power, 
ch. 4). 



58 



The Society and Its Environment 



Islam first spread southward into West Africa, including Maurita- 
nia, with the movement of Muslim traders and craftsmen and later 
with the founders of Islamic brotherhoods. Although the brother- 
hoods played a role in the early expansion of Islam, it was not until 
the nineteenth century that these religious orders assumed impor- 
tance when they attempted to make religion a force for expanding 
identities and loyalties beyond the limits of kinship. The relative 
peace brought to the area by the French administration and the 
growing resentment of colonial rule contributed to the rapid rise 
in the power and influence of the brotherhoods. In recent decades, 
these orders have opposed tribalism and have been an indispensa- 
ble element in the growth of nationalist sentiment. 

Origins of Islam 

In A.D. 610, Muhammad, a prosperous merchant of the Ara- 
bian town of Mecca, began to preach the first of a series of revela- 
tions said to have been granted him by God (Allah) through the 
agency of the archangel Gabriel. The divine messages, received 
during solitary visits into the desert, continued during the remainder 
of his lifetime. 

Muhammad denounced the polytheistic paganism of his fellow 
Meccans, his vigorous and continuing censure ultimately earning 
him their bitter enmity. In 622 he and a group of his followers were 
forced to flee to Yathrib, which became known as Medina (the city) 
through its association with Muhammad. The flight {hijra) marked 
the beginning of the Islamic Era and the entrance of Islam as a 
powerful force on the stage of history; indeed, the Muslim calen- 
dar begins with the year 622. In Medina, Muhammad continued 
his preaching, ultimately defeated his detractors in battle, and con- 
solidated the temporal and spiritual leadership of most Arabs in 
his person before his death in 632. 

After Muhammad's death, his followers compiled those of his 
words that were regarded as coming directly from God in a docu- 
ment known as the Quran, the holy scripture of Islam. Other say- 
ings and teachings of the Prophet, as well as the precedents of his 
personal behavior as recalled by those who had known him, be- 
came the hadith (sayings). From these sources, the faithful have con- 
structed the Prophet's customary practice, or sunna, which they 
endeavor to emulate. Together, the Quran, hadith, and sunna form 
a comprehensive guide to the spiritual, ethical, and social life of 
the faithful in most Muslim countries. 

Islam in a short time was transformed from a small religious com- 
munity into a dynamic political and military authority. By the early 
eighth century A.D. , Muslim conquerors had subdued the coastal 



59 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

population of North Africa, but widespread conversion of the 
nomads of the central and western desert did not come until after 
large-scale invasions of the eleventh century by beduin tribes from 
Arabia and Egypt (see Almoravids, ch. 1). As Islam spread west- 
ward and southward in Africa, various elements of indigenous re- 
ligious systems became absorbed into and then altered strictly 
Islamic beliefs. For example, the Islamic tradition includes provi- 
sions for a variety of spirits and supernatural beings, as long as 
Allah is still recognized as the only God. Muslims in Mauritania 
believe in various lesser spirits apparently transformed from pre- 
Islamic faiths into Islamic spirits. Mauritanian Muslims, however, 
do not emphasize the Islamic concepts of the eternal soul and of 
reward or punishment in an afterlife. 

Tenets of Islam 

The shahadah (profession of faith, or testimony) states succinctly 
the central belief, "There is no God but God (Allah), and 
Muhammad is his Prophet." The faithful repeat this simple profes- 
sion on ritual occasions, and its recital designates the speaker as 
a Muslim. The God preached by Muhammad was known to his 
countrymen, for Allah is the general Arabic term for the supreme 
being rather than the name of a particular deity. Rather than in- 
troducing a new deity, Muhammad denied the existence of the pan- 
theon of gods and spirits worshiped before his prophethood and 
declared the omnipotence of God, the unique creator. The term 
Islam means submission to God, and a person who submits is a 
Muslim. 

Muhammad is the "Seal of the Prophets," the last of the pro- 
phetic line. His revelations are said to complete for all time the 
series of revelations that had been given earlier to Christians and 
Jews. God is believed to have remained one and the same through- 
out time, but men are seen as having misunderstood or strayed 
from his true teachings until set aright by Muhammad. Prophets 
and sages of the biblical tradition, such as Abraham, Moses, and 
Jesus, are recognized as inspired vehicles of God's will. Islam, 
however, reveres as sacred only the message, rejecting Christianity's 
deification of the messenger. It accepts the concepts of guardian 
angels, the Day of Judgment, resurrection, and the eternal life of 
the soul. 

The duties of the Muslim form the "five pillars" of the faith: 
the shahadah, salat (daily prayer), zakat (almsgiving), sawm (fasting), 
and hajj (pilgrimage). The believer prays facing Mecca five times 
a day. Whenever possible, men pray in congregation at a mosque 
under direction of an imam (see Glossary), or prayer leader, and 



60 



I 



Old mosque at Nouakchott 
Courtesy Larry Barrie 




on Fridays are obliged to do so. Women are permitted to attend 
public worship at the mosque, where they are segregated from the 
men, but their attendance tends to be discouraged, and more fre- 
quently they pray in the seclusion of their homes. 

In the early days of Islam, a tax for charitable purposes was im- 
posed on personal property in proportion to the owner's wealth; 
the payment purified the remaining wealth and made it religiously 
legitimate. The collection of this tax and its distribution to the needy 
were originally functions of the state. With the decentralization of 
Muslim religious and political authority as Islam spread to many 
countries, however, this became an individual responsibility. 

The ninth month of the Muslim calendar is Ramadan, celebrated 
as the time during which the Quran was revealed to Muhammad. 
It is a period during which Muslims must abstain from food, drink- 
ing, smoking, and sexual activity during the daylight hours. Ex- 
empted are the sick, soldiers on duty, travelers on necessary 
journeys, young children, and menstruating, pregnant, or lactat- 
ing women. The well-to-do accomplish little work during this 
period, and many businesses close or operate on reduced sched- 
ules. Since the months of the lunar calendar revolve through the 
solar year, Ramadan occurs during various seasons. 

Finally, at least once during their lifetime, all Muslims should 
if possible make the hajj to the holy city of Mecca to participate 
in the special rites that occur during the twelfth month of the lunar 
calendar. Upon completion of this and certain other ritual 



61 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

assignments, the returning pilgrim is entitled to an honorific title, 
Hajj (fern., Hajji). 

In addition to prescribing specific duties, Islam imposes a code 
of conduct entailing generosity, fairness, honesty, and respect for 
others. It proscribes adultery, gambling, usury, and the consump- 
tion of carrion, blood, pork, and alcohol. The proscription of al- 
cohol is irregularly enforced in most Muslim countries, but since 
1986 the Mauritanian government has strictly enforced its prohi- 
bition. 

Muslims traditionally are subject to sharia, which — as interpreted 
by religious courts — covers most aspects of life. Sharia was devel- 
oped by jurists from the Quran and from the traditions of the 
Prophet, and it provides a complete pattern for human conduct. 
Sharia also serves as a normative legal code (see Legal System, 
ch. 4). 

Brotherhoods and Saints 

The religious movement known as Sufism arose in the thirteenth 
century in reaction to the orthodox emphasis on law and its denial 
of the mystical or emotional needs of the human spirit. Sufism 
stressed the intuitive and emotional discovery of Allah by the faith- 
ful, and it interpreted the Quran as providing a key to the mystic 
union or personal friendship of individuals with God. The mysti- 
cal elements of Sufism also facilitated the blending of Islamic be- 
liefs and pre-Islamic religious concepts. With the rise of Sufi 
concepts came acceptance of the role of "intercessors" between 
the individual and God, which led to the formation of brotherhoods 
(tariqas, or "ways") and recognition of holy men (marabouts). From 
the thirteenth century, the brotherhoods and the marabouts were 
perhaps the most important elements in the growth and develop- 
ment of Islam in West Africa. 

Essentially stemming from the combination of Sufi mysticism 
and orthodox Sunni intellectualism, the Islamic brotherhoods have 
also been important as a unifying cultural and religious force. Be- 
cause membership in a brotherhood cut across ethnic and tribal 
lines, it contributed to the development of a broad communal 
identity. 

The brotherhoods are all extremely hierarchical. Each has a chief 
who initiates all members and delegates certain responsibilities and 
authority to other leadership levels. Brotherhood members gener- 
ally live in the secular communities of their tribes rather than in 
a central location, although they may live in separate communi- 
ties while they are undergoing instruction. Thus, the religious com- 
munity is more spiritual than physical for most brotherhood 



62 



The Society and Its Environment 

members, even though there is a central territory {zawiya; pi., 
zawayd) for an order or for its important branches. 

The leaders of the brotherhoods are believed to have baraka, a 
supernatural gift that has been defined variously as "blessing" or 
"mystical power." In a general sense, baraka is more than a spiritual 
force or power. It is a complex of positive personal traits — moral, 
intellectual, and emotional — with which only some men are en- 
dowed and which sets these men apart from others in their group. 
Originally it was believed that baraka was invested only in the descen- 
dants of Muhammad. With the rise of Sufism and the growth of 
the brotherhoods, however, it became a quality that could be trans- 
mitted to other religious leaders or to anyone judged particularly 
worthy. 

In the 1980s, two brotherhoods, the Qadiriya and the Tijaniya, 
accounted for nearly all the brotherhood membership in Maurita- 
nia. The Qadiriya and Tijaniya were essentially parallel "ways," 
differing primarily in their methods of reciting the litanies. Their 
Islamic doctrines and their religious obligations were basically simi- 
lar. Two smaller brotherhoods also existed — the Chadeliya, cen- 
tered in Boumdeit in Tagant Region, and the Goudfiya, found in 
the regions of Tagant, Adrar, Hodh ech Chargui, and Hodh el 
Gharbi. 

The Qadiriya 

The Qadiriya is the largest and most highly organized brother- 
hood in Mauritania. Founded in Mesopotamia in the twelfth cen- 
tury by Abd al Kadir ad Djili, it spread to Africa in the fifteenth 
century. Like all brotherhoods, the Qadiriya includes some emo- 
tional mystical elements, but it also stresses learning and Islamic 
education as the way to find God. All members of the Qadiriya 
are directed to follow the precepts of humility, generosity, and 
respect for their neighbors regardless of religious beliefs or social 
standing. 

The Qadiriya brotherhood has had two main branches in 
Mauritania, the Sidiya and the Fadeliya. Although the Sidiya has 
been most influential in the vicinity of Trarza — where the family 
and followers of the brotherhood's founder, Shaykh Sidiya Baba, 
were centered — it has also been important in Brakna, Tagant, and 
Adrar. The Fadeliya, founded in the early nineteenth century by 
Mohammad Fadel, has been centered in Oualata and Atar. 

The Tijaniya 

Ahmed at Tijani, an Algerian Berber, founded the Tijaniya 
brotherhood in 1781. Its rituals tend to be simpler than those of 



63 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

the Qadiriya, and its members are not expected to pursue Islamic 
learning to the same extent. Essentially a missionary order, the 
Tijaniya brotherhood has spread in many areas of West Africa at 
the expense of the Qadiriya. One explanation for its expansion may 
be that the simpler and more flexible Tijaniya teachings are better 
suited for modern life. 

Tijaniya precepts include injunctions against lying, stealing, 
cheating, and killing. These precepts insist that promises and ob- 
ligations be honored, neighbors be loved, and superiors be obeyed. 
Members are to deprive no one of his freedom without cause and 
are to reflect continually on God in prayer. Although the Tijaniya 
recognizes that everyone sins, it suggests that loyal members of 
the brotherhood will be rewarded in an afterlife. 

The Tijaniya has two branches in Mauritania, the Hadeflste (or 
Hafediste) and the Omariya. Litde is known about the Hadeflste. 
The Omariya branch was founded by a Toucouleur, El Hadj Omar, 
in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The membership of 
the Omariya is largely Toucouleur, but many Soninke, Fulbe, and 
Wolof also belong to this order. A subdivision of the Omariya, the 
Hamallya, was founded in the early twentieth century by Sherif 
Hamallah. The Hamallya emphasizes mystical Islamic beliefs more 
than most of the other brotherhoods and stresses the equality of 
all mankind. Drawn from the Fulbe and from mixed Maure groups, 
Hamallya membership initially included ex-slaves, young people, 
and women. This group has tended to be extremist, and the main 
Tijaniya brotherhood claims it is not a true Tijaniya group. 

Marabouts 

The leader of a brotherhood, called shaykh by the Maures, is 
often referred to as a marabout. This term, however, is a general 
title that applies to any religious leader or to any person who per- 
forms the functions traditionally associated with Islam. In a religion 
without formal clergy, the marabout represents the human element 
in the faith, the intermediary between the people and Islamic the- 
ology. The marabout exercises a moral and spiritual influence 
within the culture and propagates the faith by teaching, proselytiz- 
ing, and — at least in the past — wielding political influence. 
Marabouts usually are associated with a brotherhood and, like the 
leaders of the brotherhoods, are believed to possess baraka. 

The functions of a marabout include teaching and promoting 
Islamic culture; leading religious recitations (including chants in 
some cases) in community prayer; and performing rites connected 
with curing the ill, preventing misfortune, and soothsaying. Be- 
cause illness is believed to have spiritual as well as physiological 



64 



The Society and Its Environment 



causes, the marabout is called upon to help cure the sick. The 
marabout also makes, uses, and sells amulets and talismans that 
are believed to have mystical powers to protect their bearer from 
sickness, injury, and other misfortune. 

Other functions of the marabout include negotiation, mediation, 
and activities related to peacekeeping; the granting of protection 
and asylum to individuals; and the acting as advisers and agents 
of important tribal leaders. Although the role of the marabout as 
political adviser to warring tribes or groups has diminished, many 
of these mediation or arbitration tasks have political overtones. 

Changing Social Patterns 

In the 1980s, Mauritanian society was a collection of distinct, 
stratified ethnic groups that showed little evidence of social cohe- 
sion or national identity. The process of creating national in- 
stitutions or professional classes had hardly begun. For most 
Mauritanians, loyalty to family, lineage, and ethnic group far 
outweighed allegiance to the state or to national institutions. Ethni- 
city, social position, and caste identity remained strong, condition- 
ing the processes of state formation and administration. 

During the colonial period, Mauritania's social structure had 
come to reflect the impact of French administrative preferences. 
Individuals, families, and dominant clans attempted to use the 
colonial presence to maintain or improve their privileged status. 
Among the Maures, for example, the zawaya tribes at first used 
their control of religious education to dominate economically and 
politically. This was accomplished at the expense of the hassani, 
who had made the transition from warriors, raiders, and tribute 
collectors to pastoralists, traders, and low-level civil servants. 
However, the French generally employed Wolof and Toucouleur, 
rather than Maures, as low-level civil servants. By 1960 black Afri- 
cans were the majority of the colonial administration's civil ser- 
vants and played a much larger role in the modern employment 
sector than did either the hassani or the zawaya. 

After independence was granted in 1960, Mauritanian society 
changed faster than it had during the colonial period. This era saw 
the beginnings of urbanization, the founding of a permanent cap- 
ital, the establishment of national organizations such as trade 
unions, and the expansion of education facilities and literacy. It 
also brought a reorientation away from West Africa toward the 
Maghrib (see Glossary) as the number of white Maures in the 
government increased. Secular education, heretofore largely the 
preserve of black Africans, increased significantly among Maures. 
White Maures attempted to give Mauritania a distinct Arab-Berber 



65 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

character and in doing so often alienated the black population. At 
the same time, Maures developed a sense of ethnic identity and 
unity that had not existed before independence. 

By the 1980s, the ranks of the bureaucracy and military included 
both white Maures and black Africans, but the distribution of 
professionals in these ranks varied widely (see Impediments to 
Change, ch. 4). In the late 1970s, studies indicated that black Afri- 
cans generally formed a larger proportion of the salaried profes- 
sional class than did white Maures, whereas the opposite was the 
case among wage earners and general laborers. Continuing the 
colonial pattern, the Toucouleur and the Wolof were well repre- 
sented in higher and mid-level professional ranks, and the Soninke 
were beginning to penetrate the lower and mid-level ranks. White 
Maures and black Africans were almost equally represented at the 
highest bureaucratic levels. 

Considerable tension existed between Maures and black Afri- 
cans in the late 1980s. Many Maures still viewed black Africans 
as people who should be under Maure control, a perception espe- 
cially evident among more traditional Maure tribes of the north. 
Many blacks, however, considered Maures (especially white 
Maures) to be ignorant, lazy, and inefficient. They also saw white 
Maures as slaveholders. Thus, they feared growing Maure politi- 
cal and social dominance. 

These attitudes intensified during the 1980s. Despite official de- 
nials, many black Africans complained of widespread racial dis- 
crimination in political and economic areas. They pointed to the 
disproportionate number of Arab-Berbers at the top of the govern- 
ment bureaucracy and military command, to Mauritania's close 
ties with the Arab world, and to the emphasis on the use of Arabic 
in national life to support these complaints. 

Another issue that exacerbated racial tensions during the 1980s 
was access to land along the Senegal River. As plans for economic 
development along the river valley progressed, blacks feared that 
wealthy white Maures would buy up productive land in areas tradi- 
tionally claimed by blacks. Desertification of once-fertile lands far- 
ther north added to the competition for better watered land in 
southern Mauritania. 

As in many newly independent countries with marked ethnic 
and linguistic diversity, the selection of national and official lan- 
guages heightened intergroup tensions. At independence, Hassaniya 
Arabic was given "national" language status, while French re- 
mained an "official" language. In 1966, however, the government 
made Hassaniya Arabic an official language along with French and 
required that Arabic be taught in secondary schools, a requirement 



66 



Peul market in Nouakchott 
Courtesy Larry Barrie 

that brought protests from Mauritania's blacks (see Public Order 
and Internal Security, ch. 5). 

In the late 1980s, blacks continued to protest against the com- 
pulsory study of Arabic and complained that their lack of profi- 
ciency in the language was used to block their advancement in the 
bureaucracy and military. Blacks could still choose to be educated 
in French, however, and French retained its status as an official 
language. The government also permitted primary-level instruc- 
tion in several of Mauritania's African languages. 

Economic development has altered traditional social organiza- 
tion, particularly among groups near centers of modernization. 
Rapid urbanization has accelerated these changes. The importance 
of lineage endogamy has declined among Maures, and customary 
marriage patterns have begun to change. By the late 1980s, urban 
Mauritanians paid less attention to distant segments of their lin- 
eages, and they seldom reckoned their kin- group membership back 
more than five generations. 

Economic functions of the various black African and Maure caste 
groups were becoming less rigid; social patterns, therefore, also 
were becoming more fluid. An increasing number of Mauritani- 
ans were involved in work unrelated to traditional caste occupa- 
tions. Although the customary social distinctions associated with 
traditional stratification patterns remained and individuals were 



67 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

still identified socially as members of particular castes, there were 
indications that caste designations were becoming less important 
socially and economically. In addition, government efforts to 
modernize and commercialize the activities of craftsmen and fisher- 
men resulted in some rise in the social status of these groups. 

If the pace of change was slow in Mauritanian society as a whole, 
it was even slower in the area of slavery. Slavery was abolished 
in 1960 and again in 1980. Mauritanian authorities acknowledged 
the continued existence of slavery and took limited steps to eradi- 
cate it, but in 1981 observers estimated that at least 100,000 peo- 
ple were still slaves and 300,000 were ex-slaves. 

In 1974 a group of escaped slaves formed an emancipation move- 
ment known as El Hor (Freedom). By the late 1970s, El Hor began 
to achieve some notable successes; the 1980 decree abolishing slavery 
was owed at least in part to El Hor's agitation, as were fact-finding 
missions by the London Anti-Slavery Society (1981) and the UN 
(1984). Building on these achievements, El Hor continued to press 
for specific laws to ensure that emancipation became a reality and 
that former slaves enjoyed equal rights and treatment. 

Factors that conditioned the role of women in Mauritanian 
society in the late 1980s included the impact of Islam and sharia 
(Islamic law); West African influences that allowed women sub- 
stantial independence in some social and economic areas; eco- 
nomic modernization, which challenged customary behavior 
patterns in some areas; and Mauritania's rapid pace of urbani- 
zation, which subjected traditional nomadic customs to new scru- 
tiny. Many women in such urban centers as Nouakchott, for 
example, were born in the rural interior of the country and found 
their childhood training challenged by changing urban social con- 
ditions. 

Girls' education took place primarily at home and emphasized 
homemaking skills. Some girls attended Quranic schools, but their 
training was usually limited to learning verses from the Quran and 
attaining minimal literacy skills. A mother's responsibility toward 
her daughter traditionally included instruction in household and 
family affairs and childrearing. In recent decades, fathers were 
responsible for financing any formal education for their children, 
but a father's most important responsibility toward his daughters 
was to prepare them for marriage, primarily by ensuring their phys- 
ical attractiveness. A widespread practice was forced feeding (gavage). 
Forced feeding usually involved psychological pressure, rather than 
physical force, but it often required a family to reserve substantial 
quantities of food — in most cases, milk — for consumption by its 
pre-teenage daughters, whose beauty was a measure of a father's 



68 



The Society and Its Environment 



commitment to the marriage alliances they would form. Many 
young women were betrothed or married by the age of eight or 
ten. Unmarried teenage girls were subjected to severe social 
criticism. 

Divorce was fairly common in Mauritanian society in the 1980s, 
even among very traditional villagers. A divorced man suffered 
no social stigma, but a divorced woman could still become an out- 
cast if her family or her former husband's family criticized her be- 
havior. Women traditionally had cared for their homes and worked 
in limited agricultural pursuits; but by the 1980s, they were be- 
ginning to enter professions formerly closed to them, such as com- 
merce, teaching, and a variety of skilled occupations. 

By 1985 nearly one-fourth of all girls below the age of eleven 
attended primary school, a marked increase over enrollment figures 
just a decade earlier. More women were attending secondary schools 
and university, and in the mid-1980s two women were appointed 
to cabinet-level posts (see Women, ch. 4). 

Education 

In the late 1980s, Mauritania was still in the early stages of de- 
veloping a modern education system. Although Islamic education 
had long been an important part of life, this religious instruction 
involved only rote learning of the Quran. Few Mauritanians pos- 
sessed skills necessary to create a modern nation-state. 

The government has consistently stressed the need for improved 
and expanded education programs and in the 1980s was actively 
pursuing these goals. While modern, skill-oriented programs were 
being established to help satisfy the growing needs for skilled work- 
ers and technicians, efforts also were under way to expand tradi- 
tional Islamic education. Expanding Quranic education has been 
viewed as necessary to preserve Islamic cultural tradition and pro- 
mote national unity. 

Traditional Islamic Education 

Mauritania has long had an extensive but scattered education 
system consisting of the religious and cultural education provided 
by marabouts. Indeed, it was largely through the efforts of these 
teachers that Islam was spread throughout West Africa. Although 
in the past Islamic education was largely limited to fundamental 
religious teaching, the children of white Maures often studied Arabic 
and simple arithmetic as well. Both boys and girls received tradi- 
tional education, at first within the family and later in the local 
Quranic schools operated by the marabouts. They usually began 



69 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

their education around the age of eight, the boys studying for about 
seven years, the girls for perhaps only two. 

Traditional Islamic schools were found in the nomadic commu- 
nities and in settled villages. Because particularly renowned 
marabout teachers would be surrounded by families who wished 
their children to learn from these masters, several centers of more 
advanced Islamic learning developed around the camps of these 
marabouts. In these centers, students learned grammar, logic, and 
other subjects, as well as traditional religious subjects. Many of 
the centers developed sizable collections of manuscripts through 
the efforts of the great marabouts. 

The tradition of religious learning centers continued through the 
late colonial period. The Institute of Islamic Studies, founded in 
1955 at Boutilimit, was the only Islamic institution of higher learn- 
ing in West Africa. It provided instruction in traditional Islamic 
subjects and teaching methods. After independence, it was moved 
to Nouakchott, where it continued to draw upon the manuscript 
collection built by the marabouts of Boutilimit as well as other 
libraries of traditional Islamic literature in Chinguetti, Kaedi, 
Mederdra, Oualata, and Tidjikdja. 

Modern Education 

The French colonial administration established a system of public 
schools in Mauritania. The French schools were largely concen- 
trated in the sedentary communities in the Senegal River Valley. 
In 1950 the first teacher training school was established at Bou- 
tilimit, and in 1957 the secondary school in Rosso also began train- 
ing teachers. In part because public schools were concentrated in 
the south, black Africans enrolled in large numbers. As a result, 
the overwhelming majority of public school teachers were black, 
and blacks came to dominate the nation's secular intelligentsia. 

The few French schools located in nomadic areas had difficulty 
attracting students. The Maures in particular were reluctant to ac- 
cept the public schools and continued to favor purely Islamic in- 
struction. Gradually, however, they began to send their children 
to public schools, as they saw that traditional religious training was 
not preparing their children for life in the twentieth century. The 
French also experimented with "mobile schools" after World War 
II, and in this way they provided public education for a larger num- 
ber of nomads. In 1954 there were twelve so-called "tent" schools 
serving 241 students. At least some of these tent schools continued 
to function after independence. 

The independent government viewed secular education as one 
of the major methods to promote national unity, as well as a 



70 




Classroom in a Nouakchott school 
Courtesy United Nations (J. Laure) 



necessary step toward the development of a modern economy. It 
still faced shortages of funds, adequately trained teaching staff, and 
classroom facilities at all levels. Another teacher training school 
was opened in Nouakchott in 1964. 

School attendance was not compulsory, and in 1964-65 only 
19,100 primary- school students and 1,500 secondary-school stu- 
dents — about 14 percent of school-age children — were enrolled. By 
1985 an estimated 35 percent of primary- school- age children were 
enrolled in school, but only about 4 to 10 percent of eligible 
secondary-school-age children were enrolled. In both cases, boys 
heavily outnumbered girls. 

In 1985-86 primary- school enrollments had climbed to 140,871, 
and enrollments in secondary and vocational schools amounted to 
34,674. The government reported a total of 878 primary schools 
and 44 secondary or vocational institutions. A total of 4,336 stu- 
dents were enrolled in postsecondary training programs. An addi- 
tional 448 students were attending the National Islamic Institute 
(formerly the Institute of Islamic Studies), and some 1,900 Maurita- 
nians were enrolled in various training programs abroad. The public 
schools employed almost 2,900 primary teachers, 1,563 secondary 
and vocational teachers (412 of them foreign), and 237 postsecon- 
dary instructors, more than half of them expatriates. In 1982 the 
National College of Administration and the National College of 



71 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

Sciences opened in Nouakchott, and in 1983 nearly 1,000 students 
began instruction at the University of Nouakchott. 

Illiteracy remained a major problem and an important impedi- 
ment to economic and social development. In 1985 the adult liter- 
acy rate was estimated at 17 to 25 percent, approximately half the 
average for sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, this rate represented 
an improvement over the estimated 5 percent literacy rate at in- 
dependence and 10 percent a decade later. Recognizing the need 
for a better educated work force, in mid- 1986 the government 
launched a major literacy campaign and created the State Secretariat 
of Culture, Information, and Telecommunications to head the 
effort. That same year, the government reported that the number 
of literacy classes had already increased more than ten times over 
the 1985 number. 

At the same time, the cost of education was quite high in com- 
parison with neighboring countries. In the mid-1980s, Maurita- 
nia was spending about US$45 million (20 percent of current 
expenditures) on education every year. Its costs for primary school- 
ing were the highest per student in francophone West Africa, and 
only Cote dTvoire exceeded the cost per secondary pupil. These 
high costs were due in part to teachers' salaries, particularly those 
of expatriates, and to a generous system of scholarships. Planned 
investment in education for the years 1985 through 1988 was set 
at US$27 million under the Economic Recovery Program for 
1985-88, an increase of less than 1 percent over the period from 
1980 through 1984. 

The French system of primary and secondary schools remained 
in force into the late 1980s. Over the years, however, some sig- 
nificant changes had been made, and others were planned. In the 
early 1980s, instruction in Pulaar, Azayr (Soninke), and Wolof was 
introduced into the primary school curriculum, and Arabic was 
emphasized at all levels. The official policy of gradually replacing 
French with local languages and Arabic, adopted in the late 1970s, 
drew vigorous protests from French-speaking black Mauritanians 
and was abandoned within a decade. 

Mauritania remained critically short of skilled labor. In the 
mid-1980s, only about 15 percent of secondary- school students were 
enrolled in vocational education. To redress this situation and to 
raise the general level of literacy, the government encouraged the 
growth of private and Quranic schools; most industrial training 
took place in private institutions. More important, the government 
also turned to the international community. In 1987 the World Bank 
agreed to help make Mauritania's education system more respon- 
sive to the country's development needs. Proposed changes involved 



72 



The Society and Its Environment 



expanding primary education and restructuring secondary school- 
ing. Special attention was to be given to vocational training in areas 
of particular national need, such as hydraulic engineering and 
fisheries. 

Health and Welfare 

Despite the central government's good intentions and some health 
care planning, health care and medical facilities in Mauritania re- 
mained inadequate in the late 1980s. Most Mauritanians, espe- 
cially those who inhabited rural areas, did not have access to modern 
health care facilities. Nouakchott and the provincial centers had 
facilities, but even in these locales health care was rudimentary. 
Planned public investment in health and social services for the years 
1985 through 1988 was projected at only US$2.5 million. While 
this doubled the amount spent from 1980 through 1984, it was still 
inadequate to meet the country's needs. 

Medical Care 

Mauritania's health care infrastructure in the early 1980s con- 
sisted of a central hospital in Nouakchott, twelve regional hospi- 
tals, a number of health clinics, maternal and child care centers, 
dispensaries, and mobile medical units to serve the countryside. 
All facilities suffered from a lack of equipment, supplies, and trained 
personnel. The ratio of people to hospital beds was 2,610 to one. 
The ratio of people to physicians was 13,350 to one. This ratio 
represented an improvement over the 1965 figure of 36,580 to one 
and was better than that of some of Mauritania's neighbors. 

In 1987 Mauritania's largest medical facility was the 500-bed 
government-run hospital in Nouakchott. Staffed by Mauritanian 
and expatriate doctors, it lacked supplies and properly maintained 
equipment. Other facilities included the National Health Center, 
built in 1977 for the study of disease prevention and methods of 
public health care education, and the National School of Nurses 
and Midwives, founded in 1966 to train nurses, midwives, and 
paramedical personnel. 

In general, health standards were quite low, and many infec- 
tious diseases were endemic. Contagious diseases (such as measles 
and tuberculosis) and respiratory disorders were more prevalent 
in northern arid regions, whereas malaria, guinea worm infection, 
and schistosomiasis were more common in the Senegal River 
Valley. The desert tended to be a healthier environment than the 
more tropical south, but several major diseases were common to 
all areas of the country. Typhoid, poliomyelitis, hepatitis, and a 
variety of parasitic illnesses also affected the population. In late 
1987, the World Health Organization issued warnings about 



73 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

cholera, and outbreaks of both yellow fever and Rift Valley fever 
were reported in the extreme southern part of Trarza Region around 
Rosso. Contagious and infectious diseases were rampant in the kebes 
surrounding major towns, cities, and villages. 

In the mid-1980s, a mass vaccination campaign for children 
under five years of age was under way. The program, aimed at 
reducing infection from poliomyelitis, diphtheria, pertussis, and 
several other diseases, was reportedly meeting with some success. 
Malnutrition remained widespread, especially in children. The long- 
term drought and the consequent drop in food production exacer- 
bated this problem during the early 1980s. According to a 1987 
report by the United States Agency for International Development, 
between 40 percent and 70 percent of children under the age of 
five had experienced moderate to severe malnutrition. The degree 
of malnutrition varied according to the success or failure of local 
crops, and some slight improvement was noted in early 1987. 

Housing 

The massive influx of nomads into towns and cities during the 
1970s and 1980s created a severe housing shortage in southern 
Mauritania. Kebes quickly sprang up around Nouakchott and other 
cities and towns and along major roadways. These kebes continued 
to grow as drought emptied the countryside of most of its inhabi- 
tants. By the late 1980s, according to government estimates, roughly 
one-half of Nouakchott's total population lived in the shantytowns. 

Many of these nomads continued to live in tents, each tent nor- 
mally housing five or six people. Others constructed crude dwell- 
ings of wood and scrap metal. In the south, refugees more 
commonly built temporary houses of sun-dried brick. In virtually 
all locales, kebe dwellers and permanent city residents alike had lit- 
tle or no access to such basic urban amenities as drinkable water 
or sanitary waste disposal. To emphasize that it considered the kebes 
temporary, the government prohibited construction of permanent 
housing in shantytowns, hoping to induce refugees to return to their 
rural homelands. Expenditures on rural and urban water supplies 
were set at more than 14 percent of projected public investment 
for the years 1985 through 1988, or US$10.4 million, an increase 
of almost 11 percent over the amount budgeted from 1980 through 
1984. 

Confronted with an urgent need for low-cost housing, the govern- 
ment created the Real Estate Construction and Management Cor- 
poration (Societe de Construction et de Gestion Immobiliere) in 
1974. Relatively few housing units were built, however, and those 
proved too expensive for the intended occupants because of cost 



74 



A woman tends a plot rented from 
the Women 's Cooperative in Mbagne. 
Courtesy UNICEF (Maggie Murray-Lee) 

overruns and poor financial management. From 1977 to 1982, an 
experimental self-help housing scheme in the Sahara District of 
Rosso Region led to the construction of more than 500 housing 
units for 4,500 people. Employing local labor and materials and 
assisted by outside expertise and capital, the project succeeded until 
external financing and local initiative faltered. Additional inter- 
national assistance was promised in 1985 when Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia agreed to finance more than 1,000 low-cost dwellings. 

* * * 

The best coverage of contemporary Mauritanian society is found 
in Introduction a la Mauritanie, published by the Centre National de 
la Recherche Scientifique in Paris. The essays in this volume cover 
major aspects of Mauritanian society; particularly relevant is the 
essay by Francis de Chassey, ' 'L'evolution des structures sociales 
en Mauritanie de la colonisation a nos Jours." Two other sources 
on social structure are Charles C. Stewart's "Political Authority 
and Social Stratification in Mauritania, ' ' which traces the continuity 
in social classes and political authority from the nineteenth to the 
mid- twentieth century, and Amadou Diallo's "Reflexions sur la 
question nationale en Mauritanie." Diallo covers much of the same 



75 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

ground as Stewart, but in addition he looks at the representation 
of different ethnic groups in the professions and state offices. 

Richard V. Weekes's Muslim Peoples contains basic ethnographic 
information on Mauritania's major peoples. Otherwise, informa- 
tion on family structure and values and on Mauritanian Islam is 
generally lacking in current literature, although Barbara Abeille's 
study of women provides information on the role of women and 
the family. Sources on contemporary Mauritanian slavery are 
Roger Sawyer's Slavery in the Twentieth Century, John Mercer's "Slav- 
ery in Mauritania Today," and the 1984 report of the United Na- 
tions Economic and Social Council's Commission on Human 
Rights, Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices. These studies detail the con- 
ditions of slaves in mid-twentieth-century Mauritania and also pro- 
vide prima facie evidence that the Mauritanian government has 
acknowledged the existence of slavery and attempted to ameliorate 
if not to abolish it. 

A number of sources deal with the current cycle of drought af- 
fecting West Africa. Michael H. Glantz, in "Drought in Africa," 
discusses the fundamental factors behind recurrent African 
droughts. William S. Ellis and Steve McCurry assess the impact 
of the drought upon humans, animals, and land in the mid-1980s 
in text and photographs in "Africa's Sahel — The Stricken Land." 
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



76 



Imraguen fisherman and his catch 



AT INDEPENDENCE IN I960, Mauritania embarked on an 
ambitious but ill-conceived development plan to construct large- 
scale industrial projects in the mining, energy, and manufactur- 
ing sectors. The failure of many of these projects left the nation 
saddled with one of the largest foreign debt burdens in the world 
in proportion to the size of its economy. In the late 1980s, Maurita- 
nia's economy continued to rely heavily on the earnings derived 
from the export of iron ore and fish. The economy also remained 
seriously hampered by a structural inability to feed the country's 
population. Even in nondrought years, large amounts of food aid 
were needed to supplement domestic production and commercial 
food imports. 

Until the mid-1980s, iron ore mining was the motor of economic 
development in Mauritania. Exploitation of rich, high-grade iron 
ore deposits began in 1963. In the 1960s, mining directly provided 
almost one-third of the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos- 
sary) and contributed more than 80 percent of the country's ex- 
port earnings. Mauritania also began mining copper deposits in 
1973; the mine closed in 1975, however, because of falling world 
copper prices. The worldwide recession that caused a fall in de- 
mand for copper also affected iron exports. Iron mining stagnated 
during the later 1970s. By the mid-1980s, the mining sector had 
lost its predominance in the economy, accounting for between 10 
and 11 percent of GDP in fiscal year (FY— see Glossary) 1984, 
and by 1985 export earnings from mining had fallen to around 40 
percent (see fig. 5). 

The waters off the coast of Mauritania are among the richest 
fishing grounds in the world. Before 1979, however, the govern- 
ment exercised little control over foreign fishing operations, and 
Mauritanians took little part in fishing. Fishing and fish process- 
ing accounted for less than 5 percent of GDP in 1975, and vir- 
tually the only revenues obtained were in the form of royalties on 
fishing licenses paid by foreign fishing companies to the govern- 
ment. In 1979 Mauritania established its New Fisheries Policy and 
a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The industry 
underwent rapid growth under the new policy, which required for- 
eign operators to form joint ventures with Mauritanian compa- 
nies and resulted in the development of a national fishing fleet. 

Although in 1984 fishing contributed less than 10 percent to GDP 
at current market prices, the volume of reported fish exports rose 



79 



Mauritania: A Country Study 



FY 1984- GDP US$545.4 

(in millions of United States dollars) 

■ Mining 

■ Fishing, agriculture, 
hunting, and forestry 

■ Manufacturing 
(electricity, gas, 
and water) 

■ Construction 

□ Commerce 

□ Transportation and 
communication 

□ Services 
(government 
and other) 



Source: Based on information from David Hillings et al., Africa South of the Sahara, 16th 
ed., London, 1987, 680. 

Figure 5. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, Fiscal Year (FY) 1984 

rapidly. In 1983 fishing became the number one foreign exchange 
earner with some 54 percent of export revenues. Fishing, together 
with mining, employed about 9 percent of the economically active 
population. 

Through the 1970s, agriculture, including herding, continued 
to deteriorate. Serious droughts combined with economic neglect 
to cause a severe decline in farm production. Both herding and 
agriculture were hard hit by the droughts: their combined contri- 
butions to GDP dropped from about 40 percent in the 1960s to 
about 25 percent in 1986. 

In the early 1960s, Mauritania produced about half of its grain 
needs. After dropping to an all-time low of about 3 to 5 percent 
of its grain needs during the drought years of 1983-85, produc- 
tion rebounded somewhat to about one-third of need in 1986. 
Although the vast majority of the people remained attached to the 
traditional agro-pastoral life of the countryside, this life was be- 
coming extremely difficult. Desertification advanced in some areas 
at a rate of six kilometers per year. Increasingly, refugees from 
the countryside began to migrate to urban centers such as 




80 



The Economy 



Nouakchott. With the exception of a few scattered oases, farming 
was limited to the narrow band along the Senegal River. 

As recently as the mid-1970s, only 20 percent of Mauritania's 
total population were sedentary farmers. Between 1975 and 1980, 
their contribution to GDP averaged 3 to 5 percent. During the same 
period, the pastoral herding sector of the economy constituted about 
20 percent of GDP and engaged 60 to 70 percent of the total popu- 
lation. Of the states in West Africa, Mauritania had the highest 
ratio of cattle to people, a ratio of three to one. The livestock-to- 
crop ratio of GDP also was the highest for West Africa, as animal 
husbandry contributed four times as much to GDP as did farming. 

The cumulative effects of drought and weak demand for Maurita- 
nia' s iron exports, along with the heavy expenses of the war in the 
Western Sahara (see Glossary) during the mid-1970s, curtailed the 
rapid growth of the 1960s that had been marked by an average 
rise in GDP of 8 percent a year. During the late 1970s and the 
1980s, the economy stagnated, and financial instability supplanted 
an earlier ability to meet foreign debt obligations. From 1974 to 
1984, GDP growth averaged 2.3 percent, barely keeping pace with 
population growth. In 1986 GDP per capita income was estimated 
at US$410, no higher in real terms than a decade earlier, placing 
Mauritania at the lower end of low- to middle-income developing 
countries. Real per capita income for the vast majority of the popu- 
lation outside the small modern sector was much lower, estimated 
in the range of US$100 to US$150 per year. 

Role of the Government 

Since independence in 1960, the government has played the cen- 
tral role in development planning and economic management. In 
1963 the government inaugurated the first of a series of four- and 
five-year development plans. Covering the period 1963-67, the first 
plan had two primary goals: reducing Mauritania's dependence 
on external financing (principally French) and foreign personnel 
and laying the foundation for economic development through a 
series of basic studies of the country's resources. The plan gave 
investment priority to processing facilities in the mining industry 
(30 percent of total programmed financing), urban development 
(15 percent), and transportation and communications (12 percent). 
The plan neglected the rural sector, however; only 9 percent of 
programmed financing was earmarked for agriculture and livestock, 
and nearly all of it went for construction and maintenance of small 
dams and wells and for meat packing and storage plants. Vir- 
tually no money was allocated for improving agriculture and live- 
stock production techniques. In 1963, in pursuit of the plan's first 



81 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

objective, the government requested a halt to French subsidies to 
the current operating budget. Nevertheless, French development 
assistance continued and was critical to investment plans that 
favored the partly French-owned iron mines that opened in 1963. 

In the second (1970-74) and third (1976-80) development plans, 
Mauritania asserted an independent national economic identity and 
established the framework of the public sector. In 1973 Maurita- 
nia withdrew from the French-backed West African Monetary 
Union (Union Monetaire Ouest Africaine — UMOA) and created 
an independent central bank and national currency, the ouguiya. 
In 1974 the government nationalized the mining sector, and en- 
terprises engaged in basic public services and "mauritanized" staff 
positions throughout the newly expanded public sector. Planners 
continued to focus on investment in mining and infrastructure 
(roads in particular). Between 1970 and 1975, mining received 39 
percent of a planned total expenditure of UM8.9 billion (for value 
of the ouguiya — see Glossary), and roads received 20 percent. The 
rural sector continued to lag, as the government allocated to it only 
7 percent of total development spending. 

The government that came to power in 1978 adopted a fourth 
five-year development plan (1981-85) and a stabilization pro- 
gram that had International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glos- 
sary) support. The stabilization program called for tighter controls 
on government spending, more stringent tax collection, and major 
debt rescheduling. The five-year plan had three objectives: the 
development of irrigated agriculture, the rehabilitation of the iron 
mining sector, and the construction of a national fishing industry. 

Public enterprises emerged rapidly during the 1970s and by 1985 
totaled more than 100 entities. Through these parastatal enterprises, 
the government brought under national control the exploitation 
of the country's natural resources and the provision of basic pub- 
lic services — functions that were still largely in foreign hands as 
late as the mid-1970s. By the mid-1980s, public enterprises gener- 
ated about 20 percent of GDP and employed some 14,000 people, 
thus providing about 25 percent of recorded employment in the 
modern sector. By 1986 the parastatal companies included twenty- 
five largely government-owned industrial and commercial enter- 
prises, twenty- seven joint ventures with the private sector, and fifty- 
six decentralized services in administration, research, and educa- 
tion. The largest public enterprise was the National Mining and 
Industrial Company (Societe Nationale Industrielle et Miniere — 
SNIM). 

The majority of the larger, wholly government- owned enterprises 
operated in principle on a commercial basis. Nevertheless, since 



82 



The Economy 



the late 1970s they have operated at a loss, and many have failed 
to provide the services for which they were responsible. Direct 
government operating subsidies to these public enterprises were 
modest, totaling only 3 percent of government expenditures in 1983. 
Their losses (in addition to undelivered services) reverted to the 
government, however, because they failed to pay tax liabilities and 
the government assumed their debts. In 1986 public enterprises 
owed 25 percent of Mauritania's total public external debt. 

The poor performance of public enterprises had a variety of 
causes, including a paucity of technical and professional skills among 
increasingly "mauritanized" staffs, a poor definition of roles and 
responsibilities, inadequate pricing policies, weak accounting prac- 
tices, and overstaffing. In 1983 the government launched a pro- 
gram to reform and rehabilitate the public sector, and this program 
continued under the 1985-88 Economic Recovery Program and 
the 1987 Structural Adjustment Program agreements with the 
World Bank (see Glossary). Under the original 1983 program, no 
new public enterprises were to be established unless they could be 
economically justified; public enterprises were to be reviewed and 
nominated for liquidation, privatization, or rehabilitation; subsi- 
dies were to be phased out; and pricing policies were to be revised 
to reflect economic costs. In addition, interlocking relationships 
between the central government and individual enterprises were 
to be more clearly defined and enterprise debt arrears settled; ex- 
cess staff was to be trimmed, hiring of new unskilled staff was to 
be frozen, and a new salary scale was to be established. Finally, 
substantial improvements in budgeting, accounting, and auditing 
procedures were to be introduced. 

By 1987 progress in achieving these goals was impressive. The 
government had implemented selective rehabilitation of five large 
public enterprises. It also had privatized three others and begun 
liquidating five more. 

The government's plan included privatizing three of the coun- 
try's eight public financial institutions. In 1984 it setded interlocking 
debts of fifteen important enterprises through compensation, can- 
cellation, and refinancing. In 1985, under new pricing policies, 
regulated producer prices paid to farmers by the Commission for 
Food Security (Commissariat a la Securite Alimentaire — CSA) rose 
by 40 percent. At the same time, the CSA raised the price of sub- 
sidized food aid on sale by 50 percent. The National Import-Export 
Company (Societe Nationale d'lmportation et d'Exportation — 
SONIMEX) raised consumer prices for food and basic commodity 
goods by approximately 30 percent to reflect real costs and to achieve 
full import parity on grain prices at the Senegalese border. Water 



83 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

and electricity prices rose by 10 percent, and port services fees rose 
by 25 percent, in part to compensate for the 1985 currency devalu- 
ation (see Government Finances, this ch.). The government reduced 
labor costs at SNIM, where it cut the work force by 25 percent. 
By the end of 1987, public sector management, wage policies, train- 
ing, accounting procedures, and policies governing relations be- 
tween the public enterprises and the central government all were 
under intensive review by the World Bank and the international 
donor community. 

Fishing 

The waters off the 754-kilometer-long coast of Mauritania are 
among the richest fishing grounds in the world (see fig. 6). In 1986 
estimates of the country's potential annual marine resources ranged 
between 400,000 and 700,000 tons. Mauritanian officials estimated 
the potential annual catch at 525,000 tons, a level close to that of 
Senegal, which had the largest fishing industry in West Africa. The 
actual catch, however, could only be estimated on the basis of export 
figures from Mauritania, recorded catches of licensed operators, 
and estimates of unrecorded and unlicensed catches. Unrecorded 
and unlicensed fishing in Mauritania's waters were believed to be 
high, perhaps in excess of 100,000 tons annually. In 1983 recorded 
exports and declared licensed fishing catches were estimated at 
450,000 tons. Combining these figures, experts believed Maurita- 
nia's waters were close to being overfished. Although these waters 
had long been commercially exploited by foreign fleets, Maurita- 
nians historically had done litde fishing. The majority Maure popu- 
lation consumed little fish, and only the small Imraguen ethnic 
group fished for subsistence (see Maures, ch. 2). 

Until 1979, Mauritania's efforts to exploit the economic benefits 
of its fishing grounds focused on licensing foreign operators in ter- 
ritorial waters (confined until 1980 to a thirty-nautical-mile limit). 
These efforts, coupled with some port and processing development 
designed to attract fleets to land their catches at Nouadhibou, were 
only partially successful. The principal benefit came in the form 
of licensing royalties, calculated on the basis of 10 percent of an 
operator's reported catch. Because Mauritania had no means of 
patrolling its waters, many foreign operators were never licensed, 
and licensed operators consistently underreported their catches. 
Nevertheless, revenues from fishing royalties were very important 
to the government and in 1977-78 accounted for almost 20 per- 
cent of total budget receipts. In addition, the port and processing 
facilities were underused. In 1967 only 35 percent of the 52,000-ton 
annual processing capacity was used. Foreign operators preferred 



84 



The Economy 



to use the facilities at Las Palmas, in Spain's Canary Islands, where 
they could avoid the supply, handling, water, and electric power 
shortages prevalent at Nouadhibou. 

In 1979 Mauritania initiated its New Fisheries Policy and es- 
tablished a 200-nautical-mile EEZ. The New Fisheries Policy had 
three objectives: the formation of Mauritanian-controlled joint ven- 
tures, the creation of a national fishing fleet, and the establishment 
of a Mauritanian-controlled fish processing industry at Nouadhibou. 

The first of these objectives led to the replacement of licensing 
and royalties agreements with foreign operators by newly formed 
Mauritanian-controlled joint ventures. In principle, such joint ven- 
tures implied a 43 percent government share, an 8 percent local 
private sector share, and a 49 percent foreign share. In practice, 
Mauritanian control of these ventures was nominal. The foreign 
partner provided all the capital and equipment and controlled all 
operations. Government and private shares were to be purchased 
out of venture profits over periods as long as twenty years. By 1986 
the most important of the joint venture agreements that had been 
established was the Mauritanian- Soviet Maritime Resources Com- 
pany (Mauritanienne-Sovietique des Ressources Maritimes — 
MAUSOV). Between 1985 and 1987, MAUSOV accounted for 
about 55 percent of total export tonnage and 20 to 30 percent of 
the total value of fish exports. The next most important joint ven- 
ture was the Mauritanian-Romanian Fishing Company (Societe 
Mauritano-Roumaine de Peche — SIMAR). Between 1985 and 
1987, SIMAR accounted for 16 to 18 percent of total export ton- 
nage and 7 to 10 percent of the total value of fish exports. Other 
significant joint ventures were established with Algeria, Iraq, and 
the Republic of Korea (South Korea). 

The development of a national fishing fleet and processing in- 
dustry led to the creation in the early 1980s of two public enter- 
prises. The government also participated in and lent support to 
several privately owned Mauritanian fishing and processing 
companies. The most important of these was the Mauritanian Com- 
mercial Fish Company (Societe Mauritanienne de Commerciali- 
sation du Poisson — SMCP). Owning no boats or facilities, the 
SMCP was a marketing board that bought all fish landed at 
Nouadhibou. By the terms of their agreements, joint ventures were 
required to land a portion of their catches — in practice, only the 
more valuable demersal (sea-bottom) fish — for local processing. The 
SMCP arranged processing and cold storage at port facilities 
before resale and export. Between 1985 and 1987, the SMCP ex- 
ported 14 to 17 percent of the total catch and accounted for 71 to 
82 percent of the demersal catch, which translated into 75 to 



85 



Mauritania: A Country Study 



® 
▲ 

Fe 
Cu 
Gy 
Ph 



T 



National capital 
Fishing 

Fish processing 
Iron 

Copper 

Gypsum 

Phosphates 

Livestock 
Dates 
Agriculture 
Railroad 



100 200 KILOMETERS 



100 



200 MILES 




Circled resources indicate that they were under exploitation in 1987. 



Figure 6. Economic Activity, 1987 



86 



The Economy 



88 percent of the value of demersal exports and 43 to 60 percent 
of the value of total fish exports. Another public enterprise, the 
Mauritanian Refrigeration Company (Societe des Frigorifiques 
Mauritaniens — SOFRIMA), operated processing facilities as well 
as a fleet of fishing boats. Several small privately owned Maurita- 
nian companies also operated facilities or fleets of fishing boats. 

Between 1968 and 1974, processing capacity at Nouadhibou rose 
by 22 percent per year until it reached an annual capacity of around 
140,000 tons. Between 1970 and 1979, however, companies land- 
ed between 50,000 and 80,000 tons of fish annually for processing 
at Nouadhibou — far below the port's capacity. During the first years 
of the New Fisheries Policy (1979 to 1982), tonnage landed dropped 
to under 10,000 tons. Once joint venture agreements were signed, 
however, average annual tonnage landed began to rise, reaching 
about 58,500 tons annually between 1984 and 1986. Joint venture 
companies built additional processing capacity, and by 1985 the 
port had an annual processing capacity of some 200,000 tons. 
Despite government policy requiring certain landings, however, 
at the rates companies were landing their catches, only 30 percent 
of the port's capacity was in use. 

Because of poor services and high costs, Nouadhibou was unat- 
tractive to fishing fleets. Its principal problem was lack of handling 
equipment for quickly unloading frozen or iced fish from vessels 
to cold storage. In addition, fish spoiled quickly in the desert heat, 
and the high cost of electrical power for processing and cold storage 
(three times the cost at Las Palmas) made landing of any but the 
most valuable fish varieties uneconomical. In addition, supplies 
and equipment were not readily available. Many items had to be 
brought in on an emergency basis by air, further inflating the cost 
of operations. Local banking facilities were limited, and interna- 
tional communications were difficult and often unavailable. Finally, 
Nouadhibou — with only two small hotels and scant recreational 
opportunities — offered little attraction to crews of vessels calling 
at the port. For the most part, crews who used the port either stayed 
on ship, went directly to chartered flights home, or took commer- 
cial flights to recreational ports such as Las Palmas or Dakar. Thus, 
the local economy benefited little from their presence. 

Compounding these problems, the types of fishing vessels in use 
and the economics of the international market in fish varieties also 
made Nouadhibou unattractive for fish processing. The most eco- 
nomical types of vessels in use in the mid-1980s were large trawl- 
ers capable of freezing, processing, and transshipping catches 
independently of any port. The largest were Atlantic- and Super 
Atlantic-class factory trawlers, built for the most part in the German 



87 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

Democratic Republic (East Germany) and operated by the Soviets 
and Romanians. In the mid-1980s, these ships accounted for the 
bulk of Mauritania's reported catch, including 85 percent of pelagic 
(open-sea) fish. Between 1985 and 1987, pelagic fish represented 
about 79 percent of the total catch. The pelagic catch included 
sardines, herring, tuna, and anchovies. Although it represented 
the bulk of tonnage caught, the pelagic catch included the least valu- 
able of fish varieties in Mauritania's waters and was fished almost 
entirely by the Soviet and Romanian joint ventures. From 1985 
to 1987, MAUSOV and SIMAR accounted for 90 percent of the 
pelagic catch. Because of their size and draft, the Adantic- and Super 
Atlantic-class pelagic freezer-factory trawlers could not enter 
Nouadhibou, and they transshipped their catches to refrigerated 
carrier vessels anchored outside the port. 

The most valuable varieties of seafood in Mauritania's waters 
were demersals, including cod, sole, octopus, squid, lobster, and 
shrimp. For these varieties, joint ventures and local operators used 
demersal freezers and demersal ice boats. The ice boats had to un- 
load their catches for processing at port before export, but the freez- 
ers were somewhat less dependent on port processing. In 1983 the 
government began requiring the landing and processing of all de- 
mersal catches at Nouadhibou under the SMCP monopoly. Be- 
tween 1985 and 1987, the demersal catch was estimated at about 
21 percent of the total catch, with the SMCP accounting for 71 
to 81 percent of the demersal exports, representing as much as 60 
percent of the total value of fish exports in those years. 

Despite difficulties, the New Fisheries Policy was partially suc- 
cessful. Its adoption led to the formation of important joint ven- 
ture operations and the growth of locally owned fishing fleets. Efforts 
to encourage local fishing brought some opportunity for sales to 
processors and exporters, estimated at 10,000 tons per year. In the 
1983-85 period, 70 percent of the total estimated catch in Maurita- 
nian waters was brought in by joint ventures and ships flying the 
Mauritanian flag. This activity generated approximately US$150 
million in gross export receipts and made fishing the country's most 
important source of foreign exchange. The remaining 30 percent 
of the reported catch continued to be fished by companies under 
older licensing agreements. These older agreements were due to 
expire by 1988 and included, in particular, operations of the Spanish 
and Portuguese fleets. A comprehensive fishing agreement cover- 
ing the operations of these and other European operators that mainly 
fished for demersals was under negotiation with the European Com- 
munity (EC) in 1987. To better control the estimated 100,000 tons 
of fish taken by unlicensed trawlers, the government, the World 



88 




Imraguen fishermen 
Courtesy UNICEF (Maggie Murray-Lee) 



89 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

Bank, and the donor community were considering measures to 
increase surveillance and reporting. In late 1987, studies sponsored 
by the World Bank and donor community were under way to de- 
termine ways to increase the value-added portion of the industry 
to GDP. 

Mining 

Mauritania's mineral wealth has been exploited since Neolithic 
times. Archeological evidence of a copper mining and refining site 
near Akjoujt in west-central Mauritania dates from 500 to 1000 
B.C. Modern exploitation of copper at Akjoujt and the more im- 
portant iron ore deposits between Fderik and Zouirat began after 
independence. 

Iron 

Plans to exploit the high-grade iron ore deposits at Kedia, near 
Zouirat, began in 1952 with the formation of the privately owned 
Mauritanian Iron Mines Company (Societe Anonyme des Mines 
de Fer de Mauritanie — MIFERMA). With support from the World 
Bank, the French government, and the Mauritanian government, 
MIFERMA (owned by French, British, Italian, and West Ger- 
man steel interests) began operations in 1963. By 1966 MIFERMA 
had invested the equivalent of some US$200 million in mining facili- 
ties at Kedia, port facilities at Nouadhibou, and a rail line to carry 
the ore to port for export. 

Iron mining quickly dominated Mauritania's economy. In 1966, 
after only three years of operations, iron mining contributed 28 
percent to GDP and accounted for 92 percent of the value of all 
exports. The three surface mines at Kedia had a rich ore content 
of 65 percent. Mined by explosives from the sides of tall rock for- 
mations, the ore was loaded on 100- ton trucks for transport to the 
railhead. There, the ore was also crushed and sorted. The ore was 
then loaded on the world's heaviest trains (200 cars carrying a total 
of 20,000 tons, pulled by four locomotives, and averaging two 
kilometers in length) for transport to Nouadhibou for export (see 
Transportation and Communications, this ch.). Normally, there 
was one trip daily in each direction along the 650-kilometer line. 

Iron mining provided the income for Mauritania's economic 
development during the first two decades of independence. Con- 
struction of the mine, rail, and port facilities provided wages to 
thousands of laborers. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
industry employed some 6,000 workers and accounted for about 
10 percent of the jobs in the modern sector. Development of the 
mines and their associated infrastructure took the bulk of investment 



90 



The Economy 



funds allocated under the first three national development plans 
(see Role of the Government, this ch.). The iron mining industry 
had a substantial direct and indirect impact on the economy, and 
many industrial and construction enterprises worked primarily or 
exclusively for the iron company. By the mid-1970s, iron opera- 
tions consumed about 40 percent of the country's imports of fuel 
oil. At the same time, mining was responsible indirectly for about 
25 percent of GDP because of its high consumption of public utili- 
ties (power and water), commerce, transportation, and services. 
Iron also provided nearly 30 percent of all government revenues, 
thereby making an important contribution to all public sector in- 
vestment and current expenditures. By the early 1970s, the cumula- 
tive effects of the growth of iron mining on national accounts, along 
with rising demand and good world commodity prices, enabled 
Mauritania to be recategorized by the World Bank and United 
Nations (UN) from a "least developed country" to a "moderate- 
income developing country." This reclassification increased 
Mauritania's ability to borrow on the international market to 
finance its ambitious development plans. 

The development of the iron mines also contributed directly to 
the country's rapid urbanization. At independence, the popula- 
tions of Nouadhibou and Zouirat were estimated at less than 5,000 
each. By the mid-1970s, these two towns had more than quadru- 
pled in size to around 20,000 to 30,000 people each. Mining 
revenues to the government also helped spur the growth of the 
administrative capital at Nouakchott, which grew from around 
5,000 people in 1960 to over 125,000 people in the mid-1970s. 

In 1974 Mauritania nationalized the mining industry as a part 
of its effort to establish economic independence under the second 
development plan. With substantial assistance from Arab mem- 
bers of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
Mauritania bought out the European owners of MIFERMA. 
Transfer of ownership to the newly formed SNIM was smooth; 
the terms of the transfer kept the foreign expert personnel and 
managers on the job and maintained the commercial relationship 
with the former owners of MIFERMA. 

The mid-1970s marked a turning point for Mauritania's econ- 
omy. Two events adversely affected the mining sector. The first 
was the onset of the world recession in 1974 and 1975, caused by 
the sharp rise of world oil prices; the second was Mauritania's costly 
involvement in the Western Sahara conflict between 1976 and 1978. 
These events, along with a prolonged drought that began in the 
late 1960s, reversed Mauritania's iron-based economic growth. 



91 




92 




93 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

From the beginning of mining operations in 1963, Mauritania's 
production and export of iron ore rose constantly for a decade. In 
1974 ore exports reached their all-time high of 11.7 million tons 
(see fig. 7). In the following year, with falling demand for steel 
in Western Europe, Mauritania's exports of iron ore declined by 
more than 25 percent, to 8.7 million tons. Between 1975 and 1987, 
iron ore exports averaged 8.5 million tons annually. Between 1976 
and 1978, attacks on the rail line by the Polisario (see Glossary) 
exacerbated the situation. In 1978 ore exports had fallen to 6.2 mil- 
lion tons. Mauritania's withdrawal from the war in mid- 1978 
allowed some recovery but did not affect the trend resulting from 
continued weak demand for iron ore on world markets. 

By the late 1970s, the worsening economic situation created the 
first in a series of financial crises for the state, whose revenues fell 
with declining iron ore exports. This decline affected the govern- 
ment's ability to meet increasing foreign debt obligations. An im- 
mediate result of this financial crisis was the government's decision 
to reorganize the nationalized mining sector as a part of an IMF- 
supported stabilization program. Following nationalization in 1974, 
SNIM controlled not only iron mining but also copper and gyp- 
sum mining, as well as other industries and trading activities related 
to mining. The most important benefits of this arrangement for 
SNIM were control over the national distribution of petroleum 
products through the Petroleum Products Commercial Union 
(Union Commerciale des Produits Petroliers — UCPP); control of 
the explosives industry (with factories in Nouadhibou and Nouak- 
chott); and participation in the Arab Metal Industries Company 
(Societe Arabe des Industries Metallurgiques — SAMIA), which 
planned and later operated a steel rolling mill at Nouadhibou. Until 
1978 SNIM's operations were the direct responsibility of the presi- 
dent of the republic and were administered by a board of supervi- 
sors composed of twelve members from the various ministries under 
the chairmanship of the minister of planning and mines. 

The reorganization carried out between 1978 and 1979 led to 
SNIM's divestiture of many of these operations, particularly those 
related to copper and gypsum mining and petroleum products dis- 
tribution. The financial reorganization of SNIM resulted in the 
sale of about 30 percent of the company's shares to new foreign 
investors, including the Arab Mining Company, the Islamic 
Development Bank, the government of Morocco, the government 
of Iraq, and the Kuwait Foreign Trading, Contracting, and In- 
vestment Company. 

The critical importance of iron ore mining to the economy was 
underscored in the late 1970s by the ripple effects its decline had 



94 



The Economy 



on the country's ability to meet its debt obligations. Prospects that 
the industry would continue to decline throughout the 1980s as the 
older Kedia deposits were exhausted led the government, with 
World Bank support, to embark on the US$500 million Guelbs 
Iron Ore Project in 1979. The sale of US$120 million worth of 
SNIM shares to Arab investors was one means of raising the capi- 
tal for this massive project. Further support was guaranteed by large 
loans from the World Bank, the Saudi Fund, France's Central Fund 
for Economic Cooperation (Caisse Centrale de Cooperation 
Economique — CCCE), the Kuwait Fund, the Arab Fund for Eco- 
nomic and Social Development, the Abu Dhabi Fund, and the 
European Investment Bank. Smaller loans were secured from the 
Japan Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, the African Develop- 
ment Bank, and the OPEC Special Fund. 

In late 1984, the first phase of the Guelbs project went into oper- 
ation with the opening of new surface mines at El Rheins, located 
in the Zouirat district, about twenty-two kilometers from the Kedia 
deposits. Because the ore from the new deposits was not as rich 
as the Kedia ore (38 percent pure iron content as compared with 
Kedia ore's 65 percent iron content), the project required the con- 
struction of concentration and beneficiation facilities to raise the 
ore content to competitive marketing levels before export. Trans- 
portation, water, power, housing, and port facilities were also up- 
graded at Zouirat and Nouadhibou to handle what was expected 
to be increasing ore exports. By 1987, however, world demand for 
iron ore had not risen as expected, and the 1986 opening of new 
Brazilian mines increased overproduction worldwide. The Guelbs 
project was not expected to be cost effective for some time, if ever. 
Plans for a second-phase expansion were postponed in 1987; the 
Kedia deposits were still in operation in late 1987 and were ex- 
pected to continue production into the 1990s. 

Since 1975 the decline of the iron mining industry, as represented 
by its direct contribution to GDP, has been constant. During the 
1960s, mining directly accounted for no less than 25 percent and 
as much as 33 percent of GDP at current market prices. If indirect 
contributions to related industries are factored in, these propor- 
tions rise. By the mid-1970s, with its direct contribution to GDP 
around 20 percent, mining's total contribution to GDP was still 
above 30 percent. After 1976 mining's direct contribution to GDP 
fell, so that between 1980 and 1985 it averaged 10 percent; by 1987 
it was only 8.6 percent. 

Iron ore was the nation's most important source of foreign ex- 
change for twenty years; the value of iron ore exports relative to 
other exports fell below 50 percent for the first time in 1983. In 



95 



Mauritania: A Country Study 



THOUSANDS 
OF TONS 

12,000 



10,000. 
8,000 
6,000 
4,000 
2,000 




! ! 



II B 



nr 



73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 

YEARS 



Figure 7. Iron Ore Exports, 1973-83 



that year, exports of fish overtook iron ore exports as Mauritania's 
most important foreign exchange earner. In 1985 iron ore repre- 
sented 40 percent of total export earnings, down from an average 
of 80 percent between 1963 and 1980. 

Despite these relative declines, iron mining remained a key fac- 
tor in the overall economy. In terms of relative export percentages, 
mining's decline had little effect on day-to-day operations. In the 
1984-86 period, levels of tons of iron ore shipped from Nouadhibou 
were actually higher than in the 1982-83 period. In 1985 SNIM 
was the country's largest employer after the government and ac- 
counted for over 40 percent of the jobs in public sector enter- 
prises. In the 1970s, iron ore contributions to government 
revenues were estimated at around 30 percent of all government 
revenues. This percentage probably declined during the 1980s, 
but in late 1987 statistics were unavailable. Between 1981 and 
1986, mining royalties contributed about 5 percent to govern- 
ment tax revenues. The industry's actual contributions were 
much higher, however, when taxes paid on business profits and 
wages and salaries, employers' payroll taxes, turnover taxes, ex- 
port taxes, and nontax revenues from public enterprises are taken 
into account. 



96 



The Economy 



Copper, Gypsum, Phosphates, and Oil 

In 1967 the Mauritanian government formed a joint venture 
company with French and other interests to create the Mining Com- 
pany of Mauritania (Societe des Mines de Mauritanie — SOMINA). 
SOMINA was created to exploit copper deposits at Akjoujt. Oper- 
ations began in 1973 but closed in 1975 because of the combina- 
tion of high operating costs (particularly for fuel) and falling world 
commodity prices for SOMINA 's low-grade ore. In 1975 the com- 
pany was sold to SNIM. SNIM reopened the mine and continued 
to operate it at a loss until 1978, when the government separated 
SOMINA from SNIM and closed the mine. In the early 1980s, 
plans were laid to reopen the mines with backing from the Jordan- 
based Arab Mining Company of Inchiri (Societe Arabe des Mines 
de rinchiri— SAMIN). By 1987, however, SAMIN had abandoned 
plans to operate the copper mine because of continued low world 
commodity prices and the high costs of processing the low-grade 
ore with its high arsenic content. In a related development, SAMIN 
planned to open a plant at Akjoujt to process copper tailings for 
gold content. Operations were scheduled to begin in 1988. 

In 1973 SNIM began exploitation of large deposits of gypsum 
located about fifty kilometers northeast of Nouakchott. Total reserves 
of 98 percent pure gypsum were estimated at 1 billion tons. SNIM's 
operations during the 1970s entailed the export by road of roughly 
17,000 tons per year to cement factories in Senegal. Senegal in turn 
sold cement to Mauritania on a rebate basis. Rising transportation 
costs forced a halt to operations in 1981 . In 1984 production of gyp- 
sum resumed under the newly created SAMIA. SNIM held equal 
shares in SAMIA with the Kuwait Foreign Trading, Contracting, 
and Investment Company. Output in 1985 was 5,470 tons, which 
were consumed locally in a crushing and bagging operation that im- 
ported clinker from Senegal to make cement. Plans in 1987 called 
for resuming exports of gypsum to Senegal by sea once the new 
Chinese-built Friendship Port at Nouakchott became operational 
(see Transportation and Communications, this ch.). 

In 1984 a consortium discovered large deposits of phosphates 
near the Senegalese border. Nonetheless, by 1987 no plans existed 
to exploit these deposits (estimated at 95 million tons of rock, aver- 
aging approximately 20 percent of phosphate pentoxide). The high 
cost of building the infrastructure and facilities needed to exploit 
the deposits, estimated in 1984 at US$400 million, made exploita- 
tion unlikely for the foreseeable future. 

In 1985 seismic surveys conducted jointly by Occidental Petroleum 
Company of the United States, the Chinese Petroleum Corporation 



97 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

of Taiwan, and Yukong Limited of South Korea indicated a high 
possibility of petroleum and natural gas reserves in Mauritanian 
waters. In 1987 the American Oil Company (Amoco) signed an 
agreement with the government for a production-sharing contract 
to conduct offshore explorations in a 920,000-hectare tract west 
of Nouakchott. The company began seismic acquisition work in 
late 1987 and planned to drill exploratory wells in 1988. 

The Rural Economy 

Located in the Sahelian and Saharan zones, Mauritania has one 
of the poorest agricultural bases in West Africa. Most important 
to the rural economy has been the livestock subsector. Between 
1975 and 1980, herding engaged up to 70 percent of the popula- 
tion, and sedentary farmers constituted about 20 percent of the 
population. The vast majority of the population lived in the southern 
one-third of the country, where rainfall levels were high enough 
to sustain catde herding. Farming was restricted to the narrow band 
along the Senegal River where rainfall of up to 600 millimeters 
per year and annual river flooding sustained crop production as 
well as large catde herds. In the dry northern two- thirds of the coun- 
try, herding was limited to widely scattered pastoral groups that 
raised camels, sheep, and goats, and farming was restricted to date 
palms and minuscule plots around oases. 

A major reason for Mauritania's economic stagnation since the 
mid-1970s has been the decline of its rural sector. Government plan- 
ners neglected both herding and farming until the 1980s, concen- 
trating instead on development in the industrial sector. The rural 
sector was severely affected by droughts from 1968 through 1973 
and from 1983 through 1985, and it has suffered from sporadic 
dry spells in other years. In the 1960s, livestock and crop production 
together provided 35 to 45 percent of GDP (at constant 1982 prices). 
From 1970 to 1986, their contribution to GDP (at constant 1982 
prices) averaged 28 percent, with herding accounting for about 20 
percent of this figure and with crop production falling to as low 
as 3 to 5 percent in the worst drought years. 

Herding 

Historically, cattle herding was Mauritania's most important 
economic activity. In the 1980s, with a catde-to-people ratio of three 
to one — the highest in West Africa — herding provided subsistence 
for up to 70 percent of the country's people. Herding has been 
dramatically affected by chronic drought and the attendant rapid 
advance of the desert. These events have forced shifts in patterns 



98 



Ore-loading facility near Zouirdt 
Courtesy Embassy of Mauritania, Washington 

of movement, herd composition and ownership, and increased 
pressures on lands also occupied by sedentary farmers in the south. 

Although sources disagree about herd size, it is clear that num- 
bers have fallen since the 1960s (see table 2, Appendix). The decline 
in herd size probably did not reflect a wide scale dying-off of animals 
so much as an increasingly permanent shift of herds to better 
watered lands in Senegal and Mali. 

The drought also caused shifts in the herding of camels (tradi- 
tionally located in the drier north) and of sheep and goats (held 
by groups all across Mauritania). These changes were less dramatic 
than those for cattle, however, because camels, sheep, and goats 
are more resistant to drought. Although decreases in sheep, goat, 
and camel herd size in drought years could be significant, recov- 
ery was more rapid and sustained. In the years following the 
1968-73 drought, camel, sheep, and goat herd sizes increased to 
predrought levels or higher. The same pattern seemed evident dur- 
ing the 1983-85 drought and the recovery years of the late 1980s. 
Indeed, the overall size of camel, sheep, and goat herds may have 
risen since the 1960s, as these hardier animals have moved into 
areas abandoned by cattle herds. This pattern seems to have been 
particularly true for the camel herds. 

In the 1960s, cattle herds in Mauritania were composed of two 
basic types: the lighter, short-horned zebu, or "maure," which 



99 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

made up perhaps 85 percent of the national herd; and the heavier, 
long-horned zebu, or "peul." The smaller zebu ranged farther 
north and were owned by nomadic herders. The larger zebu stayed 
closer to the better watered riverine areas and were owned by seden- 
tary groups who practiced agriculture in addition to livestock 
raising. 

Although traditional herding patterns persist, considerable 
changes have taken place. Since the 1968-73 drought, precipita- 
tion has been below average. Between 1973 and 1984, as the 
150-millimeter isohyet line moved south, livestock often were forced 
to stay year-round in dry season grazing areas nearer the Senegal 
River and across the border in Senegal and Mali (see Major Geo- 
graphic and Climatic Zones, ch. 2). Thus, the herd populations 
were compressed into a smaller area, increasing pressure on land 
resources and heightening competition among herding groups and 
between herders and sedentary farmers. Overgrazing in increas- 
ingly crowded areas and the cutting of trees and shrubs for fire- 
wood and fodder (particularly for sheep and goats) contributed to 
accelerating desertification and posed a threat to crop production. 

Patterns of herd ownership also changed with drought and the 
impoverishment of the rural sector. Increasingly, herds belonged 
to urban investors (mostly government officials and traders) and 
were cared for by hired personnel (drawn from the pool of desti- 
tute pastoralists who, having lost herds, migrated to urban areas). 
Herders began to take advantage of access to public wells to graze 
herds in areas traditionally controlled by tribal groups. The ex- 
tent of this growing system of "absentee herding" was difficult 
to assess; but by the mid-1980s, as much as 40 percent of the 
national herd was thought to be involved. 

The Ministry of Rural Development was responsible for livestock 
and natural resource conservation. The ministry's National 
Livestock Department (Direction Nationale d'Elevage — DNE) was 
responsible for field services and for the annual rinderpest vacci- 
nation campaign. Headquartered in Nouakchott, in the mid-1980s 
the DNE operated eleven field centers in regional capitals and 
nineteen veterinary field stations, mostly located in the southern 
third of the country. Used principally in the annual vaccination 
campaigns, these field stations offered few other veterinary and 
extension services. The ministry also operated the National School 
for Training and Rural Extension (Ecole Nationale de Formation 
et Vulgarisation Rurale — ENFVR) at Kaedi, which since 1968 has 
trained veterinary field staff. 

In 1981 the government established an autonomous state mar- 
keting enterprise, the Mauritanian Livestock Marketing Company 



100 



The Economy 



(Societe Mauritanienne de la Commercialisation du Betail — 
SOMECOB). This agency had an official, but unenforceable, mo- 
nopoly over livestock exports and the authority to intervene in mar- 
ket operations to stabilize domestic livestock prices. SOMECOB 
was also responsible for the Kaedi Abattoir, constructed in 1975 
as an export slaughterhouse. By 1986 it functioned for local 
municipal consumption only, far below capacity, and SOMECOB 's 
exports were negligible. Private exports of live cattle took place 
without obstruction from SOMECOB. This trade consisted mostly 
of unrecorded movements into Senegal, Mali, and countries far- 
ther south. In the mid-1980s, the most important market for 
Mauritanian cattle was domestic, centered on Nouakchott, 
Nouadhibou, and the mining centers. 

Farming 

Although it is a large country, most of Mauritania is desert. In 
the late 1980s, arable land was scarce, and, except for some oases, 
crop production was limited to a narrow band along the southern 
borders with Senegal and Mali. Farmers practiced four types of 
agriculture: rain-fed dryland cropping, called dieri; flood recession 
cropping along the Senegal River and its seasonal tributaries, called 
oualo; oasis cultivation, the least important; and modern irrigated 
agriculture. 

The most important methods, dieri and oualo, were entirely de- 
pendent on limited and erratic rainfall and on the annual flooding 
of the Senegal River and its only perennial tributary in Maurita- 
nia, the Gorgol River. Dieri cultivation occurred during the rainy 
season, from June-July to September-October, in areas receiving 
sufficient precipitation (400 to 450 millimeters annually) to grow 
millet and peas. Oualo plantings occurred during the cold dry sea- 
son from November to March, to take advantage of ground 
moisture as the flood waters of the Senegal and Gorgol rivers reced- 
ed. Sorghum was the major crop for this season. Oasis cultivation 
drew its water from subterranean sources and so was not depen- 
dent on rains. Indeed, areas where oases were located might not 
experience any significant rainfall for years. Modern irrigated 
agriculture was only partially dependent on annual rainfall. It 
depended primarily on dams to retain water from the annual rise 
on the rivers resulting from rains falling upriver. For the Senegal 
River, these rains fell principally in the headwaters in eastern Mali 
and Guinea. 

The two major droughts of the African Sahel were prolonged 
in Mauritania by intermittent dry spells. The result was a serious 
decline in overall agricultural production. In the 1960s, Mauritania 



101 



Mauritania: A Country Study 




73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 
YEARS 



82 83 84 85 



Figure 8. Grain Production, 1973-85 



produced about one-half of its grain needs. By the 1983-85 period, 
grain harvests had fallen to a level that met only about 3 to 8 per- 
cent of the country's grain needs. The cereal deficits have been 
filled through a combination of commercial imports and interna- 
tional food aid, of which the United States has been the principal 
donor. During the most serious drought years, from 1983 to 1985, 
food aid accounted for over 61 percent of Mauritania's available 
supply of grain, commercial imports of rice by the government cov- 
ered approximately 20 percent, and imports of flour by private 
traders provided another 13 percent. Local production was able 
to cover only 5 percent of need. In the following three years, local 
production recovered sufficiently to meet about one-third of the 
annual grain need, estimated in 1986 at 260,000 tons. In that year, 
local production covered 35 percent of need, government imports 
supplied 30 percent, and food aid met 35 percent. 

Although accurate data were lacking, production of all grains 
in the recovery years from 1985 to 1987 rose to between 68,000 
and 120,000 tons, a large increase over the record low of approxi- 
mately 20,000 tons in 1984 (see fig. 8). Thus, gross production 
between 1985 and 1987 attained levels not matched since the 
mid-1960s. Rising population in the interim meant that, despite 



102 



The Economy 



this significant recovery, the country remained dependent on im- 
ported grains to satisfy its needs. 

Crops 

Millet and sorghum were Mauritania's principal crops, followed 
by rice and corn. Before the 1980s, millet and sorghum accounted 
for 70 to 80 percent or more of total grain production. Rice produc- 
tion in the 1970s averaged 5 to 10 percent, and corn made up 10 
to 25 percent. In the 1980s, rice production grew in importance, 
as national planning emphasized irrigated agriculture (which 
favored rice) and a change in dietary habits. 

A few other crops were cultivated. Around 10,000 to 15,000 tons 
of dates were produced annually in the country's oases, mostly for 
local consumption. During the 1960s, the traditional production 
of gum arabic (see Glossary) rose to some 5,000 tons a year. By 
the 1980s, however, production of gum arabic had disappeared. 
The ill-considered cutting of trees to increase short-term produc- 
tion combined with drought to destroy virtually all of Mauritania's 
gum-producing acacia trees. 

By 1986 farmers working irrigated lands produced about 35 per- 
cent of the country's grain crops. Of a potentially irrigable area 
estimated at 135,000 hectares, only some 13,700 hectares were in 
production in 1985-86. Most of the irrigated land (about 65 per- 
cent) was in large-scale developments (500 hectares or more) cen- 
tered in Bogue and Kaedi, which were controlled by the government 
through the National Corporation for Rural Development (Societe 
Nationale pour le Developpement Rural — SONADER). The 
remainder were small-scale operations (less than fifty hectares), 
developed by a newly active private sector centered mainly in Rosso. 

In the 1980s, the government put increased emphasis on develop- 
ing the rural sector. Government planning strategy under the 
1985-88 Economic Recovery Program placed the highest priority 
on rural development (35 percent of planned investments). Par- 
ticular attention was to be paid to upgrading existing land and de- 
veloping new irrigated farming and flood recession agriculture. 
There were also plans involving Mauritania, Mali, and Senegal 
to integrate rural development and water and flood control through 
the Senegal River Development Office (Organisation pour la Mise 
en Valeur du Fleuve Senegal — OMVS) as the massive Diama and 
Manantali dams became fully operational (see Relations with Other 
African States, ch. 4). 

State Control Mechanisms 

In 1986 the government agencies involved in agricultural produc- 
tion, marketing, and food distribution were SONADER, CSA, and 



103 



Mauritania: A Country Study 



SONIMEX. Created in 1975, SONADER was a public agency 
under the control of the Ministry of Rural Development. Its general 
responsibilities focused on planning rural agricultural programs, 
including building and operating irrigation projects, training farm- 
ers in new techniques required for improved irrigation cropping, 
and providing credit and such inputs as fertilizers and pumping 
equipment. Organized in 1982 from two other agencies, CSA be- 
came responsible for stabilizing grain prices, maintaining a secu- 
rity food stock through market intervention, monitoring production 
and food deficits, and distributing food aid. SONIMEX began oper- 
ations in 1966 as a government- controlled joint venture. The com- 
pany held a monopoly on the imports of basic commodities 
(principally rice, tea, sugar, and tomato paste), which it resold to 
private interests for the retail trade. The private sector's role in 
cereal imports was legally restricted to wheat and flour. Numer- 
ous private traders in the marketing chain, however, were not 
covered (or were covered only partially) by CSA and SONIMEX. 
There were no precise data on the extent of domestic production 
marketed by private traders compared with CSA or on the extent 
of the grain trade across the Senegal River that was outside the 
control of SONIMEX. 

Land Tenure 

The system of land tenure was in transition in the 1980s. Fac- 
tors contributing to this transition included government abolition 
of centuries-old slavery practices involving tribal and ethnic rela- 
tions between various herding and sedentary communities; govern- 
ment development policies, particularly with regard to land reform 
and large-scale irrigation schemes; and tremendous shifts in land 
settlement and herding patterns because of drought (see Chang- 
ing Social Patterns, ch. 2). 

Historically, landownership and range management were based 
on tribal relations and ethnic settlement patterns. Rangeland for 
herding was controlled through tribal ownership of wells; around 
oases, slave groups worked cultivable plots, although traditional 
noble clans held ownership of the land. In more southerly settled 
agricultural areas, ownership varied from region to region and 
village to village, depending on ethnic settlement patterns. Land- 
ownership might be vested in the clan or village chief as represen- 
tative of the group and land distributed in perpetuity to family units 
having usufruct. Elsewhere, traditional nobilities might hold owner- 
ship of lands worked by formerly enslaved groups, who held tradi- 
tional usufruct. Although a village chief could not sell land belonging 
to the clan (which would alienate family groups from the land), 



104 




Irrigation dam at Foum Glaeta 
Courtesy United Nations (John Isaac) 

traditional noble clans could more easily sell property and effec- 
tively displace or disinherit slave groups. By the late 1980s, it was 
not known to what extent the formal abolition of slavery had affected 
traditional land relationships among noble and former slave groups. 
Also unknown was the impact of the government's stated policy 
of giving priority to former slave groups when lands that might 
be claimed under eminent domain were redistributed. Of poten- 
tially far greater importance in land tenancy was the 1983 Land 
Reform Act (see Political Power in the Mid-1980s, ch. 4). The un- 
derlying first cause of the act was the state's inherent and overrid- 
ing interest in land development. According to the act, the 
government could grant title for parcels of undeveloped land — 
which apparently included fallow land — to whoever pledged to im- 
prove it and at the same time possessed requisite resources. 
Although the economic necessity of the act was beyond question, 
the social costs of appropriating valuable Senegal River Basin land 
hypothetically controlled by blacks and redistributing it to wealthy 
Maures from farther north could prove unacceptable. It was evi- 
dent, however, that the situation was in considerable flux. 

Large-scale government irrigation projects and plans for inte- 
grated development based on regional water management created 
another set of variables for traditional patterns of land use and 
ownership. Groups located in areas behind dams or in areas to be 



105 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

either permanently flooded or deprived of annual floods with in- 
creased control over flow levels in the Senegal River were under- 
going a process of controlled resettlement. The formation of 
cooperative production groups that were to be settied on the land — 
often on a first-come, first-served basis — was essential to project 
implementation . 

Manufacturing and Industry 

The bulk of Mauritania's industry was in mining or mining- 
related activities. Industry, including fish processing but excluding 
mining, contributed only 5.3 percent to GDP in 1984. Industrial 
development was hampered by a limited infrastructure, a small 
local market with limited purchasing power, and a lack of skilled 
labor. In the mid-1980s, the labor force engaged in industrial activi- 
ties numbered about 16,000 to 18,000 workers, of which 10,000 
were employed in construction and an additional 4,000 to 6,000 
were employed by SNIM. Most construction was related to the 
activities of foreign-financed projects, including mining. Some 
workers were employed in road and port construction. Within the 
small manufacturing sector were two main industries: an oil refinery 
and a steel mill. The rest consisted of small enterprises such as 
cement bagging, a perfume manufacturing facility, a blanket fabri- 
cation facility, and an American-built sugar mill in Nouakchott 
that had never used its refining capacity and was limited to pack- 
aging imported refined sugar. In 1986 about thirty small enter- 
prises were in operation. 

Built in 1976 with West German, World Bank, and government 
financing, the steel rolling mill had an annual production capacity 
of 36,000 tons of reinforcing bars and rods. Operated originally 
by SNIM, the mill, which was located at Nouadhibou, operated 
intermittently and unsuccessfully before it was closed and sold in 
1984 to the Arab Iron and Steel Company (Societe Arabe du Fer 
et de l'Acier — SAFA). Reopened in 1985, the mill continued to 
be plagued by technical and economic problems; output in 1986 
was only 5,300 tons. 

Energy 

Mauritania was completely dependent on petroleum imports for 
its commercial and electrical generating needs. That dependence 
increased in the later 1980s as overexploitation of the country's 
meager supply of woodlands led to further use of petroleum products 
to meet domestic energy needs. In the early 1980s, firewood pro- 
vided one-half of gross domestic energy supply and, with charcoal, 
over 90 percent of residential energy needs. Annual firewood 



106 



The Economy 



consumption was eight times greater than the natural growth rate 
of the accessible forests. Between 1975 and 1985, overexploitation 
combined with drought damage and almost-nonexistent reforesta- 
tion programs to reduce forest areas by 30 percent overall. In some 
areas, forests were reduced by as much as 50 percent. As a result 
of this declining firewood production and the total dependence of 
the modern sector on petroleum-based energy, the share of imported 
petroleum products in domestic consumption increased from 33 
percent in 1975 to 55 percent in 1983. 

By 1 983 petroleum products provided over one-half of all energy 
supplies. Because of its use in electrical power generation, min- 
ing, and transportation, diesel fuel was the most important type 
of petroleum product, accounting for 75 percent of consumption. 
It was followed in importance by gasoline (16 percent), jet and avi- 
ation fuels (7 percent), butane (1.3 percent), and kerosene (0.7 per- 
cent). Consumption of butane grew rapidly in 1982 and 1983 in 
response to shortages of firewood for cooking in urban areas. In 
the mid-1980s, Nouakchott and southern Mauritania accounted 
for about 55 percent of total consumption of petroleum products, 
with Nouadhibou and Zouirat accounting for virtually all the rest. 
In 1983 mining (plus the tiny manufacturing sector) consumed 42 
percent of all petroleum products; transport, including fisheries, 
consumed 32.5 percent; electricity generation, 20 percent; govern- 
ment and commerce, 3 percent; residential use, 2 percent; and 
agriculture, less than 0.5 percent. 

By the mid-1980s, Mauritania's installed electrical generating 
capacity was 162 megawatts. The National Electricity and Water 
Company (Societe Nationale d'Eau et d'Electricite— SONELEC) 
accounted for only about 25 percent of that capacity, and only half 
of SONELEC 's generating capacity was considered reliable. 
Nouakchott and Nouadhibou consumed 90 percent of SONELEC 's 
generated power. SNIM generated all its own electrical needs for 
mining and for supply operations at Nouadhibou. The plant that 
supplied power to the Guelbs mine and ore beneficiation facility 
(56 megawatts) increased the nation's total generating capacity by 
about 35 percent. Other self-producers included an unknown num- 
ber of small industrial, commercial, and residential establishments 
that proliferated as supplies from SONELEC became less reliable. 

As a result of the serious technical, financial, and managerial 
problems faced by SONELEC , the company underwent a rehabili- 
tation program under the 1985-88 Economic Recovery Program. 
The program included the construction of a new, cost- saving power 
plant in Nouakchott that was scheduled to begin operations in 1990. 
By 1987 SONELEC 's implementation of the program included 



107 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

improving bill collection, cutting labor costs by a 10 percent per- 
sonnel reduction, and increasing prices by up to 30 percent. 

In 1978 Mauritania completed construction of a US$140 mil- 
lion oil refinery at Nouadhibou. The refinery operated only briefly 
in 1982 and 1983 because of cost factors, shortages of crude oil, 
and technical difficulties. Between 1984 and 1987, the refinery 
underwent an Algerian-financed US$30 million rehabilitation to 
allow the processing of light Algerian crude. The project also in- 
cluded a butane bottling facility and a desalinization plant. The 
refinery reopened in early 1987 with a production capacity of 1 
million tons per year. Refinery officials signed a five-year contract 
with Algeria's state-owned oil company to manage and market its 
products. A joint venture that included Mauritania, certain pri- 
vate interests, and the Algerian company was formed to bottle and 
market butane domestically. The butane plant, located in Nouak- 
chott, started operations in 1987 with an annual capacity of 5,000 
tons. Because of the high cost of Mauritanian-produced butane, 
the plant imported butane from Senegal for its operations. 

Transportation and Communications 

The developed transportation network centered on the mining 
and fishing industries. The country's only railroad, a 650-kilometer- 
long line, connected the Zouirat mines with Nouadhibou (see fig. 9). 
Both the railroad and the ore port were operated by SNIM. The 
port had the capacity to handle bulk ore carriers of up to 150,000 
tons, and the railroad carried some of the world's longest and heavi- 
est trains (see Mining, this ch.). Nouadhibou was the country's 
only natural deep-water port and, in addition to the ore port, con- 
tained a separate commercial and fishing port. The fishing port 
was upgraded in 1983 under a US$8 million World Bank loan. 

In late 1986, the US$150 million Friendship Port at Nouakchott 
was officially opened. Financed and built by China, the 500,000-ton- 
per-year deep-water port was an engineering feat, as the Chinese 
laborers had to contend with strong Atlantic currents and waves 
up to six meters high. The port was expected to eliminate the need 
to divert 35 to 40 percent of Nouakchott's traffic through Dakar, 
Senegal, and to reduce the high percentage of goods lost during 
transshipment from ships at anchorage. Despite the official open- 
ing, by late 1987 the new port was not yet in service because it 
still lacked certain facilities and equipment. 

In the late 1980s, Mauritania's total road network was estimated 
at 9,000 kilometers. Only 1 ,500 kilometers of roadway were paved; 
the roadway consisted mainly of two trunk roads. The remaining 
roads were little more than tracks on the sand. Road construction 



108 



The Economy 



had been a high priority for Mauritania's planners in the 1970s. 
The chief project at that time was the US$300 million, 
1,000-kilometer Nouakchott-Nema Road (also called the Trans- 
Mauritanian Highway), financed largely through loans from Arab 
members of OPEC . But because the road was constructed through 
the desert north of the populated agricultural region along the Sene- 
gal River, additional major funding was later needed to link the 
southern towns of Bogue and Kaedi to the capital via this largely 
unused trunk road. Moreover, projected recurrent costs for main- 
tenance of the Nouakchott-Nema Road were well above the govern- 
ment's foreseeable budgetary means. Mauritania's other major 
surfaced road connected the capital to Akjoujt and Rosso. 

Airports at Nouakchott and Nouadhibou were capable of han- 
dling commercial jet aircraft. In 1986 the French were conducting 
studies to expand the airport at Nouakchott to handle Boeing 747s 
and comparable aircraft, and the European Development Fund was 
financing an automatic communications center at the airport. In 
the mid-1980s, the capital was served by Air Afrique, Iberia, Royal 
Air Maroc, and Union des Transports Aeriens (UTA), including 
twice-weekly direct flights to Paris and six weekly flights to Dakar, 
where links were available for direct flights to New York three times 
a week. Internal flights were available between the capital and Noua- 
dhibou and some thirty smaller airports. The national airline, Air 
Mauritanie, operated two eighty-seat Fokker F-28 passenger airliners 
for domestic flights and for flights to Dakar and Las Palmas. 

In 1985 radiotelephone and wireless telegraph services linked 
Nouakchott to Paris, to most regional capitals, and to other towns 
in Mauritania. In 1986 the government began operating earth satel- 
lite stations in Nouakchott and Nouadhibou. The system linked 
Mauritania to the International Telecommunications Satellite 
Organization (INTELSAT) network and the Arab Satellite Tele- 
communications Organization (ARAB SAT) network. It provided 
ninety telephone or telegraph circuits and a link for television recep- 
tion and transmission. 

Trade 

Located between the rich civilizations of Sudanic Black Africa 
and Arab North Africa, Mauritania was historically a crossroads 
for trade. In modern times, the trans- Saharan trade — based on the 
exchange of gold, slaves, and salt — was superseded by trade with 
Senegal, Mali, and France. Mauritania's chief export during colo- 
nial times was gum arabic. Since independence, however, there 
has been a radical shift toward the export of mineral raw materials 
and the import of food, petroleum, and manufactured goods. 



109 



Mauritania: A Country Study 




110 




Nouakchott's Friendship Port built by China 
Courtesy Embassy of Mauritania, Washington 



Exports 

Since independence, Mauritania's main exports have been iron 
ore and fish. Between 1963 and 1980, iron ore exports were clearly 
most important, averaging 80 percent of the value of total exports. 
By the mid-1980s, however, fish exports had outstripped iron ore 
exports. Between 1980 and 1986, the value of fish exports rose to 
59 percent of total exports; in 1983 fishing replaced iron ore as the 
major foreign exchange earner. During the same period, iron ore 
exports fell to around 40 percent of total exports. This circumstance 
did not reflect a significant decline in iron ore production, but rather 
a change in the way fish catches were recorded. 

Imports 

The structure of Mauritania's imports since independence has 
reflected the country's growing dependence on foreign food, mer- 
chandise, and energy products. As domestic production of grains 
fell because of neglect and drought, the nation's reliance on com- 
mercially imported food grew. Between 1973 and 1986, commer- 
cial imports of grains and other foodstuffs, such as sugar and tea, 
averaged about 31 percent of all domestically financed imports. 
Ironically, in the periods of the worst drought, commercial food 
imports fell as Mauritania received free food assistance from the 
United States and Western Europe. 



Ill 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

Other important domestically financed imports included petro- 
leum products, construction materials, and transportation equip- 
ment. The values of these items and their percentage of total imports 
varied greatly from year to year, depending on such factors as 
development project requirements and military-related needs. A 
significant portion of imports were financed by foreign sources, 
often as components of development schemes or as emergency aid 
in times of drought. Between 1973 and 1986, imports directly 
financed abroad averaged over 20 percent of total imports. 

Direction of Trade 

At independence, Mauritania traded mostly with its African 
neighbors. In 1961 almost 75 percent of the country's exports — 
then primarily livestock — went to Senegal and Mali. Imports of 
modern consumer goods came principally from France, moving 
through the ports of Senegal before transshipment to Mauritania. 

With the emergence of the iron industry and of large-scale devel- 
opment projects in Mauritania, this picture changed. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), 
Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and France imported 
most of Mauritania's iron ore. By the 1980s, as fishing exports in- 
creased, Western Europe became less important as a market for 
Mauritania's exports. Among industrial countries, which in 1986 
took around 90 percent of the country's recorded exports, Japan 
received 28 percent, Italy 24.6 percent, Belgium 15.8 percent, and 
France 14.7 percent. The rise in Japan's portion of Mauritania's 
exports reflected both a diversification in iron ore customers and 
Japan's appetite for fish. 

Since independence, France has remained Mauritania's most 
important supplier. In 1964 France provided 54 percent of the coun- 
try's imports. That percentage dropped to 39 percent in 1969 and 
to 22 percent in 1981 but rose again to about 30 percent in 1985. 
Between 1981 and 1985, Spain, West Germany, and the United 
States also were important suppliers. Developing countries provided 
between 23 and 27 percent of Mauritania's imports between 1981 
and 1985, of which African countries supplied as much as 15 
percent. 

Banking and Government Finances 

At independence, Mauritania became a member of the West Afri- 
can Monetary Union (Union Monetaire Ouest Africaine — UMOA) 
but withdrew in 1973 to demonstrate its independent economic iden- 
tity. When it withdrew, the government also relinquished mem- 
bership in the African Financial Community (Communaute 



112 





Senegal River ferry at Rosso 
Courtesy Larry Barrie 
Loading iron ore at Nouadhibou 
Courtesy Embassy of Mauritania, Washington 



113 



Mauritania: A Country Study 



Financiere Africaine — CFA), whose currency — the GFA franc — 
was freely convertible to French francs. Mauritania then created 
its own currency, the ouguiya, and an independent central bank. 

Banking 

In the mid-1980s, Mauritania's monetary and banking struc- 
ture consisted of the Central Bank of Mauritania (Banque Cen- 
trale de Mauritanie — BCM) and six commercial banks established 
with the participation of the government or of the BCM. Other 
major shareholders comprised various Arab interests, which in- 
cluded Saudi and Libyan participation. 

By the early 1980s, Mauritania's banking sector was deteriorat- 
ing, chiefly because of an accumulation of nonperforming loans 
that constituted some 50 percent of commercial bank assets. 
Between 1981 and 1983, government borrowing from the BCM 
and commercial banks rose to statutory limits. The private sector 
and public enterprises were thus forced to borrow increasingly from 
foreign banks to cover their severe liquidity problems. 

As a result of this spiral of debt, in 1985 the government, with 
IMF and World Bank support, undertook measures to restructure 
the banking system. Measures taken under the 1985-88 Economic 
Recovery Program instituted a monetary and credit policy favor- 
ing the private sector and an austerity program for the public sec- 
tor. Furthermore, in 1987 the government, in cooperation with 
the World Bank, adopted a reform program that focused on three 
areas: reforming credit policies and banking regulations, strength- 
ening the BCM, and restructuring four of the six commercial banks, 
including the International Bank of Mauritania (Banque Interna- 
tionale pour la Mauritanie — BIMA), of which the BCM held 91 
percent. 

Government Finances 

In 1986, with IMF and World Bank support, the government 
prepared its first consolidated budget. Before this, budgetary proce- 
dures covered only expenditures financed through domestic 
resources. The new procedures covered all financing sources used 
by the government in a budget encompassing both internally and 
externally financed current and capital expenditures. 

Between 1979 and 1984, expenditures on current operations aver- 
aged UM10.5 billion. Typically, domestic revenues covered about 
two- thirds of this amount; the balance was financed by direct ex- 
ternal budgetary support. Between 1978 and 1983, the government 
wage bill (including military salaries) constituted the largest line 
item of current expenditures. The second largest expenditure was 
for equipment and supplies. 



114 



The Economy 



In addition to current expenditures, the central government 
budget allocated smaller amounts for capital expenditures, which 
amounted to the government's contribution to the public invest- 
ment program. Capital expenditures accounted for only between 
8 and 1 1 percent of the total budget in the period 1979-83, far less 
than current expenditures. 

Mauritania's domestic revenue base was very narrow and de- 
pended on the iron and fishing export industries and the service 
sector. Total government revenues were derived from taxes and 
nontax revenues. Between 1981 and 1986, nontax revenues account- 
ed for from 1 1 to 20 percent of the total and consisted of fish royal- 
ties, penalties, and revenue transfers from public enterprises. Tax 
revenues were derived mainly from taxes on international trade 
and on income and profits. Between 1981 and 1986, taxes on in- 
ternational trade (of which import taxes were the most important) 
averaged 41 percent of all revenues, and taxes on income and profits 
represented 26 percent. Taxes on wages and salaries averaged more 
than 14 percent of all government revenues for this period. 

Balance of Payments, Debt, and Foreign Assistance 

The economic stagnation that had begun by the mid-1970s led 
to deficits in the country's current account balance (see fig. 10). 
These deficits were largely the result of a slump in the international 
iron industry and a rise in the price of oil. They were exacerbated, 
however, by drought and by Mauritania's involvement in the 
Western Sahara conflict. Between 1975 and 1982, the current ac- 
count deficit more than quadrupled, rising from US$62 million 
to US$277 million. This trend slowed after 1982 as the trade deficit 
improved, principally because of increased fish exports and because 
of IMF- and World Bank- supported stabilization programs. By 1985 
the current account deficit had been reduced by more than half 
from its 1982 high. 

By 1985 Mauritania had one of the worst international debt sit- 
uations in the world. In that year, total accumulated medium- and 
long-term external public debt stood at US$1.8 billion, which 
amounted to nearly 250 percent of GDP. By 1987 arrears on sched- 
uled payments amounted to around US$200 million. The bulk of 
the loans falling due were contracted in the mid-1970s to finance 
the nationalization of the iron mining industry and to pay for the 
country's involvement in the Western Sahara war. 

Mauritania's clear inability to meet its debt service obligations 
resulted in international intervention. In 1985 the World Bank held 
a special donor conference, and in 1985 and 1986 the Paris Club 



115 



Mauritania: A Country Study 



MILLIONS OF 

UNITED STATES DOLLARS 
50 



-50 



■100 
-150 
■200 
■250 



■300 



r 


\ 








SUR 


™1 
3 LUS 


































































N 




S 


1 










\ — < 


















>— 




t 














DEF 


ICIT 



































73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 

YEARS 



Figure 10. Current Account Balance, 1973-85 



(see Glossary) held several meetings on the issue. During this series 
of meetings, Mauritania presented a new economic and financial 
recovery program to the donors. This group endorsed the recovery 
program and rescheduled external debt service due in 1985 and 1986. 
As a result, all arrears on debt services were eliminated, and Maurita- 
nia's external current account deficit was reduced. In 1987 Maurita- 
nia signed a comprehensive Structural Adjustment Program with 
the World Bank that was to ease further its debt burden. 

Foreign assistance was vital to Mauritania to satisfy the coun- 
try's need for food, equipment, technical assistance, and public 
investment. Some forty nations and multilateral institutions ex- 
tended aid averaging about US$270 million a year between 1980 
and 1985 — equivalent to US$170 per capita. Particularly impor- 
tant has been aid from oil-rich Arab nations who look favorably 
on Mauritania because of its largely Muslim population. Typical- 
ly, foreign assistance funded humanitarian efforts or investment 
projects. Much of this assistance was in the form of outright grants 
or loans carrying low interest rates, long maturity terms, and grace 
periods. 



116 



The Economy 



Economic data on Mauritania are scarce. The most comprehen- 
sive information was gleaned from publications of international de- 
velopment organizations, such as the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, and assorted agencies of the United Nations. 
Several United States government offices also have produced studies 
on certain aspects of the economy, such as mining, trade, and 
agriculture. The annual Africa South of the Sahara provided up-to- 
date information, as did the periodicals Africa Economic Digest, the 
Economist Intelligence Unit's Country Report, and Marches tropicaux 
et Mediterraneens . (For further information and complete citations, 
see Bibliography.) 



117 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 




Mauritania, outlined on globe in front of Ministry of Defense 



MAURITANIA'S GOVERNANCE EPITOMIZES a cycle all 
too evident throughout sub-Saharan Africa. A civilian government, 
espousing the liberal democratic principles inherited from the colo- 
nial regime, came to power on the eve of independence. After it 
had ruled for nearly a generation, during which time the expecta- 
tions born at independence remained largely unfulfilled and govern- 
ment became increasingly capricious and corrupt, a military regime 
toppled the civilian government and suspended the Constitution. 
In the following years, a succession of military rulers, each promis- 
ing to end the corruption, abuse of authority, and economic waste 
of earlier regimes, proved as unwilling and inept as their civilian 
predecessor at ensuring the territorial integrity of the state, achieving 
national unity, and fostering economic development in the face of 
severe environmental challenges. The subsequent ascendancy in 
1987 of what appeared to be a reformist government, albeit mili- 
tary, demonstrated for the first time Mauritania's growing under- 
standing of the limits of government as this new regime grappled 
with the problem of adapting the long-standing cultural values of 
a very poor society to the needs of a modern developing state. 

Prior to independence, Mauritania served as a bridge between 
the Maghrib (see Glossary) and West Africa, with strong cultural 
links to the former and equally strong economic and administra- 
tive ties to the latter. Like Sudan and Chad, which also link Arab 
North Africa with black Africa, Mauritania suffered internal so- 
cial and political problems as cultures collided. The potential for 
conflict was strengthened by the proliferation of particularist- 
regional political parties before independence. These parties, com- 
posed exclusively of either Arab-Berbers (Maures) or one of several 
black ethnic groups and advocating union with Arab Morocco or 
with black Mali, tended to aggravate existing cleavages. 

To overcome the structural problems intrinsic to the Maurita- 
nian polity, its first president, Moktar Ould Daddah, resorted to 
one-party rule with a strong executive branch. Although the Con- 
stitution of 1961 called for some power-sharing between the presi- 
dent and the legislature, the National Assembly, in practice, rou- 
tinely supported presidential initiatives, and government remained 
highly centralized. Daddah' s ill-fated participation in the Western 
Sahara (see Glossary) conflict and the resulting ruin of the Maurita- 
nian economy led to a military coup in July 1978. Daddah was 
detained and later exiled, and his government was replaced by the 



121 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

eighteen-member Military Committee for National Recovery 
(Comite Militaire de Redressement National — CMRN) with Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Mustapha Salek as president. 

During the next six years, ensuing military regimes failed to 
resolve the thorny issue of Mauritania's involvement in the Western 
Sahara and failed to improve Mauritania's dismal economic per- 
formance. On December 12, 1984, Chief of Staff and former Min- 
ister of Defense Maaouiya Ould Sid 'Ahmed Taya led a group of 
dissident officers who staged a palace coup against head of state 
Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla. 

Still in power in late 1987, the military government under Presi- 
dent Taya has eschewed ideological labels. Initially, Taya's policies 
reflected the amalgam of private capitalism and state ownership 
of industry common throughout sub-Saharan Africa. In his first 
interviews as president, Taya pledged that his administration would 
respect human rights, end corruption, and promote national unity. 
In one of his first acts, he freed thirty-two political prisoners seized 
by his predecessor. He also promised to hold elections for municipal 
councils in Mauritania's thirteen largest urban areas before the end 
of 1986, ostensibly to encourage local initiatives but also to appease 
ethnically based interests. The elections, whose fairness was ac- 
claimed by independent observers, took place on December 19, 
1986, and more were promised for smaller towns. As for a return 
to civilian rule, Taya insisted in March 1985 that Mauritanians 
must first develop an understanding of civic participation in order 
to avoid the divisions and paralysis that characterized the final years 
of Haidalla' s government. 

Mauritania has joined the Nonaligned Movement and has sought 
to establish friendly relations with both East and West. In response 
to Morocco's irredentist claims through the 1960s, Mauritania 
appealed for and received support from France and Western and 
African allies. That support continued as Mauritania's fortunes 
in the Western Sahara conflict deteriorated in the late 1970s and 
Morocco's challenges to Mauritania's borders mounted. As its own 
economy faltered and its dependence on loans and grants deepened, 
Mauritania improved its ties with wealthier Middle Eastern and 
Maghribi states at the expense of its relations with black Africa. 
In a further attempt to find aid, the government has moved away 
from total reliance on the West and strengthened relations with 
the Soviet Union and China. 

Political Culture 

Attitudes Toward the Political System 

Attitudes toward the political system in Mauritania were like 
those found in other developing African countries undergoing a 



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similar nation-building process. Mauritanian society had both a 
modern sector and a rural, traditional sector. Each nurtured vastly 
different expectations of the political system, a split that gave rise 
to two political subcultures. Although these two subcultures were 
often depicted as polar opposites, membership was not exclusive; 
in fact, most Mauritanians participated to varying degrees in each. 
Perhaps what most distinguished modern elites from those labeled 
traditional was the former's greater reliance on modern technology 
and its commitment to economic development. 

The less educated, subsistence society offered little support to 
the modern, urban political system. Its members participated only 
insofar as government welfare programs, taxes, or laws impinged 
on their lives. To many Mauritanians, national government sig- 
nified only President Taya and did not imply any further loyalty 
to government, state, or nation. For this sector, citizenship meant 
respect for tradition, maintenance of social status, and rigid rules 
of behavior (see Changing Social Patterns, ch. 2). Accordingly, 
traditional injunctions against rising above one's inherited class 
stifled economic activity among black groups as well as among 
Maures. Maures of high status often viewed economic activity, such 
as earning a salary, with disdain. By the same traditions, women 
were accorded only a minor role in politics. 

Although traditional elites dominated local politics in rural areas, 
a modernizing elite, which constituted approximately 10 percent 
of the population, greatly influenced national and urban politics. 
That elite comprised senior military officers, government workers, 
wealthy businessmen, union members (especially teachers), and 
students. Insofar as economic development was dependent on na- 
tional unity and a less rigid social structure, the members of the 
modernizing elite were also committed to the progressive trans- 
formation, with its concomitant dislocations, of traditional society 
through the agency of the state. Among the modern elite, political 
consciousness remained high, even if military rule limited oppor- 
tunities for participation. 

The political goals of the modernizing elite were initially articu- 
lated by Daddah and were retained in 1987 under the Taya admin- 
istration. These goals included cultural independence, economic 
development, and democracy. The conditions for cultural indepen- 
dence, according to Daddah, included bilingualism, a revitaliza- 
tion of Islam through a return to its original precepts, and a more 
prominent role for women. Cultural independence was not to be 
construed as a return to precolonial social mores, but rather as an 
adaptation of Mauritania's unique cultural heritage. Economic in- 
dependence, according to Daddah, meant "mauritanization" of 



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Mauritania: A Country Study 

the labor force, restrictions on the repatriation of funds by foreign- 
owned firms, and diversification of Mauritania's sources of exter- 
nal aid, most of which came from France. Democracy, the third 
of Daddah's goals, meant popular participation, especially by 
women and youth, in the management of public policy. 

The military rulers who succeeded Daddah have implicitly 
adopted his perspective. Since the 1978 coup, Mauritania has im- 
posed bilingualism, incorporated the Islamic legal code, elevated 
women within the government, made the study of Arabic an educa- 
tional requirement, borrowed from an ever- increasing list of donors, 
limited foreign participation in industry while replacing foreign- 
ers with Mauritanians, and held elections to promote participa- 
tion in local politics. 

Thus, in Mauritania in the mid-1980s traditional outlooks based 
on custom, family ties, and Islam were gradually giving way to 
a more modern set of political views based on codified laws and 
procedures, achievement, and a national consciousness. More and 
more, individuals tended to rely on the modern political institu- 
tions of society (government, interest groups, police, and the like) 
to satisfy their needs, rather than on traditional political and reli- 
gious leaders. This process has been hastened by a protracted 
drought during the 1970s and 1980s. Over a period of approxi- 
mately fifteen years, 60 percent of Mauritania's previously nomadic 
people, who constituted 80 percent of the total population, reset- 
tled in urban areas, with many becoming dependent on govern- 
ment aid programs. The resettlement in towns has markedly altered 
traditional economic patterns and political alliances. 

Impediments to Change 

In 1987 the pace of modernization remained slow in Maurita- 
nia, where much of the population was closely bound to traditional 
subsistence agriculture and pastoralism and where literacy in French 
or Arabic was limited to only about 18 percent of the population. 
Although the modernizing elite shared with the traditional elite and 
the Mauritanian masses a common history and religion that pre- 
vented the state from collapsing, centrifugal forces competed for 
scarce economic and political resources. These forces ranged from 
ethnic groups and tribes to occupational and social classes. 

An even greater impediment to development and moderniza- 
tion was the cleavage between the Maures and Mauritania's black 
population, the size of which has never been precisely ascertained 
and may be either undercounted or overrepresented, depending 
on one's perspective. Historically, the Maures have discriminated 
against the black population, which, well into the twentieth century, 



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Government and Politics 



continued to be a source of slaves (see Maures, ch. 2). Different 
languages and a fairly uncomplicated geographic split tended to 
reinforce racial differences. Moreover, the black southern portion 
of the country, which was predominantly agricultural and until in- 
dependence had generated much of the country's wealth, lost eco- 
nomic and political influence as mining and fishing investments 
in the Maure northern portion achieved far greater economic im- 
portance beginning in the late 1960s. By the mid-1980s, however, 
the economic pendulum began to swing back again as mining and 
fishing revenues leveled off or began dropping while the relentless 
process of desertification had increased the value of black-held lands 
along the Senegal River. Nevertheless, blacks still complained that 
the government allocated greater resources to projects benefiting 
the Maures than to those benefiting blacks. 

Governmental Power 

Mauritania's experiment with one-party democracy ended with 
the replacement of Daddah's government by the CMRN on July 
10, 1978. In April 1979, following the coup that brought Lieutenant 
Colonel Haidalla to power, the CMRN became the Military Com- 
mittee for National Salvation (Comite Militaire de Salut National — 
CMSN). The Taya government came to power following a blood- 
less palace coup on December 12, 1984 (see Political Disintegra- 
tion, ch. 1). To justify the reorganization, President Taya and 
members of the CMSN charged Haidalla with excluding his col- 
leagues on the CMSN from the decision-making process. The 
CMSN also expressed concern over the impact of the Structures 
for Educating the Masses (Structures pour l'Education des Masses — 
SEM), a grass-roots network established by Haidalla in 1982 to 
lobby on behalf of his policies toward the Polisario (see Glossary). 
Over time, the SEM had become both the center of a personality 
cult and an alternative political apparatus. Finally, the new lead- 
ers pointed to evidence of corruption, which, if not benefiting 
Haidalla directly, profited family, friends, and the Polisario guer- 
rillas. 

Constitution 

The military regime that toppled Daddah in 1978 abolished the 
Constitution that had been ratified on May 20, 1961 . Then in De- 
cember 1980, when he unexpectedly announced a return to civilian 
rule, Haidalla promulgated a new provisional constitution. That 
draft constitution provided for a multiparty system and freedom 
of association, provisions Haidalla hoped would attract support from 
the labor union movement. Following an abortive coup attempt 



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Mauritania: A Country Study 

in March 1981 by former members of the military government, 
however, Haidalla reneged on his intention of returning Maurita- 
nia to civilian rule and scrapped the draft constitution. 

The Constitutional Charter of the CMSN, which was promul- 
gated on February 9, 1985, served as a de facto constitution in 1987. 
The charter unequivocally eliminated any of the pretenses of 
democracy embodied in the 1961 constitution. At the same time, 
it pledged adherence to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and, in Article 14, presaged a return to democratic institu- 
tions and a new constitution that would bear some semblance to 
the 1961 Constitution. 

The 1961 Constitution clearly reflected the influence of the Con- 
stitution of the French Fifth Republic in its dedication to liberal 
democratic principles and inalienable human rights as expressed 
in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. In addition, the Constitution under- 
scored the state's determined quest for independence and unity by 
proclaiming Islam the official religion. Somewhat paradoxically, 
freedom of religion was also guaranteed. Strict adherence to both 
sets of principles would seemingly have given rise to conflict, es- 
pecially in the area of jurisprudence; however, in practice the 
government sought with acceptable success to balance the demands 
of the two. 

Under the Constitution, the government was composed of three 
branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. The executive branch 
was headed by the president of the republic and included ministers 
whom he appointed and the administrative bureaucracy. The presi- 
dent was elected by universal suffrage for a five-year term and could 
serve an indefinite number of terms. From 1966 until the coup in 
1978, all candidates for the office had to be nominated by the 
Mauritanian People's Party (Parti du Peuple Mauritanienne — 
PPM), be at least thirty-five years old, and have full exercise of 
their political and civil rights. In sharp contrast to its French an- 
tecedent, the Mauritanian Constitution strengthened presidential 
power by combining it with the function of prime minister, while 
making the National Assembly subordinate. Like a prime minister, 
the president participated in legislative processes that would other- 
wise reside in the domain of the National Assembly. At the same 
time, the Constitution prevented the president from dissolving the 
National Assembly, and it also denied the assembly the right to 
unseat the president by means of a vote of no confidence. 

In its entirety, the Constitution came to resemble those of other 
francophone African states that were also adopted under the in- 
fluence of General Charles de Gaulle's Fifth Republic and in 



126 



Government and Politics 



response to the perceived need for strong, centralized leadership. 
In light of the highly fragmented polities typical of much of sub- 
Saharan Africa at that time, however, a system of checks and 
balances was thought to be overly cumbersome for the immediate 
tasks at hand. 

Other presidential powers included commanding the armed 
forces; appointing civil servants, military officers, judges, and am- 
bassadors; ratifying treaties and other international agreements; 
initiating or amending legislation; eliciting advisory opinions on 
proposed legislation from the Supreme Court; and exercising a tem- 
porary veto over legislation. Perhaps the president's greatest power 
lay in his right, in times of peril, to declare an emergency and exer- 
cise extraconstitutional authority. 

The National Assembly was subordinate to the president. At in- 
dependence, the assembly numbered forty deputies, all of whom 
were elected as a slate by universal suffrage for five-year terms. 
By 1971 the number had grown to fifty and by 1975 to seventy- 
eight, including the new deputies from the annexed portion of the 
Western Sahara, Tiris al Gharbiyya. The presidency of the assembly 
was the second highest position in the government and often the 
locus of traditionalist opposition to Daddah. Along with three vice 
presidents and two secretaries, the president of the assembly was 
elected from among the deputies. The assembly's limited power 
derived from Article 39 of the Constitution and included the for- 
mulation of broad policies on national defense, education, labor, 
and public administration. The assembly also had responsibility 
for legislating civil rights and taxation. All other legislative powers, 
including the implementation of specific policy decisions, fell to 
the president. In general, Daddah 's handling of policy matters 
underscored the imbalance between the two branches of govern- 
ment. For example, although the president was required to present 
an annual message to the nation and might also provide supplemen- 
tal statements to the assembly, he alone determined what infor- 
mation to share with legislators, who could not compel him to be 
more forthcoming. The president could also bypass the legislature 
completely by submitting proposed legislation to a popular referen- 
dum. Finally, the assembly's relatively short session, fixed at four 
months per year, limited the amount of legislation it could pass. 

Constitutional amendments were permissible if they did not 
threaten the state or its republican form of government. Either the 
president or the National Assembly could propose an amendment, 
which would then require a two-thirds vote in the legislature in 
order to become law. If the proposed amendment received only 
a simple majority, the president could submit it as a referendum. 



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Mauritania: A Country Study 

In fact, the latter process was never necessary. Two major amend- 
ments were passed in the 1960s, one in 1965 institutionalizing 
one-party government, and a second in 1968 pertaining to local 
administration, the status of magistrates, and the designation of 
Hassaniya Arabic as an official language. 

Although the Constitution did not provide for a system of checks 
and balances, the assembly did have three ways to limit presiden- 
tial power. First, it could refuse requested budgetary appropria- 
tions, although the president could circumvent the assembly's 
budgetary veto by simply promulgating an interim budget based 
on total receipts of the previous year. Second, if able to muster 
a two-thirds vote, the assembly could impeach the president or any 
of his ministers for treason or plotting against the state. The 
Supreme Court, a body appointed by the president, would judge 
the charges in such cases. Finally, the assembly could, in effect, 
override a presidential veto if, after a second reading, the law 
received an absolute majority in the assembly and was declared 
constitutional by the Supreme Court. 

In fact, the assembly's debates and votes were most often highly 
symbolic gestures that brought closure to a process initiated and 
dominated by the executive. In the early 1960s, however, the legis- 
lature often challenged the executive, only to be deluged with pri- 
ority bills that in effect smothered any legislative initiatives. With 
the institutionalization of one-party rule in 1965, engaging debate 
in the assembly was no longer possible, and the assembly's role 
became promotion of political integration at the expense of indi- 
vidual rights while strengthening party unity and discipline. 

Constitutional Charter 

Like the Constitution, the Constitutional Charter of February 
1985 pledged adherence to principles embodied in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and in the charters of the United 
Nations (UN), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the 
League of Arab States (Arab League). The charter also proclaimed 
Islam the state religion and sharia (see Glossary) the only source 
of law. 

The fundamental powers and responsibilities of the CMSN, out- 
lined in Article 3 of the charter, included establishing the general 
policies of the nation, promulgating ordinances to carry out pol- 
icy, monitoring actions of the government, ratifying international 
agreements, and granting amnesty except in cases of retributory 
justice and religious crimes (see Law and Crime, ch. 5). Articles 4 
through 10 pertained to the internal organization of the CMSN 
and presidential succession. Members were nominated to the 



128 



Government and Politics 



CMSN by ordinance of that body, and it alone decided the proce- 
dures by which it would conduct its business. Included within the 
CMSN was the Permanent Committee, consisting of all CMSN 
members posted to Nouakchott. The Permanent Committee met 
in ordinary session once every fifteen days and in extraordinary 
session when convoked by the president. The CMSN was required 
to meet in ordinary session every third month and in extraordi- 
nary session when convoked by the president after approval of the 
Permanent Committee, or upon the request of one-third of the 
members. If the president were temporarily absent, the president 
of the CMSN would nominate a member of the Permanent Com- 
mittee to carry out the routine affairs of state. If the president were 
temporarily incapacitated, the Permanent Committee would 
nominate one of its members to manage affairs of state for a period 
not to exceed one month. In the event of the president's death or 
a long-term incapacitation, the Permanent Committee would desig- 
nate one of its members to carry out the functions of president for 
one week, after which the entire CMSN would appoint a new presi- 
dent from among its members. 

Articles 11 and 12 determined the manner in which the presi- 
dent nominated civilian and military members of government. As 
head of state and commander in chief of the armed forces, the presi- 
dent made all nominations for civilian and military posts and for 
members of the government. Similarly, he could dismiss an ap- 
pointee at any time. The final four articles of the Constitutional 
Charter dealt with maintenance of public order and enforcement 
of CMSN ordinances. 

A second ordinance, promulgated at the same time as the charter, 
governed the internal organization of the CMSN and supplemented 
the charter. The preamble to this ordinance unequivocally entrusted 
the CMSN with national sovereignty and legitimacy, but only until 
replaced by democratic institutions. 

The first three articles established de jure membership and rank 
in the CMSN and delineated the relationship between members 
of the government and the CMSN. Members of the CMSN ranked 
higher than members of the government. Accordingly, no mem- 
ber of the CMSN could be sued, searched, arrested, held, or tried 
while carrying out official duties. No member could be arrested 
or sued in criminal cases or minor offenses without authorization 
from either the full CMSN or the Permanent Committee, unless 
caught in flagrante delicto. 

The second article dealt with the selection and responsibilities 
of the president of the CMSN, who was chosen in a secret ballot 
by a two- thirds majority of its members and could be deposed in 



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Mauritania: A Country Study 

the same way. The president presided over debates and ensured 
that the Permanent Committee complied with the charter and the 
committee's regulations. He also controlled debate and could sus- 
pend the session at any time. Internally, the CMSN included five 
advisory commissions dealing with cultural and social affairs, secu- 
rity affairs, public works and development, economy and finan- 
cial affairs, and education and justice. The commissions monitored 
the implementation of policy in their respective areas. 

In reality, the CMSN in 1987 was a coterie of officers, most of 
whom were Maures, representing a variety of sometimes overlap- 
ping and sometimes discrete corporate and ethnic interests. Among 
its members, rank, status, and influence varied widely. In debates, 
which were resolved by consensus, the opinions and positions of 
the acknowledged "big men" were not likely to be challenged open- 
ly by members of lower status, who instead might have engaged 
in surreptitious maneuvering or plotting behind the scenes. The 
most powerful member of the CMSN in the late 1980s was Taya, 
who was often described as hardworking and dedicated and whose 
achievements were the result of strength of purpose rather than 
political ambition. The second most powerful figure was the minister 
of interior, information, and telecommunications, Lieutenant 
Colonel Djibril Ould Abdallah, who was often described as "Taya's 
strongman." 

The military government operated through a cabinet whose mem- 
bers, both civilian and military, were appointed by the president, 
presumably after consultation with members of the CMSN. In 1987 
approximately one-third of the fifteen cabinet ministers were also 
members of the CMSN, although that ratio changed with every 
cabinet reshuffle. Cabinet officers were responsible for implement- 
ing policies initiated by the CMSN. 

Legal System 

Through the 1960s and early 1970s, Mauritania's legal system 
bore the imprint of the French legal and judicial system. As the 
number of legal cadres rose, so did attempts to reconcile secular 
and Islamic law. In the meantime, Islamic courts coexisted along- 
side secular courts based on the French model. Neither appellate 
courts nor courts with constitutional jurisdiction existed. There were 
few secular lawyers; Mauritania's first French-trained lawyer was 
Daddah. The 1961 Constitution provided that French laws were 
to remain in effect until amended or repealed, as were French civil, 
commercial, and penal Codes. The first Mauritanian chief justice 
of the Supreme Court was not appointed until November 1965, 
in accordance with a law requiring that a Muslim fill the position. 



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Government and Politics 



As late as 1968, fully one-quarter of Mauritania's judges (includ- 
ing almost all the secular law judges) were French. Only in the 
early 1970s were new labor and nationality codes adopted, along 
with new codes of penal, civil, commercial, and administrative 
procedure. 

The sharia Islamic code, which was instituted in 1980, served 
as the law of the land in civil matters, except in certain so-called 
modern areas, such as nationality law and litigation involving cor- 
porations, automobiles, and aircraft (see Tenets of Islam, ch. 2). 
Sharia also covered such areas of public law as theft and murder. 
As in French law, no one was presumed innocent; thus an inabil- 
ity to convince the sitting magistrate that the government's charges 
were erroneous in itself constituted proof of guilt, as did firsthand 
testimony from a witness or codefendant. Defendants had the right 
to counsel and could appeal a verdict to the Supreme Court within 
fifteen days. As in secular courts, circumstantial evidence was in- 
admissible as proof of guilt. Plea bargaining was also common. 
Although Mauritanian law guaranteed expeditious arraignment and 
trial, the slow functioning of the state's inadequately funded judi- 
cial system frequently resulted in long pretrial detentions. Under 
legislation approved by the increasingly isolated President Daddah 
just prior to the 1978 coup, the state arrogated the authority to 
detain without trial or appeal anyone judged to be a national security 
threat. (The Taya government exercised that prerogative in Sep- 
tember 1986 when it arrested thirteen blacks from the Toucouleur 
ethnic group, including prominent educators, politicians, and media 
figures, on charges of sedition and threatening national security.) 

Although nearly all of Mauritania is Muslim, some opposition 
to the institution of sharia was expressed by blacks and women, 
who believed that it discriminated in favor of the white, Maure 
male population. Meanwhile, communal tensions resulting from 
a strict interpretation of sharia have waned over the years as courts 
have moderated their interpretation. This moderation has not 
prevented the government from more fully implementing previ- 
ously ignored provisions of sharia, however. In October 1986, the 
government interdicted the introduction and sale of alcohol in 
Mauritania to all but foreign diplomats and technical assistants 
working for the government. Punishment for violating the ban was 
to be forty lashes administered in public as prescribed by sharia. 

At the top of the judicial system in 1987 was the Supreme Court, 
which had six permanent members, including a president, who had 
to be a jurist in both Islamic and secular law. In addition, court 
members included two vice presidents, one Islamic and one secu- 
lar; two ordinary counselors, also one Islamic and one secular; and 



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Mauritania: A Country Study 



a financial counselor, who served a two-year term and was selected 
jointly by the ministries of justice and finance. The six judges did 
not sit together to hear cases; the number and type of judge (secu- 
lar or Islamic) depended on the nature of the case. The court had 
three areas of competence: appellate review, administrative litiga- 
tion, and financial oversight. The Supreme Court also heard ques- 
tions on constitutionality. 

In judging constitutional cases before the 1978 coup, the court 
included only five judges: the president, the two vice presidents, 
and two extraordinary counselors, one of whom was appointed by 
the president of the republic and the other by the president of the 
National Assembly; both extraordinary counselors served two-year 
terms. (Under military rule, both were chosen by the head of state 
with advice from the CMSN.) The court ruled on the constitu- 
tionality of proposed projects, laws, or treaties at the request of 
the president; determined the eligibility of presidential candidates; 
adjudicated electoral disputes; and supervised referenda and cen- 
suses. The court also closely supervised the normal activities of the 
National Assembly, ensuring its conformity to the Constitution. 
As the final appellate court, the Supreme Court heard appeals from 
the Court of First Instance and the Labor Court or appeals based 
on the lack of jurisdiction or a violation of due process from any 
other court. As an administrative court, it had first and final juris- 
diction in litigation concerning state-owned property, the status 
of civil servants, and public administration. In its financial over- 
sight role, the Supreme Court verified public accounts and imposed 
sanctions on civil servants found guilty of fraud or mismanagement. 

Local Government 

The 1961 Constitution kept the highly centralized colonial struc- 
ture of counties (cercles), subdivisions (sous -prefectures), and adminis- 
trative posts. Local councils were established in the twelve cercles — 
the French created eleven cercles coterminous with the old amirates, 
and the newly independent government created a twelfth cercle, Tiris 
Zemmour, out of northern Adrar — as representative and adminis- 
trative bodies to replace the chiefs and councils of notables through 
whom the French ruled. By 1961 urban and rural communes had 
been created, and rudimentary representative councils had been 
established with elected mayors in the urban communes. There 
were five urban communes modeled after similar bodies in France 
in Rosso, Kaedi, Atar, Bogue, and Nouakchott (see fig. 1). Three 
experimental communes were established in Nouadhibou, 'Ayoun 
el 'Atrous, and Fderik. Although the government attempted to give 
the councils and mayors of the communes control over communal 



132 




National College of Administration, Nouakchott 
Courtesy Derwood Staeben 
Palace of Justice, Nouakchott 
Courtesy Derwood Staeben 



133 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

legislation, the communes failed to fulfill any meaningful function 
for lack of trained and experienced managerial cadres and for want 
of resources to support local administration. With the Law of March 
4, 1968, the rural communes were abolished, and less than a year 
later the urban and experimental communes were also eliminated. 
Local administration reverted to the traditional authorities, who 
became the links between the rulers and the rest of the population. 

On July 30, 1968, the resources and functions of the former com- 
munes were transferred to twelve regions and one district (Nou- 
akchott) in sweeping reforms of local administration. Each of the 
regions, which were generally coterminous with the former cercles, 
were subdivided into departements, generally coterminous with the 
former sous-prefectures, and further divided into arrondissements, cor- 
responding to the former administrative posts. A thirteenth region 
encompassing Tiris al Gharbiyya (that part of Western Sahara 
claimed by Mauritania) was created in 1976; however, it was aban- 
doned when Mauritania withdrew from the Western Sahara con- 
flict. The state viewed the regions as serving as administrative 
subdivisions and as independent judicial districts. 

Each region was headed by a governor representing the central 
government. The governor headed the administrative bureaucracy 
of the region, ensured the execution of laws and regulations, and 
coordinated state services (except for military and judicial activi- 
ties). Under his authority were prefets, who administered departe- 
ments, as well as other civil servants of the region. The governor's 
staff also included two assistants responsible for administration and 
economic and social development. The governor and his two as- 
sistants were appointed by the president. 

Each region had a regional assembly of twenty to thirty mem- 
bers {conseillers) named by presidential decree from a list of nominees 
presented by the party. The conseillers served with no pay for five 
years. The regional assemblies had only minimal autonomy. The 
regional budgets for which they voted were prepared by the govern- 
ment in Nouakchott and included mandatory expenses, such as 
the cost of administration and maintenance of local roads and secon- 
dary airports. Regional assemblies could also levy taxes on cer- 
tain specified goods and allocate a portion of their budgetary 
subvention from the central government to discretionary items. In 
spite of these apparent moves toward decentralization, effective con- 
trol remained with the central government in the name of forging 
national unity. Regional assemblies served only to disseminate 
orders and information from Nouakchott, and not to mediate be- 
tween local and centralized authority. 



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Government and Politics 



Under military rule, the government no longer pursued even 
the pretense of democracy. Although the office of regional gover- 
nor was retained, the regional assemblies, like the National Assem- 
bly, were eliminated. In addition to a regional governor with 
responsibility for regional administration, six regions also had a 
regional military commander responsible for maintaining internal 
security, a task that included monitoring and controlling political 
dissent within his region. The two regions classified as autonomous 
military sectors also had military commanders with responsibili- 
ties similar to those of the regular commanders. 

Local Elections 

To appease the demands of ethnic minorities and diminish the 
role and obligations of an already overburdened government, 
Taya's government hesitantiy took the first steps toward democrati- 
zation and decentralization. In December 1986, residents of Nou- 
akchott and Mauritania's regional capitals, by then numbering 
twelve, voted for candidates for thirteen municipal councils. The 
municipal councils consisted of either thirty or thirty- six members, 
depending on the size of the constituency. For example, the Atar 
council had thirty seats; Zouirat had thirty- six. The councils as- 
sumed responsibility for local economic and financial planning and 
for cultural activities; however, as in the old regional assemblies, 
theirs was a limited autonomy. In addition to the elected conseillers 
and mayor, each council included an agent of the state with the 
title of secretary general, appointed by the minister of interior, in- 
formation, and telecommunications. The ostensible task of the secre- 
taries general was to provide managerial expertise to the elected 
conseillers and mayor, none of whom may have had previous ad- 
ministrative experience. At the same time, however, the secretar- 
ies general acted as representatives of the central government and 
thus fulfilled the Taya government's objective of decentralizing 
while maintaining national control. 

Membership in the municipal councils was determined by popu- 
lar vote with universal suffrage and secret ballots. Locally based 
political parties, some of which had ties with parties in other areas 
and all of which included as part of their name the word union, 
nominated slates for all or a portion of the seats on the council. 
Debate dealt exclusively with local issues, and a limit of four can- 
didates represented the four slates contesting each seat. The cam- 
paigns and elections in December 1986 were conducted in what 
has been characterized as a surprisingly decorous manner, with 
between 48 and 65 percent of the electorate voting. To its credit, 
the government refused to inflate vote totals as is often customary 



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Mauritania: A Country Study 

elsewhere in the Third World. In four of the thirteen municipali- 
ties, no slate won a majority during the first round of voting, so 
a runoff vote was held a week later on December 26, 1986. Once 
seated, the councils elected mayors who, in every city except Nou- 
akchott, had headed the majority slate in the council. In the capi- 
tal, Mohamed Ould Mah, who headed the Union for Progress and 
Brotherhood minority slate, won an unexpected victory over the 
leader of the majority National Democratic Union slate. 

In some respects, the election of municipal councils seemed lit- 
tle more than a repeat of earlier, somewhat pretentious attempts 
to bring the trappings of representative democracy to a society 
unaccustomed to mass political participation. But unlike earlier 
efforts, which were inappropriate copies of the colonial adminis- 
tration, the new councils had organic roots and modest aspirations. 
In light of the paucity of resources available to the mayors and the 
councils, foreign observers doubted that this experiment in demo- 
cracy would resolve Mauritania's profound economic and politi- 
cal problems. Nevertheless, the Taya regime asserted that the 
elections were but a first step in the long-term process of democrati- 
zation. 

Political Power in the Mid-1980s 

Upon taking office in 1984, Taya pledged to promote political 
unity and stability by improving the economy, redressing the ero- 
sion of civil and human rights, and ensuring Mauritania's strict 
neutrality in the Western Sahara conflict. During the first two years 
of Taya's administration, Mauritania's economic performance im- 
proved, even though attempts to halt or slow desertification proved 
ineffectual (see Balance of Payments, Debt, and Foreign Assistance, 
ch. 3). Revenues from agriculture, mining, and fishing increased 
from the depressed levels of the drought years; the rate of inflation 
decreased; and the World Bank (see Glossary) stepped up lend- 
ing, following a currency devaluation in 1985. In keeping with his 
promise concerning human rights, in late 1984 and early 1985 Taya 
freed many of the political prisoners jailed by his predecessor. More 
important, he successfully organized Mauritania's first elections. 

Taya himself, known as a diligent, loyal, disinterested profes- 
sional, remained a popular figure. At least at the outset, his te- 
nure attracted support from Mauritania's principal constituencies, 
including harratin (see Glossary), labor, and students, as well as 
from the exiled, pro-Moroccan Alliance for a Democratic Maurita- 
nia (Alliance pour une Mauritanie Democratique — AMD) based 
in Paris and the Organization of Mauritanian Nationalists (Or- 
ganisation des Nationalistes Mauritaniens) formed in Senegal. His 



136 



Government and Politics 



general amnesty for political prisoners pleased both domestic and 
external dissidents, and his ban on alcohol won support from Islamic 
fundamentalists . 

In spite of Taya's successes, internal politics in 1987 remained 
unsettled. Alternative political choices were still banned, and neither 
of the two exiled dissident groups chose to return. Corruption, which 
had flourished under Haidalla, was still a significant problem. The 
number of nomadic herders dropped from 85 percent of the popu- 
lation to 15 percent, with former nomads settling in Nouakchott 
and other cities and vastly inflating the number of unemployed or 
underemployed living in kebes (shanty towns) surrounding Nouak- 
chott. Harratin, who previously had worked for the nomads, also 
entered the labor market, often in competition with their former 
employers for scarce or nonexistent jobs. Wealthy speculators ex- 
ploited the difficulties of the nomads by purchasing their herds at 
distress prices and then selling them to farmers in the south. The 
economy, which had rebounded somewhat during Taya's first two 
years in office, stagnated. The government raised prices for sta- 
ples and simultaneously devalued the ouguiya. Revenues from min- 
ing, fishing and agriculture dropped. To prevent a financial 
collapse, the World Bank took control of the International Bank 
of Mauritania (Banque Internationale pour la Mauritanie — BIMA). 
Finally, southern blacks, and the Toucouleur in particular, charged 
the Taya government with discrimination and bias, and in frus- 
tration they took their grievances to the streets. 

Internal divisions based on race remained Taya's most critical 
domestic problem in 1987, in spite of his insistence that racism was 
of no consequence in Mauritania. Since independence, some black 
groups repeatedly had charged the government with discrimina- 
tion, alleging underrepresentation of blacks in important posts in 
government, education, and business. Other grievances included 
supposed favoritism by the state in allocating resources, such as 
bank loans and scholarships, and a land reform act that seemingly 
gave Maures preference in the acquisition of irrigated land along 
the Senegal River. The 1983 Land Reform Act maintained that 
as the owner of all unimproved and undeeded land, the state had 
an inherent interest in its development. The act stipulated that in 
accordance with relevant provisions of sharia, the government was 
permitted to cede land to those committed to improving it (see 
Farming, ch. 3). Although the policy of providing parcels of fal- 
low, irrigable land to those willing to farm it was economically 
sound, ambiguities surrounding the implementation of the Land 
Reform Act raised the specter of wealthy land speculators from Nou- 
akchott and Nouadhibou appropriating tracts of rich agricultural 



137 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

land along the Senegal River and displacing blacks whose roots 
extended back for generations. Complicating the issue was the fact 
that wealthy blacks from the Senegal River Basin were also inter- 
ested in assembling large, capital-intensive farms on riparian lands 
and were very much in favor of the government's efforts on their 
behalf. 

President Taya attempted to deal with racial controversy by creat- 
ing a national constituency to replace local or regional (often eth- 
nically based) affiliations. To this end, he sought to eliminate racial 
and ethnic labels. He continued to bring southern blacks and har- 
ratin into his government, in mid- 1987 he named three women to 
cabinet positions, and he earmarked agriculture along the Sene- 
gal River, historically a black enterprise, for heavy investment. Not- 
withstanding such efforts, local blacks, Mauritania's black African 
neighbors, and many foreign observers shared the perception that 
Maures formulated and carried out the political agenda. Moreover, 
frequent cabinet changes, coupled with the rapid rotation of regional 
governors and military commanders, have prevented Mauritania's 
political leaders from acquiring managerial expertise. 

Interest Groups 

In the absence of political parties, in 1987 political demands found 
informal expression only through the various interest groups within 
Mauritanian society. Their interaction with the military govern- 
ment provided some indication of the regime's support. Four in- 
terest groups offered contrasts in how they related to government: 
blacks, who questioned the legitimacy of any government headed 
by Maures; traditional elites, whose importance diminished under 
the military; women, whose limited political strength has come only 
at the sufferance of the government; and labor unions. Maurita- 
nia's most important interest group was the military, for which 
the rules of politics were different (see Role of the Military in So- 
ciety, ch. 5). 

Ethnic Minorities 

In 1987 the most visible political organization among Maurita- 
nia's blacks was the African Liberation Forces of Mauritania (Forces 
Liberation Africaine de Mauritanie — FLAM). Founded in 1983 
and outiawed in 1984, the group has developed a complex and clan- 
destine organization based in Dakar, Senegal. It drew its mem- 
bership primarily from the Toucouleur. Among alleged FLAM 
members arrested by the government in September 1986 were Ibra- 
hima Sarr, a television journalist; Tafsirou Djigo and Mamadou 
Ly, former cabinet ministers; Mahmoudi Ould Boukhreiss, a 



138 



Government and Politics 



businessman and brother of Colonel Moulay Ould Boukhreiss, a 
former minister of justice known for his pro-Libyan sentiments; 
Tene Youssouf Gueye, a writer; Oumar Ba, a noted historian and 
linguist; and Def Ould Babana, a former diplomat. Several profes- 
sors and researchers from the University of Nouakchott were also 
linked to FLAM. 

FLAM members have claimed responsibility for distributing a 
highly articulate, fifty-page pamphlet entitled "Le Manifesto du 
Negro-Mauritanien Opprime" (The Manifesto of the Oppressed 
Black Mauritanian), documenting alleged examples of officially 
sanctioned discrimination. Copies of the manifesto were circulated 
in Addis Ababa during the spring 1986 meetings of the OAU and 
during the summer 1986 summit meetings of the Nonaligned Move- 
ment in Harare, Zimbabwe. FLAM adherents were also charged 
with instigating a series of attacks in September and October 1986 
against a fish-processing facility in Nouadhibou, a pharmacy and 
gas station in Nouakchott, and three government vehicles. Although 
damage from the attacks was minimal, they were the first such acts 
of sabotage in Mauritania and thus represented a dramatic escala- 
tion in political violence. 

The government responded quickly and harshly to these attacks. 
It labeled FLAM leaders as "misled persons" intent on "under- 
mining the values and foundations of . . . society" by sowing 
"hatred and confusion" with the assistance of foreign enemies, pos- 
sibly Libya. On September 4 and 5, 1986, army and police units 
arrested between thirty and forty suspected FLAM members. 
Twenty of the group were later given sentences ranging from six 
months to five years. Lieutenant Colonel Anne Amadou Babali, 
the black minister of interior, information and telecommunications, 
was dismissed from his post, allegedly for ignoring evidence of 
FLAM's existence. He was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Djibril 
Ould Abdallah, who was known for his firmness. Also relieved of 
their positions were Captain Niang Harouna and Commander 
Diouf Oumar of the Mauritanian Army, as well as the director 
of BIMA and other highly placed officials elsewhere in government. 
Most of those dismissed blacks were replaced by other blacks from 
Wolof or Soninke groups, and only a few were replaced by Maures. 
None of the new black appointees, however, supported the FLAM 
agenda. 

With its leadership imprisoned or in self-imposed exile, FLAM's 
activities through the first half of 1987 diminished considerably; 
nevertheless, discontent among blacks, and especially among the 
Toucouleur, simmered. Observers speculated that further outbreaks 



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Mauritania: A Country Study 



of violence might erupt if the government attempted to implement 
its 1983 land reform program on a large scale. 

Traditional Elites 

Although originally supported by Mauritania's leading chiefs, 
the PPM in 1963 made the policy decision to suppress the institu- 
tion of chieftaincies in order to foster unity and allegiance to a na- 
tional leader. Accordingly, no replacement was chosen for a chief 
who died or resigned. Nevertheless, traditional rulers continued 
to play a significant, if decreasing, role in the political system. At 
the local level, traditional rulers represented the administration with 
the peasantry, aided in the maintenance of public order, and mobi- 
lized resources for public works projects. Chiefs also collected taxes, 
and in return the government paid their salaries. 

On the national level, traditional rulers were most often co-opted 
and integrated into the party, where they played an important role. 
Some chiefs or their kin became secretaries of the party commit- 
tee in their villages; others held civil service positions. Through- 
out Daddah's stay in office, nearly all his ministers and deputies 
came from the highest levels of traditional leadership, and espe- 
cially from marabout (see Glossary) castes. Daddah regularly 
brought new members of the old elite into the government to im- 
prove efficiency and to enlarge his base of support. This changed 
only when the costs of the war in the Western Sahara threatened 
the economic well-being of the growing class of technocrats — a new 
elite — at home. 

The 1978 military coup brought another group of traditional elites 
into government, as leaders of what had been warrior castes (has- 
sani) replaced those of maraboutic groups. Of far greater significance 
for the long term, however, has been the movement of civilian and 
military technocrats into positions of political leadership. Taya's 
1987 cabinet appointments — such as the new minister of mines 
and industry, Khadijatou Bint Ahmed, and the new minister of 
foreign affairs, Commander Mohamed Lemine Ould N'Diayane — 
have tended to be young (Ahmed, a woman, and N'Diayane are 
under forty), well educated, motivated, articulate, and energetic 
politicians. 

Women 

During the period of civilian government, women were most suc- 
cessful in fulfilling their political demands through the party. 
Although the constitution guaranteed equality before the law and 
full rights of political participation, traditional practices effectively 
denied women any major role in political life. To elicit the support 



140 



Government and Politics 



of women, the PPM created the National Union of Mauritanian 
Women in 1961 . At first oriented only toward such typically femi- 
nine issues as health, nutrition, and education, by 1964 it had be- 
come the women's political arm of the PPM and was renamed the 
National Women's Movement (Mouvement National Feminin). 
The organization of the women's movement paralleled that of the 
PPM, with local committees, sections, and federations, and was 
headed by an elected bureau. At each level in the hierarchy, an 
official of the women's organization participated as an ex officio 
member of the respective PPM bureau. Although most women were 
far from achieving political equality with men, they were able to 
bring about change in response to some of their demands. 

Over the years, several political functions helped to improve the 
lot of women. The PPM party congress at Kaedi in 1964 con- 
demned abuses of divorce and dowries. The congress at 'Ayoun 
el 'Atrous in 1966 made provisions for the support of dependent 
children who remained with their mothers following a divorce and 
created the Superior Council for Women (Conseil Superieur des 
Femmes), which operated the National Women's Movement. At 
the Nouakchott party congress in 1968, women's issues received 
significant attention. The 300 participants, including 11 women, 
called for the obligatory registration of marriages and divorces to 
protect women, the enactment of laws to discourage polygyny, limits 
on the size of dowries, and a code to protect women's rights. In 
the 1971 elections, two women were elected to the previously all- 
male National Assembly, and one, Aissatou Kane, was named 
minister of health and social affairs, becoming the first woman to 
serve in the government. She remained in office until the 1978 coup. 

The pace of change improved under the military government 
as more women enrolled in schools and joined the labor force. In 
May 1987, in what was a remarkable step for Mauritania, Presi- 
dent Taya named three women to cabinet-level posts to "correct 
countless managerial mistakes committed in the past." Khadijatou 
Bint Ahmed of Boutilimit was appointed minister of mines and in- 
dustries. Lalla Mariam Bint Moulaye was appointed associate direc- 
tor of the presidential cabinet, and N'Deye Tabar Fall became 
general secretary of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. 

Trade Unions 

The Mauritanian Workers Union (Union des Travailleurs 
Mauritaniens — UTM), created in 1961, was a government- 
supported federation of all trade unions within the country. Until 
1969 the UTM was completely separate from the PPM and the 
government, although it supported the party and had as many as 



141 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

seven representatives in the National Assembly. Initially, the UTM 
was conceived as a radical union in a class-oriented society and 
was pledged to forward the interests of workers as a class. Accord- 
ingly, union leadership ruled out integration with the party, as was 
customary in most other one-party states in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Consequently, union leaders were not averse to challenging the 
state. In May 1968, when news of student and worker demonstra- 
tions in France reached Mauritania, iron ore workers at Zouirat 
struck to protest the pay differential, amounting to almost 1,000 
percent, between the salaries of West Europeans and Africans. The 
government called on the army to restore order, a move that resulted 
in the death of eight workers and injuries to twenty-three. 

At the fourth congress of the UTM, held in February 1969, party 
leaders and UTM leadership proposed incorporating the UTM into 
the PPM. Several member unions of the UTM denounced both 
the proposal and UTM leadership, which was described as no longer 
representing the interests of workers. Subsequently, several unions, 
including the National Union of Mauritanian Teachers, formally 
opposed integration with the party and voted to withdraw from 
the UTM. Under the Directing Committee of Mauritanian Work- 
ers, the "Progressive" UTM was formed. The new federation ar- 
gued that the UTM was now under the control of management 
and could no longer represent the interests of the working class. 

The PPM and the government refused to recognize the new labor 
federation, arguing that there could be no political activity out- 
side the party. Mauritanian students, on the other hand, supported 
the new federation and in May 1971 challenged police and army 
units by demonstrating throughout Mauritania. Workers joined 
students in protest when miners at Fderik closed the mines in Sep- 
tember and October 1968. 

Subsequent union activity under the military was marked by con- 
flict and confusion. In 1983 Haidalla imprisoned UTM secretary 
general Elkory Ould H'metty for allegedly having used the UTM 
for political purposes and on behalf of Libyan interests. Taking 
over UTM leadership was H'metty's former assistant, Beijel Ould 
Houmeit, who had been a faithful Haidalla supporter. In 1985 
H'metty was freed by President Taya. Nevertheless, Houmeit only 
begrudgingly yielded power to the erstwhile secretary general. From 
1984 until mid- 1987, the administration of the UTM was para- 
lyzed, and union locals atrophied. In an effort to secure worker 
cooperation during the period of recession, the government decid- 
ed to reinvigorate the UTM. In mid- 198 7 local offices were being 
reestablished in major urban areas, and a general UTM congress 
was tentatively planned for late 1987. 



142 



National Textile Workers Union on parade 
Courtesy Embassy of Mauritania, Washington 

Foreign Relations 

The historic contradictions and competing interests involved in 
formulating foreign policy have allowed Mauritania's several heads 
of state to justify a monopoly on foreign policy decision making. 
As a result, Mauritania's foreign policy, like that of other developing 
states, represents at once an extension of the president's personal- 
ity and the embodiment of an otherwise fragile state. Accordingly, 
Mauritania's foreign policy over the years avoided ideological 
posturing in favor of pragmatic responses to domestic and foreign 
pressures. That was particularly true in the mid-1980s when harsh 
economic realities and the ongoing conflict in the Western Sahara 
compelled the Taya government to strengthen its ties to France; 
continue its balancing act among Morocco, Algeria, and the 
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR); and solicit support 
from as many donors as would come to its aid. 

Foreign Policy 

During the late colonial period, Mauritania had few contacts with 
the other territories of French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale 
Francaise — AOF). At the time of the independence referendum 
in 1958, Mauritania's representatives on the Grand Council of the 
AOF remained neutral, while all other AOF members divided 



143 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

between the African Democratic Rally (Rassemblement Democra- 
tique Africain — RDA) and the African Regroupment Party (Parti 
du Regroupement Africain — PRA). Until Mauritania became in- 
dependent and Morocco threatened its security, Mauritania did 
not participate in AOF intraterritorial political, labor, or cultural 
movements. Only when Mauritania's existence as a state became 
problematic did it seek international recognition and support. 

Throughout the 1960s, Mauritania's main foreign policy objec- 
tive was preserving its independence in the face of Moroccan ir- 
redentism (see Regional Security Concerns, ch. 5). (Morocco finally 
recognized Mauritanian independence in 1969.) To that end, the 
Daddah government insisted on maintaining close ties with France, 
an effort that included allowing France to station troops on Maurita- 
nian soil (see The Independence Period and the French Military 
Legacy, ch. 5). In Africa, Mauritania established ties with the more 
conservative francophone countries because all the Arab League 
states (except Tunisia) and the African members of the Casablanca 
Group (Ghana, Guinea, and Mali) supported Morocco's irreden- 
tist claims. 

Mauritania applied for admission to the UN in 1960, sponsored 
by France, but its membership was vetoed by the Soviet Union, 
which supported the Arab League. For the most part, black Africa 
and the West favored Mauritania's admission, and the Soviet Union 
dropped its opposition in 1961 in exchange for a favorable vote 
on Mongolia's admission. In a final effort to block Mauritania's 
admission, Morocco brought the issue to the General Assembly, 
which supported Mauritania's application by a vote of sixty-eight 
to thirteen, with twenty abstentions. Mauritania was admitted to 
the UN on October 27, 1961 . Mali, Guinea, and most Arab states 
supported Morocco in the debate. 

In January 1962 Mauritania edged away from its previously con- 
servative, pro-French position by extending recognition to the Provi- 
sional Government of the Algerian Republic and refusing to attend 
meetings of the French-backed Common Saharan States Organi- 
zation. These tentative displays of independence increased Maurita- 
nia's credibility with its more progressive African neighbors and 
emphasized the country's role as a bridge between Arab North 
Africa and black sub- Saharan Africa. Mauritania and Mali sub- 
sequently achieved a rapprochement with the signing of the Treaty 
of Kayes in February 1963. Relations with Algeria improved when 
Mauritania supported Algeria in its dispute with Morocco. Egypt, 
known at the time as the United Arab Republic (UAR) and the 
acknowledged leader of the Arab world, also sided with Algeria, 
and on October 21, 1964, the UAR officially extended recognition 



144 



Government and Politics 



to Mauritania. That action encouraged Daddah to undertake an 
even bolder foreign policy. 

In 1963 Mauritania joined the OAU, whereupon Morocco 
resigned in protest. In 1964 Daddah became the first president 
of the recently formed Afro-Malagasy Union for Economic 
Cooperation (Union Africaine et Malagache de Cooperation 
Economique — UAMCE), a loose grouping of francophone Afri- 
can countries pledging technical and cultural cooperation. When 
the organization was subsequently upgraded to become a political 
organization in defiance of the OAU charter, Mauritania withdrew 
from all but the technical committees. 

Through the early 1970s, Mauritania continued to play the role 
of bridge between the Maghrib and sub-Saharan Africa. Mauritania 
also maintained its commitment to nonalignment while opening 
relations with Eastern Europe and the radical states of Africa. In 
support of Arab League and OAU positions, Mauritania did not 
seek ties with Israel, South Africa, or Portugal. Mauritania finally 
established diplomatic relations with Morocco in 1969. Close re- 
lations with France, on whom Mauritania continued to rely for 
much of its development aid, remained the cornerstone of Maurita- 
nian foreign policy through the late 1980s. 

Spain's withdrawal from the Spanish Sahara and the latter' s par- 
tition and annexation by Mauritania and Morocco in 1976 inau- 
gurated an eight-year period of conflict and fighting against Polisario 
guerrillas of the SADR, resulting in military setbacks and stag- 
nating diplomacy for Mauritania (see Conflict in the Western 
Sahara, ch. 1). Upon annexation, Mauritania's former ally Algeria 
severed its ties with the Daddah government in support of the 
SADR. From 1976 to 1979, Polisario guerrillas increased pressure 
on Mauritania and launched commando attacks against Fderik and 
Nouakchott. As a consequence of the economic and political costs 
of the fighting, the military successors to Daddah attempted to dis- 
engage Mauritania from the conflict; nevertheless, Polisario forces 
penetrated Mauritania's defenses, often with impunity, to infiltrate 
fighters into the Western Sahara. Subsequently, relations with 
Morocco again deteriorated and then finally ruptured in 1981 when 
Mauritania accused Morocco of backing a coup attempt in Nou- 
akchott. Conversely, relations with the Polisario and Algeria im- 
proved. In December 1983, Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania 
signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship. The following year 
Haidalla extended diplomatic recognition and support to the SADR, 
an action that ultimately led to the downfall of his government. 
President Taya maintained ties with the SADR, but the link was 



145 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

at best correct and represented little more than Taya's attempt to 
appease his more formidable neighbors. 

Mauritania's principal foreign policy objective in the mid-1980s 
has been to ensure its own territorial integrity. Translated into 
diplomacy, this has meant pursuing a policy of strict neutrality in 
the Western Sahara dispute, improving relations with Morocco and 
Algeria, and seeking guarantees of support from France should ties 
with Mauritania's northern neighbors seriously deteriorate. Taya's 
efforts in that area have had mixed results. Although Taya insisted 
that Mauritania would remain neutral in the conflict over the 
Western Sahara, Mauritania faced a mounting threat of greater 
involvement because the combatants themselves continued to en- 
croach on Mauritanian territory. As the Moroccans pushed south- 
ward in the Western Sahara behind their highly effective network 
of sand walls (berms — see Glossary) to within a few kilometers of 
the Mauritanian border, Mauritanian armed forces were placed 
in the position of confronting either well-equipped Moroccan troops 
pursuing Polisario guerrillas, or Polisario commando teams cross- 
ing into and perhaps attacking the berms from Mauritanian terri- 
tory. In either case, Mauritania would probably be the loser. 

Taya has also sought to improve ties with other countries to se- 
cure trading partners or find new investors. Mauritania's principal 
benefactors have been Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and France. The list 
of donors also includes Japan, Iraq, Italy, the Federal Republic 
of Germany (West Germany), Romania, the United States, the 
Persian Gulf states, and China (see Balance of Payments, Debt, 
and Foreign Assistance, ch. 3). 

Relations with France 

Most of Mauritania's developmental assistance in the 1980s was 
provided by France, which was also the major supplier of private 
direct investment. Bilateral accords signed with France in 1961 
provided for economic, financial, technical, cultural, and military 
cooperation and aid. Although Mauritania opposed France on 
Algerian independence, nuclear testing in the Sahara, and French 
arms sales to South Africa, ties remained cordial through the Dad- 
dah term. French citizens worked in Mauritania as technical as- 
sistants in the government, administrators, teachers, and judges. 
Daddah frequently traveled to France, and French development 
aid flowed to Mauritania. The level of French involvement rose 
markedly following the outbreak of hostilities in the Western Sahara. 
Between 1976 and 1979, when Mauritania unilaterally declared 
peace and withdrew from combat, French aircraft provided air 



146 




Colonel Maaouiya Ould Sid 'Ahmed Taya 
Courtesy Embassy of Mauritania, Washington 



147 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

support for Mauritanian troops fighting Polisario forces, and French 
paratroops were stationed at Nouadhibou. 

Activity by Mauritanian dissidents in France, together with 
Mauritania's gradual policy shift toward the Polisario, resulted in 
a growing coolness toward Paris. In May 1979, Mauritania asked 
France to remove its troops from Nouadhibou. France continued 
to provide a high level of financial aid, although less than requested 
by the Haidalla government, and this curtailment further strained 
ties. Following alleged accusations of Moroccan support of a coup 
attempt in March 1981, Haidalla again turned to France to ob- 
tain guarantees of Mauritania's territorial integrity. French presi- 
dent Georges Pompidou and Haidalla concluded an accord in 1981 , 
as Morocco threatened to carry the struggle against Polisario guer- 
rillas into Mauritanian territory. As Morocco's advancing sand 
walls increasingly obligated Polisario guerrillas to use Mauritania 
as a staging area, President Haidalla and, later, President Taya 
sought and received guarantees of French support in August 1984 
and June 1987. 

Relations with Morocco 

Prior to the December 1984 coup that brought Taya to power, 
the Mauritanian-Moroccan cooperation agency stated that rela- 
tions between the two countries were on the mend in spite of alleged 
Moroccan complicity in a 1981 coup attempt and Mauritania's sub- 
sequent turn toward Algeria (see Consolidation of Power, ch. 1). 
Representatives from both sides initiated a series of low-level con- 
tacts that led to a resumption of diplomatic ties in April 1985. For 
Mauritania, the detente with Morocco promised to end the threat 
of Moroccan incursions, and it also removed the threat of Moroc- 
can support for opposition groups formed during the Haidalla 
presidency. Through the agreement with Mauritania, Morocco 
sought to tighten its control over the Western Sahara by denying 
the Polisario one more avenue for infiltrating guerrillas into the 
disputed territory. 

Relations between Morocco and Mauritania continued to im- 
prove through 1986, reflecting President Taya's pragmatic, if un- 
stated, view that only a Moroccan victory over the Polisario would 
end the guerrilla war in the Western Sahara. Taya made his first 
visit to Morocco in October 1985 (prior to visits to Algeria and 
Tunisia) in the wake of Moroccan claims that Polisario guerrillas 
were again traversing Mauritanian territory. The completion of 
a sixth berm just north of Mauritania's crucial rail link along the 
border with the Western Sahara, between Nouadhibou and the iron 
ore mines, complicated relations between Mauritania and Morocco. 



148 



Government and Politics 



Polisario guerrillas in mid- 1987 had to traverse Mauritanian ter- 
ritory to enter the Western Sahara, a situation that invited 
Morocco's accusations of Mauritanian complicity. Moreover, any 
engagements near the sixth berm would threaten to spill over into 
Mauritania and jeopardize the rail link. 

Relations with Other States of the Maghrib 

Focusing on internal affairs prior to independence, Mauritania 
was reluctant to participate in the Common Saharan States Or- 
ganization proposed by France in 1957, and the organization col- 
lapsed when Algeria gained its independence. From the mid-1970s, 
Mauritania's ties with Libya and, to a greater extent, Algeria were 
inextricably linked to the Western Sahara conflict and the larger 
confrontation between Algeria and Morocco. As relations with 
Morocco cooled following Mauritania's unilateral withdrawal from 
the conflict, ties with Algeria improved. Within days after the March 
1981 coup attempt, Algeria dispatched military reinforcements to 
Nouakchott. In December 1983, Algeria joined Mauritania and 
Tunisia in pledging to negotiate conflicts according to the terms 
of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Algeria also refurbished 
the oil refinery at Nouadhibou in 1982, and again in 1987, after 
the refinery had been shut down for several years for lack of ade- 
quate maintenance. 

Since the 1984 coup that brought Taya to power, Mauritania 
has been scrupulous in its efforts to balance its contacts with Algeria 
and Morocco. A visit to one capital by a Mauritanian diplomat 
is quickly followed by a visit to the other. When the sixth berm 
was completed in May 1987, bringing Moroccan troops to within 
a few kilometers of Mauritanian territory, Algeria offered to send 
troops to Nouadhibou, ostensibly to discourage hot-pursuit raids 
by Moroccan armed forces. Taya refused the offer, but at the same 
time he accorded Algeria special fishing rights without the joint 
participation required of other national fleets fishing Mauritania's 
waters. 

Libya's relations with Mauritania were generally confrontational. 
On several occasions, Libya has expressed its intention of absorb- 
ing Mauritania into an Islamic federation, and Libya allegedly 
backed a coup attempt in Mauritania in December 1980. The Oujda 
Agreement between Morocco and Libya, signed in 1984, was 
viewed as a serious threat in Mauritania that was removed only 
when the agreement collapsed in 1986. Although Mauritania has 
repeatedly professed neutrality in the Western Sahara, Taya's un- 
willingness to lend support to the Polisario was interpreted by Libya 
as a pro-Moroccan stance. In 1987 Taya suggested that Libya was 



149 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

supporting efforts by black separatists in Mauritania to destabi- 
lize his government and possibly exact a modicum of revenge 
against King Hassan II of Morocco, Libya's erstwhile ally. 

Relations with Arab States 

In 1987 Mauritania had generally cordial relations with the Arab 
states of the Middle East, which have provided it with substantial 
amounts of economic aid. Since the mid-1970s, Mauritania has 
had especially close ties with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq. 
Kuwait has provided substantial amounts of food and medicines. 
Iraq has funded the construction of health and sanitation facili- 
ties, schools, and thermal generating stations and has also invested 
in local mining, fishing, and gypsum industries. Both Saudi Ara- 
bia and Iraq — until Iraq became mired in the Iran-Iraq War be- 
ginning in 1980 — have provided direct budgetary subsidies to the 
Mauritanian government. In return, Mauritania has lent moral 
support to Iraq; and in June 1987, following a visit to Nouakchott 
by a representative of the Kuwaiti government, Taya severed diplo- 
matic relations with Iran to protest its supposed unwillingness to 
negotiate a settlement in the Iran-Iraq War. (At the same time, 
Taya, unlike many of his African counterparts, has steadfastly re- 
fused to accuse Iran of supporting radical Islamic fundamental- 
ism in his country, presumably because of his policy of remaining 
on good terms with all Middle Eastern states.) 

Relations with Communist States 

In 1987 Mauritania's diplomatic relations with China, first es- 
tablished in 1964, remained close. With one exception, every 
Mauritanian president has visited China. Taya's six-day visit, his 
first visit as Mauritanian head of state, took place in February 1986 
and was followed by China's promises of increased aid. In addi- 
tion to building a deep-water port for Nouakchott, China provided 
food, financial aid, and technical assistance in health care and 
agriculture. China also constructed a sports complex in the capital. 

Mauritania established relations with the Soviet Union in 1965. 
In the mid-1980s, commercial ties between the two states remained 
negligible, as did commercial agreements with the Soviet Union's 
East European allies. Mauritania also maintained diplomatic re- 
lations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North 
Korea). 

Relations with the West 

Relations with the United States have never been close. The 
United States recognized Mauritanian independence when it was 



150 



Saudi-financed mosque 
in Nouakchott 
Courtesy Larry Barrie 




proclaimed in November 1960, but the first two ambassadors shared 
accreditation with Senegal and resided in Dakar. A United States 
embassy opened in July 1962 in Nouakchott and was headed by 
a charge d'affaires. Only in 1972 were resident ambassadors ex- 
changed. 

Since the onset of the drought in the mid-1970s, Mauritania has 
cultivated ties with Western Europe and Eastern Europe as possi- 
ble sources of aid and investment. Mauritania's ties with Spain, 
which until 1975 were dominated by the fate of the Western Sahara, 
remained cordial in spite of repeated violations of Mauritania's fish- 
ing regulations by Spanish boats. The two countries have formed 
a joint economic and technical cooperation commission, a move 
reflecting the importance Spain gave to its aid and cooperation pro- 
gram with Mauritania. 

Relations with Other African States 

In the years following independence, Mauritania's principal 
friend in sub-Saharan Africa was Senegal, although the two coun- 
tries have espoused different strategies for development. The grow- 
ing split between blacks and Maures in Mauritania has, however, 
affected ties with Senegal, which sees itself as championing the rights 
of Mauritania's black minority. Under Taya, relations between 
the two countries were correct, even though each accused the other 
of harboring exiled dissidents. In May 1987, Senegal extradited 



151 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

Captain Moulaye Asham Ould Ashen, a former black member of 
the Haidalla government accused of corruption, but only after veiled 
threats from Nouakchott that failure to do so would result in 
Mauritania's allowing Senegalese dissidents a platform from which 
to speak out against the government of President Abdou Diouf. 
At the same time, Senegal and Mauritania have cooperated suc- 
cessfully with Mali under the Senegal River Development Office 
(Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Senegal — OMVS), 
which was formed in 1972 as a flood control, irrigation, and agricul- 
tural development project. 

Since Mauritania negotiated a boundary dispute with Mali in 
1963, ties between the two countries have been most cordial. Mali 
and Mauritania have cooperated on several development projects, 
such as the OMVS and a plan to improve roads between Nouak- 
chott and Bamako. This cooperation somewhat lessened Mali's de- 
pendence on Senegal and Cote d'l voire. Although relations were 
warm with other black African states, since 1965 the orientation 
of Mauritania's foreign policy has been northward. 

International Organizations 

Mauritania is a member of the United Nations. It is represented 
in the International Labour Organisation, the World Health Or- 
ganization, the International Telecommunication Union, and the 
Intergovernmental Consultative Organization on Maritime Navi- 
gation. In Africa, Mauritania is a member of the OAU and, at 
the regional level, the Economic Community of West Africa (Com- 
munaute Economique de l'Afrique Occidentale — CEAO), the Eco- 
nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the 
Nonaggression and Mutual Assistance and Defense Accord (a 
mutual defense accord among several francophone states of West 
Africa). Mauritania also belongs to the Arab League. 

* * * 

Writing on Mauritania, so rich for the medieval and precolo- 
nial periods when Mauritania served as a cultural and economic 
link between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, had shrunk 
by the postindependence period, when a constellation of factors 
relegated Mauritania to a relatively minor role in West Africa. 
Moreover, drought, war, and domestic security concerns have vir- 
tually eliminated the discretionary funds the government might 
otherwise have spent for publishing documentary materials per- 
taining to contemporary Mauritanian government and politics. The 
principal sources for this chapter included the earlier version of 



152 



Government and Politics 



Mauritania: A Country Study; a similar but more detailed study enti- 
tled Introduction a la Mauritanie compiled by the Centre de Recherches 
et d'Etudes sur les Societes Mediterraneennes (CRESM) and the 
Centre d'Etudes d'Afrique Noire and published by the Centre Na- 
tional de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); and J.C. Arnaud's 
Les institutions politiques de la Mauritanie. Contemporary sources in- 
cluded Africa South of the Sahara published by Europa; Africa Con- 
temporary Record; Chaab, Mauritania's French-language daily 
newspaper; the Country Reports and Quarterly Economic Reviews pub- 
lished by the Economist Intelligence Unit; and the following news 
magazines: Jeune Afrique, Africa Research Bulletin, Africa Confidential, 
and Marches tropicaux et Mediterraneens . (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



153 



Chapter 5. National Security 



Mounted color guard 



SINCE GAINING INDEPENDENCE in I960, Mauritania has 
faced a number of serious external and internal threats. Until 1969 
the majority of Arab states refused to recognize Mauritania's 
sovereignty and supported Morocco's irredentist claims to the en- 
tire nation. Only in 1969 did Morocco extend official recognition 
to the Nouakchott government. Although the two countries signed 
a treaty of friendship the following year, Mauritanian leaders have 
treated their stronger neighbor to the north with caution, relying 
heavily on French protection. The dispute over sovereignty of the 
Spanish Sahara in the early 1970s raised further security problems. 
Negotiations among Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, and Spain 
failed to resolve the issue, and in 1976 war erupted in the area 
known as the Western Sahara. As that conflict dragged on, Maurita- 
nia's economy faltered and antigovernment opposition groups 
emerged, threatening the stability of the military regime that 
replaced Moktar Ould Daddah's civilian government in July 1978. 
Subsequently, internal coups and innumerable cabinet shuffles 
plagued the government from 1978 through 1984 when the regime 
of Colonel Maaouiya Ould Sid Ahmed Ould Taya came to power. 

In 1987 government security forces, consisting of military, 
paramilitary, and police units, were small and equipped only for 
maintaining internal security. Military forces under the Ministry 
of Defense included an army, navy, air force, and three paramili- 
tary units: the Nomad Security Guard (or Camel Corps) under 
the jurisdiction of the army, the small Border Guard, and the 
National Gendarmerie. The Ministry of Interior, Information, and 
Telecommunications controlled the police and the National Guard, 
the Customs Corps, and the Presidential Guard. Mauritania's var- 
ious heads of state in turn reorganized the security forces and shuf- 
fled personnel to facilitate troop deployment and to prevent any 
one individual or group from acquiring too much power. As a result, 
force readiness and strength suffered. 

External Security Perceptions and Policies 

War in the Western Sahara 

From the 1960s through 1987, Mauritania's foreign policy was 
directed toward protecting the country's national sovereignty (see 
Foreign Relations, ch. 4). Mauritania at first sought and received 
French support to prevent Morocco from attempting to annex the 



157 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

country. Then, after Morocco recognized Mauritanian sovereignty, 
Mauritania distanced itself from France and cultivated ties with 
various Arab countries, including Algeria and Morocco, in hopes 
of avoiding regional disputes. 

Yet by 1976, Mauritania was again involved in regional con- 
flict. Along with Morocco, Mauritania, as party to the Madrid 
Agreements, claimed a portion of the Spanish Sahara (now gener- 
ally called Western Sahara). As the struggle of the Polisario (see 
Glossary) for sovereignty in the Western Sahara escalated, it be- 
came clear that Mauritania's armed forces were incapable of either 
asserting its territorial claims in the Western Sahara or defending 
its own territory. Mauritania sought assistance from France and 
Morocco in its struggle to defend itself against Polisario guerril- 
las. After relinquishing its claims in the Western Sahara in 1978, 
Mauritania again sought foreign military support from France and 
also Morocco (see Consolidation of Power, ch. 1). 

As the Western Sahara war continued into the mid-1980s, Moroc- 
can advances forced Polisario guerrillas into Mauritanian territory. 
In response, Mauritania placed troops along its northern border. 
In 1987, when Mauritania found itself unable to defend its 2,500- 
kilometer border with the Western Sahara, the country feared it 
would be dragged back into a conflict from which it had extricated 
itself nine years earlier. 

Regional Security Concerns 

Since independence, Mauritania has been confronted with several 
potential challenges to its national security. Problems in addition 
to the Western Sahara war have included Moroccan irredentist 
claims, Senegalese meddling in racial disputes, and Libyan inter- 
ference. 

Morocco 

Moroccan threats to Mauritania originated in the seventeenth cen- 
tury and continued into the twentieth century. In 1956 and 1957, 
Mauritanian and Moroccan members of the Army of Liberation 
(Armee de Liberation — AL), the military wing of the Mauritanian 
National Liberation Front headquartered in Morocco, raided 
Mauritania's northern region. With no military forces of its own 
to defend the frontiers, the preindependence transition government 
called on France for aid. In February 1958, a joint Franco- Spanish 
land-air operation destroyed the AL in the Spanish Sahara and 
stopped the southward infiltration of Moroccan-supported guerrillas. 

In the 1960s, Morocco continued to support irredentist groups 
in Mauritania, especially the Reguibat Maures of the far north, 



158 



Polisario troops at Tindouf, Algeria 
Courtesy Theresa Smith 



who claimed allegiance to the king of Morocco. Following the revolt 
of the Reguibat Maures in 1962-63, the French again sent troops 
to the troubled area. Threats from the north subsided for a short 
time when, in 1969, Morocco officially recognized Mauritania. 

Soon after, Mauritania's concerns about Morocco revived when 
Mauritania had to call on Moroccan troops for defense against 
Polisario guerrilla attacks. The stationing of Moroccan soldiers in- 
side Mauritania gave rise to suspicion that in providing military 
aid, Morocco was trying to resuscitate its old idea of a Greater 
Morocco (see fig. 3). In addition, the Mauritanian military (15,000 
to 17,000 troops) resented its role as a back-up force to the Moroccan 
troops (estimated at 10,000) garrisoned in Mauritania. At the same 
time, Mauritania feared that if it abandoned its claims to Tiris al 
Gharbiyya (that part of the Western Sahara it claimed), Moroc- 
can troops would immediately occupy it, removing the buffer terri- 
tory insulating Mauritania from Morocco. 

In 1979 that fear was confirmed when King Hassan II annexed 
Tiris al Gharbiyya several days after Mauritania's August 5 peace 
treaty with the Polisario. Consequently the government of Colonel 
Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla again sought French support. 
French president Valery Giscard d'Estaing ordered a paratroop 
unit to Nouadhibou to defend Mauritania against a possible Moroc- 
can invasion and to prevent the Polisario from using the nearby 



159 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

territory as a rear base for attacking Moroccan armed forces in 
the Western Sahara (see Foreign Military Assistance, this ch.). 
Mauritania expelled several Moroccan diplomats and withdrew the 
passports of pro-Moroccan politicians. 

In 1980, as relations worsened between the two countries, Nouak- 
chott renounced the Mauritanian-Moroccan defense pact and 
ordered Morocco to withdraw its troops from Mauritanian terri- 
tory. Morocco initially refused the evacuation order and tried to 
make the removal of its last garrison at Bir Mogrein in northern 
Mauritania contingent on the withdrawal of Mauritanian forces 
from La Guera in the Western Sahara (see fig. 11). Mauritania 
refused this request because it believed that continued adminis- 
tration of La Guera, with easy access to the iron ore port at 
Nouadhibou, was vital for security. The government claimed that 
a Moroccan presence only five kilometers from the port would invite 
Polisario attacks inside Mauritania and give King Hassan a poten- 
tial stranglehold over the Mauritanian economy. 

The two countries broke off relations in March 1981 when 
Mauritania accused Morocco of instigating a coup to establish a 
pro-Moroccan government in Nouakchott. In 1983 relations de- 
teriorated further when Mauritania officially recognized the 
government- in-exile established by the Polisario, the Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic (SADR). 

By 1983 Haidalla had aligned himself with leftist factions within 
the ruling Military Committee for National Salvation (Comite 
Militaire de Salut National — CMSN) and strengthened relations 
with Algeria, which supported the Polisario. Subsequently, and 
against the advice and wishes of a majority in the CMSN, in 1984 
Haidalla recognized the SADR. Mauritania's supportive stance 
toward the Polisario increasingly angered Hassan, who accused 
Mauritania of harboring Polisario troops. 

Observers noted, however, that the Polisario also maintained 
bases in southern Morocco and had the support of certain nomadic 
tribes in the area of the Draa River. Thus, it was clear that the 
movement received support from various sectors of the population 
on both sides of the border, irrespective of governments. 

Mauritania's foreign relations changed when the coup led by 
the Mauritanian military in December 1984 brought Taya to power. 
Taya distanced Mauritania from the Polisario, while continuing 
to recognize its rights to self-determination. Concurrently, Taya 
improved Mauritania's relations with Morocco and reestablished 
diplomatic ties in April 1985. 

Nevertheless, the Nouakchott government continued to fear that 
Morocco would violate Mauritania's borders in pursuit of Polisario 



160 



National Security 



guerrillas. In May 1987, Morocco finished construction of a sixth 
berm (see Glossary) in the Western Sahara along Mauritania's 
northern border. The system of berms built along the Western Sa- 
hara's eastern and southern borders and manned by Moroccan 
troops effectively insulated the entire territory and forced the 
Polisario onto Mauritanian soil. This threat pushed the CMSN 
to station nearly two-thirds of Mauritania's military along the north- 
western borders and to seek increased French military aid. 

Senegal 

As of 1987, Senegal posed no threat to Mauritania's national 
security. Nevertheless, Senegal has caused Nouakchott concern 
by exploiting Mauritania's ethnic cleavages for its own interests. 
Leopold Senghor, president of Senegal from 1960 to 1981, feared 
the prospect of a radical Mauritanian government that could re- 
sult if Mauritania were drawn into an Algerian- Libyan orbit. In 
order to pressure Mauritania into making security-related conces- 
sions favorable to Senegal, Senghor threatened to demand self- 
determination for southern Mauritania's black Africans if there 
was no change in Maure domination in the Nouakchott govern- 
ment. He also directed a well-coordinated press campaign that 
sought to publicize the racial problems between the black and Maure 
populations (see Ethnic Groups and Languages, ch. 2). 

Mauritania's relations with Senegal improved when Abdou 
Diouf, who did not expect Mauritania to succumb to radical in- 
fluence instigated by Algeria and Libya, replaced Senghor as presi- 
dent in 1981. Relations further improved when, after the March 16, 
1981, pro-Moroccan coup attempt in Nouakchott, Diouf expelled 
Mauritanian opposition group members from Senegal. Although 
members of opposition groups continued to take refuge in Dakar, 
the Senegalese government did not formally offer asylum to them, 
and in May 1987, Senegal extradited Captain Moulaye Asham 
Ould Ashen, a former member of the CMSN, wanted on embez- 
zling charges. Nevertheless, Senegal had a continuing interest in 
supporting a biracial Mauritania as a buffer state between its front- 
iers and what it viewed as a an expansionist Arab Maghrib (see 
Glossary). 

Libya 

Libyan intervention in Mauritania's affairs has been more direct 
than Senegalese intervention. On December 26, 1980, the Maurita- 
nian government uncovered what appears to have been a Libyan- 
backed plot to overthrow the government, after which Libya was 
to have merged Mauritania, the Western Sahara, and Libya into 



161 



Mauritania: A Country Study 




Mauritanian troops 



a single state. In response, the government arrested five Maurita- 
nians, expelled three Libyan diplomats, and closed the Libyan cul- 
tural center. 

In 1984 Mauritania temporarily broke off relations with Libya 
after accusing Tripoli of financing student movements seeking to 
destabilize the government. Relations were reestablished May 23, 
1985. Three months later, Libya threatened the new relationship 
when it deported 600 to 1,000 Mauritanian nationals as part of 
a general deportation of all foreign workers. President Taya's only 
response was a formal protest; otherwise, the official Mauritanian 
press played down the whole affair in order to keep their newly 
reestablished ties friendly. 

The Development of the Armed Forces 

The Preindependence Period 

The Mauritanian armed forces were developed by the French 
colonial army and used in military ventures throughout the French 
Empire. In recognition of the major contributions of African troops 
to the French war effort during the two world wars, the French 
government eliminated many of the distinctions between French 
and African troops. Pensions and allowances were granted to vet- 
erans in 1949, and conscripted military labor was abolished in 1950. 
By 1955 discrimination was officially eliminated by opening all 
military ranks to Africans. After 1956 officer training for Africans 



163 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

was provided at military preparatory schools located in Africa and, 
after 1958, at France's Military Academy of St. Cyr. 

An Africanized military was especially important in Maurita- 
nia, where the military governed the colony into the 1920s and in 
certain cercles, or administrative subdivisions, up to independence. 
On the one hand, Mauritanian veterans, imbued with an esprit 
de corps, a more cosmopolitan view of the world, and a growing 
self-interest, returned home as agents of modernization and polit- 
ical development. On the other hand, the French practice of 
integrating all Africans into the French army inhibited the devel- 
opment of a strictly territorial or national army. Mauritanians, 
along with other Africans, served in France, Indochina, Senegal, 
or Madagascar and operated under French statutes, conditions of 
service, and recruitment policies. Nevertheless, the Africanization 
program begun in the early 1950s gave Mauritania a small core 
of experienced officers on which to build its military forces. 

The Independence Period and the French Military Legacy 

In the 1950s and 1960s, France signed defense treaties with many 
of the new African states. Its bilateral treaty with Mauritania pro- 
vided for permanent base facilities for up to 3,000 French troops 
in Mauritania to support French interests in Algeria and to deter 
Morocco's irredentist claims. The three-part agreement provided 
for the transfer of men, units, equipment, and installations from 
France to form the basis of Mauritania's army; it provided mili- 
tary training programs and supplies; and it promised assistance 
by French personnel in the external and internal defense of the coun- 
try. Mauritania controlled both external defense and internal secu- 
rity; France would assist if requested. 

According to the agreement, Mauritanian nationals serving with 
the French army could either return to their country to form the 
nucleus of the new army or remain in the French army with per- 
mission of the Mauritanian government. In both cases, they re- 
tained pension rights. In addition, the colonial gendarmerie was 
transferred in toto to the new government. The army and the gen- 
darmerie were equipped at no charge by France, and France offered 
sophisticated and expensive logistical support to the Mauritanian 
Army. In return, Mauritania agreed to purchase all of its military 
equipment from France. Although the French retained the air base 
at Atar and units of the army remained at Port-Etienne (present- 
day Nouadhibou) and Fort Trinquet (present-day Bir Moghrein), 
Mauritania gained control of all other military installations in the 
country. 



164 



National Security 



French commissioned officers and noncommissioned officers 
(NCOs) filled out the command cadres and organized intensive 
training programs for Mauritanian recruits. In addition, France 
agreed to train a number of Mauritanian officers at French mili- 
tary academies at French expense (see Manpower and Training, 
this ch.). In return, Mauritania agreed not to send trainees to any 
other country. To manage the training and organization of the new 
army and to coordinate the technical assistance program, the French 
military established an aid office in Nouakchott. At the same time, 
Mauritania and France also signed two other defense-related ac- 
cords. The first was the Complementary Agreement on Raw 
Materials and Strategic Elements, whereby Mauritania granted pri- 
ority of the sale of liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons, uranium, tho- 
rium, lithium, beryllium, and helium to France. The second was 
the Status of Forces Agreement, which covered judicial treatment 
of the several thousand French troops stationed in Mauritania. 

France continued its military assistance and defense cooperation 
throughout the 1960s; meanwhile, it reduced its military presence 
to a handful of officers and NCOs in training programs. By 1966 
the last French troops had withdrawn from Mauritania and trans- 
ferred their bases to the Mauritanian armed forces. At the same 
time, more Mauritanians attended advance officer training courses 
in France. 

The replacement of French troops stationed in Africa with in- 
tervention forces stationed in France was an integral part of the 
reorganization of French defense policy started in 1959 under 
General Charles de Gaulle and followed by the successive govern- 
ments of the French Fifth Republic. Under this new defense pol- 
icy, the French deemed military bases of any considerable size (as 
well as transit facilities, technical support, and refueling stations) 
too much of a political risk in independent Africa. 

The Armed Forces 

Organization and Strength 

In 1987 the armed forces were organized under the president, 
who also served as minister of defense and oversaw all aspects of 
the military. Lieutenant Colonel Diallo Mohamed was second in 
command. Military headquarters staff was divided into offices han- 
dling personnel, intelligence, training and operations, and logis- 
tics. Headquarters staff also directed the signals, equipment, and 
quartermaster corps. The army was organized into five geograph- 
ic regions (a sixth region had been reapportioned among the re- 
maining five regions) and two at-large sectors, located in Mbeirika 
and Kaedi (see fig. 12). 



165 



Mauritania: A Country Study 






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166 



National Security 



In the 1960s and early 1970s, the chief task of the Mauritanian 
military had been internal control. When French forces departed 
in 1966, Mauritanian armed forces numbered approximately 1,000 
men (900 in the army and 100 in the fledgling air force). By 1971 
they had grown 50 percent to over 1,500 men (army 1,444; air 
force, 100; and navy, 30). Daddah deliberately kept the armed 
forces small, however, to decrease the possibility of a military coup, 
and he relied on French military assistance to meet external threats. 

With the advent of the Western Sahara war, the government 
raised troop strength and improved training. The armed forces ex- 
panded from 3,000 men at the beginning of 1976 to 12,000 by the 
beginning of 1977, and further expanded to between 15,000 and 
17,000 at the beginning of 1978. To train staff officers, the govern- 
ment opened a combined services college at Atar in November 1976. 
Haidalla also introduced a military service program called the 
National Civic Service to assist the regular military forces. Restricted 
to Mauritanian People's Party (Parti du Peuple Mauritanienne — 
PPM) members at least eighteen years old, the program provided 
military training and political education for two half-days each week. 
The newly trained servicemen were to help with civil defense, in- 
telligence, and press relations. This scheme failed, however, be- 
cause Mauritanians were disillusioned with the war and viewed 
war-related efforts with skepticism and apathy. 

Following the cease-fire with Polisario forces, Mauritanian armed 
forces strength was halved, decreasing from 17,000 in July 1978 
to 9,450 in early 1979. The forces were further reduced to 7,970 
by July 1980. The CMSN reorganized the army of 7,500 soldiers 
into one infantry battalion, one artillery battalion, two armored 
car squadrons, one antiaircraft battery, and one engineering com- 
pany. The navy, on the other hand, increased the number of navy 
personnel to 320 and acquired two new patrol craft, bringing the 
total to thirteen. Paramilitary forces decreased in size from 6,000 
to 2,750. 

Attempted coups in 1981, 1982, and 1983, followed by defec- 
tions, executions, and arrests of officers, devastated the morale of 
the armed forces. To add to their difficulties, the underequipped 
forces were charged with guarding the economically crucial iron 
mines of Zouirat, the port facilities at Nouadhibou, and the rail 
line between them. This difficult task, which exposed troops to at- 
tacks by well-equipped Polisario guerrillas, further eroded the forces' 
morale. 

The Army 

Since its formation, the Mauritanian Army has undergone several 
reorganizations. It was created in October 1961 as the First Infantry 



167 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

Battalion with its headquarters in Rosso. Units of the battalion were 
stationed in Atar, Akjoujt, Nema, ' Ayoun el ' Atrous, and Nouak- 
chott. The many problems of command, flexibility, and mobility 
led to a reorganization in 1962 that provided for a national com- 
mand in Nouakchott and separate functional, rather than territorial, 
units. In 1987 the army consisted of one infantry battalion, two 
armored car squadrons, one parachute-commando company, three 
reconnaissance squadrons, two artillery batteries, one airborne com- 
pany, one engineering corps, and one antiaircraft battery. The 
Camel Corps, considered a paramilitary unit although under the 
jurisdiction of the army, numbered 100 and patrolled the borders. 
The highest ranking officer in the army was a colonel (see fig. 13). 
Although the army was the primary defender of Mauritanian secu- 
rity, it was underequipped and undertrained, leaving Mauritania 
vulnerable (see table 3, Appendix). 

The Navy 

The Mauritanian Navy was created on January 25, 1966, after 
the extension of Mauritania's territorial waters from twelve to thirty 
nautical miles. By 1972 the navy had one small patrol gunboat and 
two small patrol craft that performed port control and customs 
duties. In 1987 the navy had thirteen boats. Of these boats, only 
eight were seaworthy, and the navy could send only two vessels 
out to open water at a time (see table 4, Appendix). Mauritania's 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extended 200 nautical miles out 
from the coast, but effective coastal surveillance was impossible be- 
cause the navy's vessels were not able to control Mauritania's 
waters. Nouadhibou housed the major naval base; Nouakchott 
housed a secondary base. 

At the navy's twentieth anniversary celebrations in 1986, the 
armed forces chief of staff announced that it would be reorganized 
to improve efficiency. In 1987 observers believed that the reor- 
ganized navy would consist of a joint operational command, with 
the navy as the senior service, teamed up with the air force, the 
Department of Fisheries, and the Customs Corps. The highest rank- 
ing officer in the navy was a colonel. 

The Air Force 

The Mauritanian Air Force (which played only a minor role in 
the Western Sahara conflict) numbered 150 men in 1987, and its 
combat capabilities were minimal (see table 5, Appendix). The 
highest ranking officer was a colonel. Because the air force lacked 
defensive capabilities, French troops from neighboring Senegal 
assisted with aerial surveillance and bombing raids during the 



168 



National Security 



Western Sahara war. At any one time, most aircraft were grounded 
because of mechanical failure, lack of spare parts, and general main- 
tenance problems. Air strips were located at 'Ayoun el 'Atrous, 
Akjoujt, Atar, Fderik, Bir Moghrei'n, Kaedi, Kiffa, Nouadhibou, 
Nouakchott, and Rosso. 

Manpower and Military Training Schools 

Although the government introduced conscription for a two-year 
period of service in 1962, by 1987 the number of volunteers sur- 
passed the needs of the armed forces. Volunteers had to be sixteen 
years of age, unmarried, and of Mauritanian nationality. Periods 
of enlistment ranged from two to five years. With military pay well 
above the national average income and with educational opportu- 
nities available, young Mauritanian males — women did not serve 
in the armed forces — of all ethnic groups volunteered for military 
service. After service all veterans were, in effect, reservists, sub- 
ject to recall in the event of a national emergency. 

The armed forces, from their inception, mirrored the ethnic 
cleavages of the larger society. Thus, in 1987 officers still came 
primarily from the north, whereas enlisted men came from the black 
populations in the south. This practice, which gave the appear- 
ance of racism, did little to foster unity among the armed forces 
and further lowered morale. 

With aid from France, the government established the Combined 
Arms School of Atar (Ecole Militaire Interarmes d'Atar — EMI A) 
in 1976 to train officers and NCOs. The future officers followed 
a two-year program, and NCOs followed a one-year program. 
Twenty French military advisers, twelve of whom were officers, 
served as technical military assistants. Working with Mauritanian 
counterparts, they coordinated training and supervised students. 
Courses included firearms, military weapons and tactics, engineer- 
ing, signals, topography, and vehicle maintenance. Since 1985 
France had sponsored trips for second-year graduates to various 
military installations and schools in St. Cyr, Coetquidan, Fontain- 
bleau, and Paris. 

Approximately 100 members of the armed forces trained in 
French military academies each year. The Military Academy of 
St. Cyr had a comprehensive two-year course for francophone Afri- 
cans. The National Training Center at Montlouis in the Pyrenees 
Mountains in southwestern France conducted commando train- 
ing, and the Montpellier Infantry Instruction School offered training 
for motorized infantry troops. The Coetquidan Military School 
trained officers. 



169 



Mauritania: A Country Study 




170 



National Security 



Although the Mauritanian Naval College at Nouadhibou trained 
some Mauritanians, for the most part the navy trained abroad. 
Libya and the United States each trained some Mauritanians, but 
the majority of navy personnel trained in France at the Toulon 
Navy School, which accepted four non-French students a year for 
an eighteen-month course. Students worked in administrative po- 
sitions in military headquarters or in port services, or they worked 
outside the navy as administrators. Training included food services, 
finance, military pay, cooperative systems, personnel management, 
social protection, civil service, and government. Other Maurita- 
nians trained at navy mechanics schools, where instruction included 
naval mechanics and refresher courses on seamanship. A two-month 
specialized course taught propulsion systems, and a five-month 
course trained naval technicians. 

Some Mauritanians also attended Zaire's armor training school 
at Mbanza-Ngungu. Before the start of the Western Sahara con- 
flict, Mauritanian pilots had trained at Algeria's Combined Ser- 
vices Military Academy at Cherchell, which by 1977 had trained 
ten of Mauritania's twelve pilots. 

Role of the Military in Society 

The martial tradition has been strong in Mauritania, where the 
armed forces have played a role that has transcended security needs. 
Having been integrated into the party structure of the PPM at the 
Third Party Congress at Nouakchott in January 1968, the result- 
ing "people's army" was to combat the problems of misery, ig- 
norance, and backwardness, as well as those who threatened 
national security. Accordingly, the armed forces were charged with 
transforming traditional attitudes and regionalism by good exam- 
ple. The soldier and policeman were to represent model citizens 
epitomizing Mauritanian independence, as well as the values of 
self-sacrifice, devotion to duty, and nationalism. 

In spite of the lofty aims, recruitment practices perpetuated histor- 
ic divisions. As noted, a large percentage of officers were Maures, 
whereas most recruits were blacks. This unevenness in recruitment 
policy caused resentment on the part of the black population and 
obstructed the formation of a united national armed forces. 
Nevertheless, the armed forces trained badly needed technicians 
and administrators, who could be employed in all areas of the econ- 
omy, including civil service positions. Military personnel also as- 
sisted in civic action programs, such as road-building. The military 
and police forces offered good pay, security, the possibility of for- 
eign training and, depending on the position, political and economic 



171 



Mauritania: A Country Study 



power, all of which tended to set the armed forces' officer corps 
apart as an elite group. 

Defense Budget and the Economy 

Because of its involvement in the Western Sahara conflict, 
Mauritania has spent large sums of money on defense. The 1976 
defense budget showed an increase of 32.9 percent over 1975, and 
that of 1977 provided a substantial increase over the 1976 level. 
In 1977 defense spending consumed 60 percent of the national 
budget, and in 1980 military spending was the only sector of the 
budget not cut. Commenting on this decision, one senior Maurita- 
nian official said that no matter what the cost, the government was 
intent on maintaining its armed forces in order to guarantee its 
independence and national sovereignty. 

Military expenditures severely distorted Mauritania's develop- 
ment. Defense spending diverted funds from rural development, 
undermined Mauritania's statist economic policies, and limited the 
business community's prosperity. From 1976 to 1978, businesses 
and government workers alike paid war taxes and took cuts in pay, 
and the government faced an increasingly impoverished popula- 
tion. To raise additional funds for defense, Haidalla increased the 
"solidarity contribution" — an unpopular payment made by salaried 
workers to the armed forces — from one to two days' pay a month. 
In addition, companies paid a special tax of 2 percent of sales as 
their contribution to defense. Ultimately, the unpopular war and 
its effects on the economy resulted in a military coup in 1978. 

Civic Action and Disaster Relief 

As a result of drought and desertification throughout the 1970s 
and into the 1980s, the government charged the armed forces with 
epidemic eradication and disaster relief. In addition, the military 
engineering corps engaged in agricultural development and road 
maintenance. 

Foreign Military Assistance 

At independence the French colonial army in Mauritania provid- 
ed the armed forces with weapons and materiel. Later, in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, France supplemented Mauritania's defense ca- 
pacity, training, and materiel as specified in various defense agree- 
ments, which provided for mutual defense assistance, for training 
Mauritanian officers in French military schools, for French over- 
flying rights, and for Mauritanian facilities for French aircraft and 
naval vessels (see The Independence Period and the French Mili- 
tary Legacy, this ch.). In 1973 Mauritania moved to reduce its 



172 




A soldier supervises food distribution. 
Courtesy United States Agency 
for International Development 



173 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

dependency on France by unilaterally abandoning these agree- 
ments, and on September 2, 1976, Mauritania and France replaced 
the defense agreement with a technical military pact, which called 
only for establishment of the military school at Atar; Mauritania 
refused all other defense-related accords. 

Despite these attempts to sever ties with France, Polisario raids 
in the mid-1970s forced Mauritania again to seek increased mili- 
tary assistance. France, along with Morocco and Spain, stepped 
up military arms deliveries. The rulers of Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, 
and Kuwait, all of whom supported fellow monarch King Hassan 
of Morocco and therefore were anti-Polisario, also financed arms 
purchases. It was reported that Mauritania received 30 French 
armored cars and 100 British Land Rovers (some equipped with 
120mm recoilless guns) to increase its military mobility and that 
Saudi Arabia sent ten Pucara aircraft and other military materiel. 

The French also sent sixty military specialists to work at the 
EMI A and supplied arms on a commercial basis. But France's low- 
key military commitment to Mauritania changed abruptly when 
in May and October 1977 the Polisario killed two French nation- 
als and kidnapped six others, all of whom were employees of the 
National Mining and Industrial Company (Societe Nationale 
Industrielle et Miniere — SNIM) at Zouirat. In response to these 
raids, France installed a military telecommunications system, 
provided air support for the Mauritanian-Moroccan forces, and 
supplied troops (from the French base in Senegal) and military 
advisers, all to protect French citizens and their investments in 
Mauritania. The French did not react when, a year later, the Dad- 
dah regime fell. 

As Mauritania's defenses deteriorated, it relied even more heavily 
on Morocco, until by February 1978 the number of Moroccan sol- 
diers in Mauritania reached 10,000 men. In June 1977, the two 
countries merged their military commands into the Supreme 
Defense Council. Two Moroccan battalions protected Nouadhibou 
and the railroad to Zouirat, where two more Moroccan battalions 
were stationed. In January 1978, the Supreme Defense Council 
placed another two Moroccan battalions at Akjoujt and Atar. By 
this time, Moroccan troops were stationed in all of Mauritania's 
major towns except Nouakchott. 

France also took an increasingly active role as the war progressed. 
French personnel, the numbers of which had increased from 60 
in 1977 to just over 300 in 1978, fully controlled Mauritanian Army 
training, and France had 1,200 troops stationed in nearby Sene- 
gal ready for emergencies. After the military coup in July 1978 
and the subsequent cease-fire, however, the number of French 



174 



National Security 



military personnel in Mauritania decreased rapidly. By August 

1978, only twenty French military and technical experts remained. 
The number of nonmilitary experts and advisers had increased, 
however. Daily flights from the military base at Dakar continued, 
and although French combat air operations ceased, reconnaissance 
flights over Mauritanian territory by French aircraft continued. 
Moreover, the number of French troops at Dakar had increased 
to 3,000. After the Mauritanian-Polisario peace treaty in August 

1979, which saw Morocco remove the bulk of its troops from 
Mauritania, France agreed to double its military aid to help 
Mauritania rebuild a small but efficient army. 

Shortly thereafter, however, Mauritania reversed its security 
alliances. Relations with Morocco and France soured while rela- 
tions with Algeria improved. In May 1980, the CMSN expelled 
200 French advisers and technical personnel, thus terminat- 
ing French training programs at Nouadhibou and French military 
air communications at Lamantin, near Nouakchott. After the 
March 16, 1981, pro-Moroccan coup attempt, Mauritania turned 
to Algeria, which began to supply the sophisticated antiaircraft 
armaments Mauritania had previously lacked. By 1981 Algeria 
was lending military assistance in the form of training and 
materiel. 

In the early 1980s, in the face of persistent regional instability, 
Nouakchott again turned to Paris for security assurances. In 
response, the French revived a 1976 military assistance conven- 
tion providing for thirty training specialists to serve in the moder- 
nization of the Mauritanian forces. In March 1987, Jacques Foccart, 
adviser to the French prime minister, traveled to Mauritania with 
a message from Prime Minister Jacques Chirac expressing France's 
desire to continue its military assistance. In 1987 France revised 
its 1976 military cooperation agreement with Mauritania, incor- 
porating the three standard points of French technical military 
accords: the disposition of French military personnel within the 
Mauritanian military, military training for Mauritanians in France, 
and provision of military materiel and logistical assistance. 

Algeria also offered support to the Mauritanian military. Algerian 
president Chadli Bendjedid visited Mauritania in April 1987 to dis- 
cuss the Western Sahara conflict. He expressed "Algeria's sup- 
port to the Mauritanian people and their leader in everything related 
to Mauritania's security, stability, and unity." In particular, he 
offered to send Algerian troops to Mauritania to protect the petrole- 
um refinery at Nouadhibou, which had been renovated and was 
being managed by Algeria (see Energy, ch. 3). The Mauritanian 
government, however, refused his offer, citing its strict neutrality 



175 



Mauritania: A Country Study 



MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, 
AND INFORMATION 



CHIEF OF STAFF OF 
NATIONAL GUARD 



PRESIDENTIAL 
GUARD 



OFFICE OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
DIRECTOR OF TERRITORIAL SECURITY 
DIRECTOR OF STATE SECURITY 
POLICE COMMISSIONER 
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL 
POLICE SCHOOL 

DIRECTOR OF POLICE JUDICIARY 

AND PUBLIC SECURITY 
POLICE COMMISSIONER OF THE 

NOUAKCHOTT DISTRICT 
DIRECTOR OF REGIONAL SECURITY 
CUSTOMS CORPS 



Figure 14. Organization oj Internal Security Forces, 1987 



in the Western Sahara conflict. Meanwhile, in 1987 Mauritania 
received substantial military technology, logistical support, and 
direct budget subventions from several foreign countries, includ- 
ing Canada, France, Kuwait, Algeria, and Morocco. 

Public Order and Internal Security 
Internal Security Forces 

In 1987 internal security forces consisted of the police and cer- 
tain paramilitary forces, including the National Guard, the 
Presidential Guard, and the National Gendarmerie. The urban- 
based police, which in 1986 numbered 1,000 men, was organized 
under the director of national security, Captain Ely Ould Mohamed 
Vail, who reported to the minister of interior, information, and 
telecommunications (see fig. 14). Locally, each prefet and town 
mayor had authority over the police in his jurisdiction. The minister 
exercised command through the governors of the twelve regions 
(see Local Government, ch. 4). 

The police were charged with law enforcement and criminal in- 
vestigation. In the name of keeping order, police could ban demon- 
strations and meetings or force them to disperse if order was 
threatened. They could ban certain persons from certain areas, put 
them under house arrest, or expel them from the country. The police 



176 



National Security 



could also suspend individual liberties if the president declared a 
state of emergency. 

The National Guard, also subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, 
Information, and Telecommunications, was responsible for main- 
taining law and order in rural areas, although at times of civil un- 
rest the unit operated in urban areas. In 1987 the National Guard 
numbered 1 ,400. The Presidential Guard was a subdivision of the 
National Guard and was responsible for protecting the president 
and his home. 

Mauritania's National Gendarmerie, or militarized police force, 
was responsible for enforcing both civilian and military law in rural 
and urban areas. In 1987 the gendarmerie was divided into six 
regional companies and numbered 2,500 men. Originally, this force 
was part of the army, but by 1987 it had become a separate force 
and had headquarters in Nouakchott. It was responsible to the 
armed forces chief of staff. 

Law and Crime 

In 1980 the government declared sharia (Islamic law) to be the 
official legal code (see Legal System, ch. 4). Since that time, many 
Mauritanians have criticized sharia for failing to consider environ- 
mental or sociological factors contributing to crime, for ignoring 
official corruption, and for authorizing such brutal and extreme 
punishment as public whippings and amputations, which were held 
at Nouakchott stadium in the early 1980s (reportedly accompanied 
by cheering onlookers). Only in August 1984 was amputation 
halted. 

Treatment of prisoners worsened in the early 1980s when both 
torture and detention without charge became increasingly routine. 
Moreover, friends and relatives of prisoners also became victims 
of harassment and repression. Foreign observers expressed con- 
cern about the treatment and well-being of those arrested, espe- 
cially black prisoners. 

In keeping with the tenets of sharia, the government moved to 
eliminate alcohol consumption (see Tenets of Islam, ch. 2). On 
October 2, 1986, the cabinet banned the import, purchase, and 
consumption of alcoholic drinks for Mauritanian nationals; Taya 
later extended the ban to foreign nationals, although diplomats from 
foreign embassies and expatriate technical assistants were exempt 
from the ban. Foreigners violating this law were liable to expul- 
sion; Mauritanian violators risked forty lashes in public as 
prescribed by sharia. 

Article 3 of the CMSN's Constitutional Charter of February 1985 
stated that the CMSN had the power to grant amnesty, except for 



177 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

violations that carried sentences of qissas and hudud (see the Con- 
stitutional Charter, ch. 4). Qissas was retributory justice requested 
by the family of a victim of a crime. Hudud was punishment pre- 
scribed by sharia for religious crimes that would be dealt with by 
civil courts in non-Muslim countries, such as adultery and drink- 
ing alcoholic beverages. 

In the Taya regime, however, strict discipline was tempered with 
leniency. When Taya seized power, one of his first acts was to 
pardon most political prisoners, including former President Dad- 
dah, as well as five men condemned to life imprisonment for their 
participation in the March 16, 1981, coup attempt. Among other 
things, the terms of the general amnesty permitted opposition 
groups to return to Mauritania. 

Internal Security Threats 

In 1987 the military government was the most likely arena for 
power struggles affecting internal security. Aside from factions 
within the military, there appeared to be no group with a large 
enough power base or organizational structure to challenge the ex- 
isting military regime. Despite the personal popularity of Presi- 
dent Taya, governmental institutions remained without a broad 
base of support and provided no outlet for discontent, dissent, or 
even meaningful debate over national policies (see Political Power 
in the Mid-1980s, ch. 4). 

From independence until the 1978 military coup, labor and stu- 
dent unrest and racial clashes presented the most serious threats 
to internal security. These threats were interrelated because black 
ethnic groups from the Senegal River Valley actively participated 
in the unions and student demonstrations. 

Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, labor unions struck 
primarily in Fderik at the Mauritanian Iron Mines Company (So- 
ciete Anonyme des Mines de Fer de Mauritanie — MIFERMA) 
complex, whose employees had grievances against the West Euro- 
pean overseers. Violence was common, and the army was used to 
quell the frequent disturbances, causing injuries, deaths, and 
numerous arrests. In their turn, many students opposed the govern- 
ment's language policy, which in 1966 required students to study 
Hassaniya Arabic as well as French. Violent confrontations often 
erupted, and schools were frequently closed for months at a time. 
Moreover, students often joined forces with MIFERMA strikers 
in opposition to the PPM. 

From the time of the military coup in 1978 through 1987, the 
CMSN leadership banned all political parties and opposition groups 
and suspended freedom of assembly, especially public meetings that 



178 



National Security 



intended to address political themes. Labor unions were the only 
nationwide organizations with any political import that were not 
dissolved following the 1978 coup. The right to strike existed in 
theory but was greatly restricted in practice, and extended strikes 
were strongly opposed by the government. There were only two 
brief strikes in the early 1980s. 

In 1978 serious ethnic conflict erupted between Maures and 
southern blacks. Blacks resented their overrepresentation as recruits 
in the Western Sahara conflict and their underrepresentation in 
the upper echelons of the military. Racial unrest peaked during 
February and March 1979. For the first time since the military 
coup in 1978, antigovernment activists distributed hostile tracts 
in the streets and placed antiregime slogans on walls. The govern- 
ment arrested several people, including black teachers and students 
who threatened to strike over the language issue. Further troubles 
occurred during March 1979 when a number of prominent, moder- 
ate blacks were arrested for advocating the use of ethnic quotas 
to fill government jobs; however, they were released a few days 
later in response to popular pressure. 

In an effort to mollify blacks, on March 19, 1979, the govern- 
ment announced the formation of the National Consultative Coun- 
cil. Composed of eighty- seven Maures and seventeen blacks, it was 
intended to provide a measure of popular participation in decision 
making until such time as elections could be held. On March 30, 
all seventeen blacks resigned, charging the council with unequal 
ethnic representation. 

Despite increased ethnic tensions, the government under both 
Mustapha Ould Salek and Ahmed Ould Bouceif took no action 
to appease the black community. On the contrary, the new mili- 
tary government virtually barred blacks from government. 
Moreover, the government took measures in November 1978 that 
favored Arabic as the sole language in Mauritania's secondary 
schools, further fueling accusations of economic and political dis- 
crimination. 

Tensions between blacks and Maures erupted in 1986 follow- 
ing the publication in April of a document entitled Le Manifeste du 
Negro -Mauritanien Opprime (Manifesto of the Oppressed Black 
Mauritanian) (see Ethnic Minorities, ch. 4). The manifesto was 
circulated in cities and towns in Mauritania and also at the Sep- 
tember 1986 Nonaligned Movement summit in Harare, Zimbabwe, 
and at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia. This document criticized "Mauritanian apart- 
heid" and the white Maure system that ensured the political and 
economic domination by the Arab-Berbers at the expense of the 



179 



Mauritania: A Country Study 



black ethnic groups (see Ethnic Groups and Languages, ch. 2). 
The manifesto also took issue with the policy of favoring Arabic 
over French, the lack of educational opportunities for blacks, and 
land reform measures. In particular, the manifesto viewed the con- 
troversial Land Reform Act of 1983 as a means by which wealthy, 
urban Maures could appropriate profitable land along the Sene- 
gal River, traditionally the homeland of Mauritania's black popu- 
lation. 

More ethnic unrest continued into September 1986, when police 
arrested several black leaders for participating in civil disturbances. 
Later that month, an additional forty blacks were arrested for what 
the government labeled subversive activities. In addition, dozens 
of leading black public figures, including two former cabinet 
ministers, were detained for questioning about "activities harm- 
ful to national unity." Nine of those arrested were later sentenced 
to five years' imprisonment, and eight were sentenced to four years' 
imprisonment. The accused had allegedly opposed the land reform 
measures. 

On October 9 and 11, 1986, in response to the September arrests, 
violence again erupted. Black demonstrators ransacked and burned 
a fish factory, gasoline station, and pharmacy. The government 
linked this violence to the African Liberation Forces of Maurita- 
nia (Forces de Liberation Africaine de Mauritanie — FLAM) and 
the black African manifesto attacking Maure discrimination (see 
Ethnic Minorities, ch. 4). Thirteen of those arrested in the 1986 
protests over racial discrimination against blacks were convicted 
of arson in Nouakchott and Nouadhibou in October 1986. Five 
of them were sentenced to five years' imprisonment and eight to 
four years' imprisonment. Five others on trial on similar charges 
were acquitted. An additional twenty people were tried and con- 
victed in March 1987. 

As part of a large-scale crackdown on blacks (and the Toucouleur 
community in particular) carried out in the second half of 1986, 
all Toucouleur officers serving at posts of responsibility in the mili- 
tary regional commands were sacked. The administration purged 
itself of all its Toucouleur governors, prefets, and sous-prefets serv- 
ing in the south; they were either sent to the far north or fired. 
Among those who lost their positions within the CMSN and/or the 
government as a result of the crackdown was the minister of in- 
terior, information, and telecommunications, Lieutenant Colonel 
Anne Amadou Babali (a Toucouleur), who was transferred to the 
Ministry of Trade and Transport for about six weeks and then dis- 
missed from government on October 4, 1986. The director of the 
International Bank of Mauritania (Banque Internationale pour la 



180 



National Security 



Mauritanie — BIMA) was fired, and the head of the Red Crescent 
(Red Cross in Islamic countries) was removed from office. Authori- 
ties banned meetings of black self-help groups and cultural associ- 
ations and even engaged in surveillance of large gatherings of black 
families, such as weddings. In this tense environment, a group call- 
ing itself the National Front of Black Officers (Front National des 
Officiers Noirs — FRON) emerged and denounced the arbitrary 
arrests and sentences of dozens of Mauritanians who wished only 
to guarantee civil and political rights for all ethnic groups. FRON 
blamed the Maure community for the chaos and called for the 
institution of a multiracial republic. 

The government was not about to follow such a drastic prescrip- 
tion. The elections of December 1986 had allowed the semblance 
of political participation at the local level, a process that Taya 
described as a first step toward participatory democracy (see Local 
Elections, ch. 4). To the credit of all Mauritanians, the elections 
proceeded peacefully; however, the problems of ethnic imbalance 
remained unaddressed by the government. 

* * * 

There is no comprehensive study that specifically covers Maurita- 
nian national security. Certain aspects, such as the armed forces' 
involvement in the Western Sahara, are covered fairly inclusively 
in Ripe for Resolution by William I. Zartman and in The Western 
Saharans by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff. Various peri- 
odicals, such as Freres d } armes, Africa Confidential, West Africa, Jeune 
Afrique, Marches tropicaux et mediterraneans, and Afrique Defense, spo- 
radically cover Mauritanian security issues. Some statistics on the 
armed forces can be found in the annual The Military Balance pub- 
lished by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. (For fur- 
ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



181 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Herd Size, 1973-84 

3 Major Army Weapons, 1986 

4 Major Naval Equipment, 1986 

5 Major Air Force Equipment, 1986 



183 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 


When you know 


Multiply by 


To find 


Millimeters 


0.04 


inches 


Centimeters 


0.39 


inches 




3.3 


feet 




0.62 


miles 


Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 


2.47 


acres 




0.39 


square miles 




35.3 


cubic feet 


Liters 


26 


gallons 




2.2 


pounds 




0.98 


long tons 




1.1 


short tons 




2,204 


pounds 




9 


degrees Fahrenheit 


(Centigrade) 


divide by 5 






and add 32 





185 



Mauritania: A Country Study 



ffl N N 
CO ff) 
CO <C 



O Oi 

CO CM -h 
Ol '-i »*"> 



O r>. 
h m m 
* >n n 



000 

N O lO 

co <£> t-» 



ID O M 

* o * 

N <0 N 



O m 
O co 



o o 
o o 

t-h CM 



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O O 
cm o 



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186 



Appendix 



Table 3. Major Army Weapons, 1986 



Type and Description 



Country of Origin 



In Inventory 



Armored fighting vehicles 

EBR-75 armored reconnaissance vehicle, 

equipped with 75mm gun France 15 

AML-60 light armored car, equipped 

with 60mm gun -do- 39 

AML-90 light armored car, equipped 

with 90mm gun -do- 14 

M-3A1 light armored car United States 12 

M-3 half track armored personnel 

carrier -do- 40 

Artillery 

120mm mortar France 8 

81mm mortar -do- 1 

Antitank weapons 

M18 57mm recoilless rifle United States n.a. 

M20 75mm recoilless rifle -do- n.a. 

M40 106mm recoilless rifle -do- n.a. 

Air defense 

ZPU-2 with 14.5mm gun Soviet Union n.a. 

ZU-23-2 with 23mm gun -do- n.a. 

M-1939 with 37mm gun -do- n.a. 

SA-7 surface-to-air missile -do- n.a. 

n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1986-1987, London, 1986, 129; 
and World Defence Almanac {Military Technology, No. 13/86), December 1986, 310. 



Table 4. Major Naval Equipment, 1986 



Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory 



Fast attack craft, patrol 

Barcelo-type FAC (El Vaiz class) Spain 3 

Le Dix Juillet Patra class France 1 

Esterel 32-meter class (TTchit class) .... -do- 2 

Coastal patrol craft 

Esterel 18-meter class -do- 2 

Miscellaneous 

Ex- Senegalese LCM landing craft -do- 1 

Service launch -do- 1 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1986-1987, London, 1986, 129; 
and World Defence Almanac (Military Technology, No. 13/86), December 1986, 310. 



187 



Mauritania: A Country Study 



Table 5. Major Air Force Equipment, 1986 

Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory 

Ground attack 

Britten Norman-2A with underwing gun 

pods and rockets Britain 6 

Coastal patrol 

Piper Cheyenne lis United States 2 

Training and liaison 

Reims-Cessna 337 Super Skymasters . . . France 3 

C ounterinsurgency 

Armed Reims-Cessna FTB 337Gs -do- 2 

Transport 

DHC-5D Buffaloes Canada 2 

Sky can 3Ms Britain 3 

Broussard France 1 

Aermacchi-Lockheed Italy 1 

Hughes 500M helicopters United States 4 

Aerospatiale Caravelle France 1 

Grumman Gulfstream II United States 1 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1986-1987, London, 1986, 129; 

and World Defence Almanac {Military Technology, No. 13/86), December 1986, 310. 



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Ndiaye, Jean-Pierre. " Presence et culture des negres mauri- 

taniens,' ' Jeune Afrique [Paris], No. 1353, December 10, 1986, 54. 
"Les officiers stagiaires de 2 e Armee de la promotion 'General 

Monclar,' " Freres d'armes [Paris], No. 144, January-February 

1987, 44-49. 

Paxton, John (ed.). The Statesman's Year-Book World Gazetteer. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 

Schissel, Howard. "Taya at the Helm," Africa Report, 31, No. 4, 
July-August 1986, 85-88. 

Thompson, Virginia, and Richard Adloff. The Western Saharans. 
London: Croom Helm, 1980. 

Toupet, Charles (ed.), Atlas de la Republique Islamique de Mauritanie. 
Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique, 1977. 

United States. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. Office 
of Public Communication. Background Notes: Mauritania. (Depart- 
ment of State Publication, No. 8169.) Washington: GPO, March 
1985. 

Venter, A1J. "French Reaction Force," Soldier of Fortune, 12, No. 1, 
January 1987, 44-47. 

World Defence Almanac (Military Technology [Bonn], No. 13/86), De- 
cember 1986, 310. 

Zartman, I. William. Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in 
Africa. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Africa Economic Digest [London]; 
African Defence Journal [Paris]; Africa Research Bulletin (Political Se- 
ries) [Exeter, Devon, United Kingdom]; Afrique defense [Paris]; 
Afrique nouvelle [Dakar, Senegal]; Economist Intelligence Unit, Quar- 
terly Economic Review of Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Guinea [London]; 
Jeune Afrique [Paris]; Marches tropicaux et mediterraneans [Paris]; and 
West Africa [London].) 



200 



Glossary 



amir — Title of an independent chieftain or regional political leader. 
Literally, "commander." Also seen as emir. 

berms — a narrow ledge typically at the top of a slope. Here, walls 
of bulldozed sand constructed within the Western Sahara vir- 
tually paralleling its borders with Mauritania. Moroccan forces 
constructed the berms, which were subsequently fitted with spe- 
cial sensory devices to prevent Polisario (q. v. ) guerrillas from 
infiltrating into territory controlled by Morocco. 

Chemama — Northern bank of the Senegal River, extending six- 
teen to thirty-two kilometers north of the river and containing 
fertile alluvial soil. 

clericalism — System under which a religious hierarchy exerts po- 
litical authority. Historically, clericalism was common among 
smaller polities in Muslim areas of West Africa. 

Franc Zone — Collection of thirteen francophone African countries 
whose currency is based on the French franc. 

GDP — Gross Domestic Product. A measure of the value of domestic 
goods and services produced by an economy over a period of 
time, such as a year. Only output values of goods for final con- 
sumption and investment are included because the values of 
primary and intermediate production are assumed to be in- 
cluded in final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated and shown 
at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies are 
included; when these have been eliminated, the result is GDP 
at factor cost. 

gum arabic — water-soluble gum obtained from several varieties of 
acacia and used in textile finishing and in inks, confectionery, 
pharmacy, and the manufacture of adhesives. 

hartani (pi., harratin) — term referring to freed former slaves. In 
Arabic, literally "plowman," referring to the low status of 
harratin. 

imam — Muslim leader who is a recognized authority on Islamic 
theology and law; also, the prayer leader of a mosque. The 
term is used to designate the leader of the Islamic community 
in a particular locale. 

IMF — International Monetary Fund. Established along with the 
World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabiliz- 
ing international exchange rates and payments. The main bus- 
iness of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members 



201 



Mauritania: A Country Study 



(including industrialized and developing countries) when they 
experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans fre- 
quently carry conditions that require substantial internal eco- 
nomic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are 
developing countries. 

indigenat — Refers to denizenship and rights of natives. In colonial 
French West Africa, the colonial system of discipline charac- 
terized by arbitrary and summary judgments accorded Afri- 
cans living in rural areas. The indigenat was abolished in 1945. 

jamaa — in Arabic, community or group. 

Mauritanian Kadihine Party — Clandestine leftist political party 
comprised primarily of Mauritania's proletariat and other low- 
wage workers. The party was formed in 1973 after the Maurita- 
nian People's Party, Mauritania's sole political party, absorbed 
the country's previously independent trade union. Literally 
kadihine means "the oppressed" or "downtrodden." 

Maghrib (adj. Maghribian) — The western Islamic world (north- 
west Africa); distinguished from the Mashriq or eastern Islamic 
world (the Middle East). Traditionally includes Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia, and what is now Libya. Literally, "the time 
or place of the sunset — the west." For its Arab conquerors, 
the region was the "island of the west" (jazirat al maghrib), the 
land between the "sea of sand" (Sahara) and the Mediterra- 
nean Sea. Also translated as Maghreb. 

Maliki rite — Interpretation of Islamic theology and law based on 
the teachings of Imam Malik, an Egyptian jurist of the eighth 
century. 

marabout — In West Africa, a Muslim prayer leader, teacher, and 
sometimes a healer who is venerated locally and believed to 
be touched by divine grace, which sometimes conferred the right 
to rule as well. Frequently called upon to arbitrate disputes. 
Translation of al murabitun (those who have made a religious 
retreat). In some locales, the title became the monopoly of cer- 
tain families, who thus formed maraboutic castes. 

OAU — Organization of African Unity. Inter- African organization 
with a membership of forty-nine African states. 

ouguiya (UM) — Mauritanian currency; in 1987, UM73.88 equals 
US$1. 

Paris Club — A noninstitutional framework whereby developed na- 
tions that have made loans or guaranteed official or private ex- 
port credits to developing nations meet to discuss borrowers' 
ability to repay debts. The organization, which met for the first 
time in 1956, has no formal or institutional existence and no 
fixed membership. Its secretariat is run by the French trea- 
sury, and it has a close relationship with the World Bank (q. v. ), 



202 



Glossary 



International Monetary Fund (q.v.), and the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 

Polisario — Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra 
and Rio de Oro (Frente Popular por la Liberation de Saguia 
el Hamra y Rio de Oro). Sahrawi liberation group seeking na- 
tional self-determination in the Western Sahara. Polisario guer- 
rillas constitute the military wing of the Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic (SADR), a government-in-exile for what 
in 1987 was known as the Western Sahara. The main base for 
the SADR and Polisario was Tindouf, Algeria. 

SADR — Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. The governing arm 
of the Polisario (q.v.). 

Sahelian — Pertains to the region south of the Sahara encompass- 
ing Cape Verde, Mauritania, southern Mali, Burkina Faso, 
southern Niger, and northern Nigeria. Literally, "coastal," 
in which the Sahara is figuratively considered to be a sea. 

sharia — Traditional code of Islamic law, both civil and criminal, 
based in part on the Quran. Also drawn from the hadith (say- 
ings and teachings of the Prophet), from the consensus of 
Islamic belief (ijma; i.e., consensus of the authorities on a legal 
question); and analogy (qiyas; i.e., an elaboration of the intent 
of the law). 

UM — The currency symbol for the ouguiya (q.v.). 

West Sahara(n) — Region of West Africa comprising parts of 
Mauritania, Mali, Morocco, and Algeria. 

Western Sahara — Formerly Spanish Sahara. Region of West Africa 
bordered on the west by the Atlantic Ocean, on the north by 
Morocco, on the south and nearly all of its west by Maurita- 
nia. In the northwest corner, it shares a very short border with 
Algeria. Spain divided Spanish Sahara between Morocco and 
Mauritania — ignoring the sentiments of indigenous groups — 
when it relinquished colonial control in 1976. Subsequently 
Polisario (q.v.) guerrillas supported by Algeria among other 
states waged a war for independence primarily against forces 
of Morocco. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of three 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the 
primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for 
productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but 
administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to 
furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much 



203 



Mauritania: A Country Study 

easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, 
founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD 
through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage 
the growth of productive private enterprises in the less devel- 
oped countries. The president and certain senior officers of the 
IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institu- 
tions are owned by the governments of the countries that sub- 
scribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, 
member states must first belong to the International Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF — q.v.). 



204 



Index 



Abdallah, Djibril Ould, 130, 139 
Abdelkader, Mohamed, 35 
Abu Dhabi, 174; economic assistance by, 
31 

Abu Dhabi Fund, 95 
administrative regions (cercles), 43, 132, 
134 

Adrar, 8, 11, 13, 15, 18, 21, 63 
Adrar administrative region, 6, 43 
Adrar Plateau, 42 

African Democratic Rally (Rassemble- 
ment Democratique Africain: RDA), 
144 

African Development Bank, 95 
African Financial Community (Com- 

munaute Financiere Africaine: CFA), 

112, 114 
African languages, 51 
African Liberation Forces of Mauritania 

(Forces Liberation Africaine de 

Mauritanie: FLAM), xxiii, 138-40, 

180 

African Regroupment Party (Parti du 

Regroupement Africain: PRA), 144 
Africans, xx 

Afro-Malagasy Union for Economic 
Cooperation (Union Africaine et 
Malagache de Cooperation Econo- 
mique: UAMCE), 145 

agriculture (see also farming), xxiii-xxiv, 
80, 81, 98; four types of, 101 

Ahmed, Khadijatou Bint, 69, 140, 141 

Air Afrique, 109 

air force, 168-69 

Air Mauritanie, 109 

airports, 109 

air strips, 169 

Akjoujt, 90, 97, 109, 168, 169 
Al Bakri, 7 

alcohol, banning of 131, 177 

Alfonso (king of Spain), 8 

Algeria, xxiv, 4, 5, 26, 27, 30, 34, 35, 85, 
108, 143, 145, 149, 157; foreign rela- 
tions with, 144, 145, 146, 149; pilot 
training for Mauritanians by, 171; 
recognition by Mauritania of provi- 
sional government of, 144 

Alliance for a Democratic Mauritania 



(Alliance pour une Mauritanie Demo- 
cratique: AMD), 35-36 

Almohad Empire, 3 

Almoravid Empire, xix, 3, 7-8, 9 

AMD. See Alliance for a Democratic 
Mauritania (Alliance pour une Mauri- 
tanie Democratique: AMD) 

Amoco Oil Company, 98 

Andalusian amirates, 8 

Angola, 27 

AOF. See French West Africa (Afrique 
Occidentale Francaise: AOF) 

Aoudaghast, xix, 6, 7, 8 

Arab-Berbers, xxii, 50-52, 66, 121 

Arab Fund for Economic and Social De- 
velopment, 95 

Arabia, 60 

Arabic language, 51, 67, 72, 179; conflict 

over, 25, 34, 179, 180 
Arab Iron and Steel Company (Societe 

Arabe du Fer et de l'Acier: SAFA), 106 
arabization, 3 

Arab League, 26, 28, 128, 144, 152 
Arab Metal Industries Company (Societe 

Arabe des Industries Metallurgiques: 

SAMIA), 94 
Arab Mining Company, 94 
Arab Mining Company of Inchiri (Societe 

Arabe des Mines de 1' Inchiri: SAMIN), 

97 

Arabs (see also Yemeni Arabs), 3, 7, 9, 11; 
influence of, 3, 9, 11 

Arab Satellite Telecommunications Orga- 
nization (ARABS AT), 109 

Arab states: relations of Mauritania with, 
xxiv, 150 

Arguin, 11, 47 

armed forces, xxiv, 163, 165; expansion 
and reduction of, 20, 167 

army: reorganizations of, 167-68; train- 
ing by French of, 164-65 

Army of Liberation (AL), 158 

army regions, 165 

Ashen, Moulaye Asham Ould, 152, 161 

Assaba region, 45 

Assembly of the French Union, 19 

assimilation, 16, 18, 41 

Association of Mauritanian Youth, 22 



205 



Mauritania: A Country Study 



Atar, 15, 32, 50, 63, 132, 167, 168, 169 
Atlantic Ocean, 46 
aviation fuel, 107 

'Ayoun el 'Atrous, 45, 141, 168, 169 
Azayr dialect, 58, 72 



Ba, Oumar, 139 

Babali, Anne Amadou, 139, 180 

Babana, Def Ould, 139 

Babana, Horma Ould, 20, 22, 23, 28 

Bafour people, 6, 54 

balance of trade, 115 

Bamako, 152 

Bambara people, xxii, 58 

Bani Hassan tribe, xx, 11, 51 

banking system, 114 

BCM. See Central Bank of Mauritania 

(Banque Centrale de Mauritanie: 

BCM) 
Belgium, 112 
Benin, 17 

Benjedid, Chadli, 175 

Berber groups, xix, xx, 6, 7, 9, 11 

Berbers, 3, 6, 7, 9 

berms, 146, 148, 149, 161 

bilingualism, 124 

BIMA. See International Bank of Mauri- 
tania (Banque Internationale pour la 
Mauritanie: BIMA) 

Bir Aidiat, 36 

Bir Moghrein, 164, 169 

black Africans {see also Bambara people; 
Fulbe people; Soninke people; Tou- 
couleur people; Wolof people), xx, xxi, 
xxii, xxiii, xxiv, xxv, 41, 49, 50-51, 
65-66, 124-25, 151, 161, 179; societal 
structure of, 56 

black Maures. See Maures 

Bneijara, Ahmed Ould, 34, 36 

Bogue, 103, 109, 132 

Border Guard, 157 

Bouceif, Ahmed Ould, xxi, 33, 179 

Boukhreiss, Mahmoudi Ould, 138-39 

Boukhreiss, Moulay Ould, 139 

Boumedienne, Houari, 33 

Boutilimit, 18, 45, 70 

Brakna region, xx, 11, 14-15, 18, 45, 63 

Brazzaville Conference, 18-19 

brotherhoods (see also marabouts; the 
Qadiriya; shaykh; the Tijaniya), 62-65 

Bu Craa, 27, 29 



budget, government, 114 
Burkina Faso, 57 
butane, 107, 108 



Camel Corps, 157, 168 
camels, 6, 99 
Canada, 176 

Canary Islands, 27, 46, 85 
Cap Blanc, 1 1 , 46 
Cape Bojadur, 47 
Cape Timiris, 47 
Cappolani, Xavier, xx 
caravan trade, 6-7, 9, 109 
Casablanca Group, 144 
caste system, 52, 54-55, 67-68 
cattle, 99-100 

CCCE. See Central Fund for Economic 
Cooperation (Caisse Centrale de 
Cooperation Economique: CCCE) 

CEAO. See Economic Community of 
West Africa (Communaute Econo- 
mique de l'Afrique Occidentale: 
CEAO) 

cement industry, 97 

Central Africa, 50 

central bank, 82 

Central Bank of Mauritania (Banque 

Centrale de Mauritanie: BCM), 114 
Central Fund for Economic Cooperation 

(Caisse Centrale de Cooperation 

Economique: CCCE), 95 
CFA. See African Financial Community 

(Communaute Financiere Africaine: 

CFA) 
CFA franc, 114 
Chad, 121 
Chegga, 35 

Chemama (see also Senegal River Valley), 
13-14, 45 

Cherchell, 171 

China, 108, 146, 150 

Chinese Petroleum Corporation (Tai- 
wan), 97-98 

Chinguetti, 7, 70 

Chirac, Jacques, 175 

Christians in Spain, 8 

Civil Territory of Mauritania, 15 

climate, 42 

CMRN. See Military Committee for Na- 
tional Recovery (Comite Militaire de 
Redressement National: CMRN) 



206 



Index 



CMSN. See Military Committee for Na- 
tional Salvation (Comite Militaire de 
Salut National: CMSN) 
Coastal Zone, climate of, 46-47 
Combined Arms School of Atar, 169 
Combined Services Military Academy 

(Algeria), 171 
commercial banks, 114 
Commission for Food Security (Commis- 
sariat a la Securite Alimentaire: CSA), 
83, 103-4 

Common Saharan States Organization, 

22, 144, 149 
communes, 132-33 

Complementary Agreement on Raw 
Materials and Strategic Elements, 165 
Congo, 18 

Congress of Ale g (1958), 22 
Congress of Vienna (1815), 3, 12 
conscription, 169 
Constituent Assembly, 23 
Constitution (1961), 121, 125, 126-27, 

130, 132 
Constitution, provisional, 125 
Constitutional Charter (1985), 58, 126, 

128 

construction, 106 
Consulate (1799-1804), 16 
Convention (1794), 16 
copper mining, 79, 90, 94, 97 
Coppolani, Xavier, 14-15, 16, 18 
corn, 103 

Coetquidan Military School, 169 
Council of the Republic (France), 19 
coup attempts, xiv, 36, 125-6, 167 
coup d'etat (1978), xxi, 5, 32, 33, 121, 

126, 140, 174-75 
coup d'etat (1979), 33, 122, 125 
coup d'etat (1984), xxii, 148 
Court of First Instance, 132 
courts, 131 

coutume, 12, 13, 14, 54 

crop production, 101 

CSA. See Commission for Food Security 
(Commissariat a la Securite Alimen- 
taire: CSA) 

Cote d'lvoire, 17, 50, 57, 72, 152 

currency, 26, 82, 114 

Customs Corps, 157, 168 



Daddah, Moktar Ould, xxi, 20, 21, 



22-23, 24, 35, 121, 123-24, 127, 130, 
131, 140, 145, 157, 167, 178; regime 
of, 144, 4, 5, 26, 28-30, 31-32 

Dahomey (Benin), 17 

Dakar, xxiii, xxv, 16, 17, 18, 22, 87, 108, 
109, 175 

Dakhlet Nouadhibou, 46 

date palms, 45 

dates, 103 

debt, external, xxiv, 83, 114, 115-16 
Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789), 
126 

defense spending. See spending 
defense tax. See tax 

defense treaty: effect on Mauritanian mili- 
tary of, 164 
Department of Fisheries, 168 
desertification, xxiv, 45, 47-48, 80, 98, 

100, 172 

development plans, xxiv, 5, 81-82, 91 
Diama dam, 103 
dim, 101 

Diouf, Abdul, 36, 161 
direct rule. See France, colonial policy of 
disaster relief, xxiv 
discrimination policy, 18 
disease, 73 
Djigo, Tafsirou, 138 
Djili, Abd al Kadir ad, 63 
Djodala people, xix, 6, 7-8 
DNE. See National Livestock Department 
(Direction Nationale d'Elevage: DNE) 
Draa River, 160 

drought, xxiii, 5, 26, 31, 37, 41, 42, 47, 
49, 50, 74, 80, 81, 91, 98, 99, 100, 

101, 104, 107, 111, 115, 124, 151, 
172 



Eastern Europe: relations of Mauritania 

with, 145 
EC. See European Community (EC) 
economic assistance, foreign, xxiv, 5, 31, 

37, 75, 82, 106, 108, 109, 111, 115, 

116, 146, 150, 151 
Economic Community of West Africa 

(Communaute Economique de l'Af- 

rique Occidentale: CEAO), 152 
Economic Community of West African 

States (ECOWAS), 152 
economic development. See development 

plans 



207 



Mauritania: A Country Study 



Economic Recovery Program, 72, 83, 

103, 107, 114 
ECOWAS. See Economic Community of 

West African States (ECOWAS) 
education: Islamic, 69-70; of girls, 68, 69; 

public, 70-73; systems of, 69-73 
EEZ. See exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
Egypt, 60 
El Djouf, 42 

elections, xxii, 24, 122, 135-36, 141; 
colonial, 19 

electric power generation and consump- 
tion, 107-8 

El Hor (Freedom), 68 

El Rheins, 95 

employment outside Mauritania, 50 
energy, 106 

ENFVR. See National School for Train- 
ing and Rural Extension (Ecole Nation- 
ale de Formation et Vulgarisation 
Rurale: ENFVR) 

Ethiopia, 36 

ethnic division, xxii, xxiv, xxv, 21, 23, 

24, 25, 31, 33, 41, 42, 65-67, 121, 

137-140, 169, 179-81 
ethnic groups, xxii, 50-58 
ethnic minorities, 138-40 
European Community (EC), 88 
European Development Fund, 109 
European Investment Bank, 95 
Europeans, xx; conquest of Mauritania, 

3; contact with Mauritania, 3, 11 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 79, 85, 

168 

explosives industry, 94 

exports, 79, 88, 90, 93, 94, 95-96, 97, 
101, 109, 111, 115; iron, 79, 90, 94, 
95, 96, 111, 112; fish, 79-80, 84, 85, 
87, 88, 111, 112; livestock, 101, 112 



Fadeliya brotherhood, 63 
Faidherbe, Louis, 3, 12-13, 15 
Fall, N'Deye Tabar, 141 
farming, 101-6 

Fderik, 90, 132, 142, 145, 169 

Fifth Republic (France), 23; constitution 

of, 126 
financial institutions, 83 
firewood, 106-7 
fiscal policy, 114-15 
fishing, xxiii, 79-80, 87-88, 96, 111, 115; 

fleets, 87-88; joint ventures of, 85, 87, 



88; licenses, 84; size of catch of, 84, 88; 

unlicensed, 84, 85, 88-89 
fish processing industry, 85, 87, 88, 106 
FLAM. See African Liberation Forces of 

Mauritania (Forces Liberation Afri- 

caine de Mauritanie: FLAM) 
flood control, xxiv 
flooding, 46, 101 
flour, 102 

Foccart, Jacques, 175 
food aid, 102 

foreign assistance. See economic assis- 
tance, foreign 

foreign policy, 143; objective of, 144, 146, 
157 

Fort Trinquet, 164 

Fourth Republic (France): constitution of, 
19 

France, 122, 146; colonial policy of, xx, 
4, 13-14, 15-16, 17, 18 19-20; defense 
treaty with Mauritania, 164-65; eco- 
nomic assistance by, xxiv, 31, 82; ef- 
fect of influence in military affairs by, 
163-64; establishes Mauritania as pro- 
tectorate, 16; Fifth Republic of, 126; 
foreign relations with, 144, 145, 148; 
influence of, 11; in Mauritania, 15; 
military support to Mauritania by, 146, 
148, 157; military training by, 169, 
171; sovereignty in West Africa of, 12; 
trade with, 109, 112 

Franc Zone, 26 

Free French, 18 

French Community, 22, 23 

French Company of the Senegal River 
(Compagnie Francaise du Senegal), 1 1 

French language, 66-67, 72 

French Revolution, 16 

French Socialist Party, 20 

French Sudan, 17 

French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale 
Francaise: AOF), 4, 16-17, 143; ad- 
ministrative structure of, 17; national- 
ism in, 19, 20; relations of Mauritania 
with, 143-44 

Friendship Port, 97, 108 

Fulbe people, xxii, 56, 57, 64 

Fulfulde dialect, 56, 57 

Gao, 9 
gasoline, 107 

de Gaulle, Charles, 126, 165 



208 



Index 



GDP. See gross domestic product 
General Council (Mauritania) {see also 

Territorial Assembly), 19, 20 
geography, 42-48 

German Democratic Republic (GDR), 
87-88 

Germany, Federal Republic of, 106, 112, 

146 
Ghana, 144 

Ghana Empire, xix, xx, 3, 7, 8, 58 
Giscard d'Estaing, Valery, 159 
goats, 99, 100 
Goree, 16 

Gorgol Democratic Bloc, 22 

Gorgol River, 45, 101 

Gouraud (Colonel), 15, 16 

government, local {see also regional ad- 
ministration), 132-35 

grain production, 80, 101-3, 111 

Grand Council (French West Africa), 19 

Great Britain, 12 

Greater Mauritania, xxi, 29 

gross domestic product (GDP): agricul- 
ture, 80; fishing, 79; husbandry, 81, 
89; iron, 79, 90, 91, 95; per capita, 81 

Guelb er Richat, 42 

Guelbs Iron Ore Project, 95, 107 

guerrilla war, 29, 30 

Gueye, Lamine, 20 

Gueye, Tene Youssouf, 139 

Guidimaka region, 45 

Guinea, 17, 101, 144 

Gulf of Guinea, 11, 22 

gum arabic, xx, 3, 11, 103, 109; trade in, 
12, 13 

gypsum mining, 94, 97 

Habib, Muhammad al, 12 

Hadefiste brotherhood, 64 

Haidalla, Mohamed Khouna, xxi, xxii, 
33, 35-36, 122, 125, 126, 137, 142, 
145, 148, 160, 167, 172; regime of, 
33-37 

Halpularen. See Toucouleur people 
Hamallya, 64 
harbors, 46-47 
harmattan, 42, 43 
Harouna, Niang, 139 
harratin, xxii, xxv, 136, 137 
hassani, 52, 54, 65, 140 
Hassan II (king of Morocco), 35-36, 150, 
159, 160, 174 



Hassaniya Arabic language, xx, xxi, 11, 

51, 66-67, 128 
health care, xxiv, 73-74 
herding, 80, 81, 98-101, 104 
hivernage. See rainy season {hivernage) 
H'metty, Elkory Ould, 142 
Hodh ech Chargui adminstrative region, 

43, 45 
Hodh el Gharbi, 45 
Hodh regions, 6 
holy war. See jihad 
Houmeit, Beijel Ould, 142 
housing, 74-75 



Iberia, 109 

Ibrahim, Yahya ibn, 7 
illiteracy, 772 

IMF. See International Monetary Fund 

(IMF) 
immigration, xix, xx 
imports, 102, 106, 107, 109, 111-12 
Imraguen people, 6, 54, 84 
income, per capita, 81 
independence, xxi, 4, 23-24, 112, 121, 

144 

indirect rule. See France, colonial policy of 
industry, other than mining and fishing, 
106 

Institute of Islamic Studies {see also Na- 
tional Islamic Institute), 70 

INTELSAT. See International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization (IN- 
TELSAT) 

interest groups, 138 

Intergovernmental Consultative Organi- 
zation on Maritime Navigation, 152 

internal security, 178-81 

International Bank of Mauritania (Banque 
Internationale pour la Mauritanie: 
BIMA), 114, 137, 180-81 

International Court of Justice, 29 

International Labor Organisation, 152 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
stabilization program, xxiii, 82, 94, 
114, 115 

International Telecommunications Satel- 
lite Organization (INTELSAT), 109 

International Telecommunication Union, 
152 

interracial marriage, 51 
investment, domestic, xxiv, 82 
investment, private direct: by France, 146 



209 



Mauritania: A Country Study 



Iran, 150 

Iran-Iraq War, 150 
Iraq, 35, 85, 94, 146, 150 
iron ore, xxiii, 79, 95, 111, 112 
iron ore exports, 94 
iron ore mining, xxi, 90-91, 94-96, 115, 
167 

iron ore workers, 142 

irrigation, xxiv, 103, 104, 105 

Islam (see also Muslims; Sunni Muslims), 

3,7,8, 42, 128; adoption in Mauritania 

of, 3, 59; brotherhoods of, 62-65; 

educational system of, 68-70; origins 

of, 59-60; tenets of, 60-62 
Islamic Development Bank, 94 
Islamic legal code. See sharia 
isohyet line, 100 
Italy, 112, 146 

Ivory Coast (Cote d'lvoire), 17 
jamaa, 18 

Japan, xxiv, 112, 146 

Japan Overseas Economic Cooperation 

Fund, 95 
jihad, 8 

judicial system, 131-32 



Kaedi, xxiii, 50, 70, 100, 103, 109, 132, 

141, 165, 169 
Kane, Aissatou, 141 
Karakoro River, 45 
Kayes, 46 
kebes, 50, 74 
Kedia, 90, 95 
Kediet Ijill, 7, 42 
kerosene, 107 
Kiffa, 169 

kinship: in Maure society, 55, 67 

kinship groups (see also lineage organiza- 
tion), 51, 57, 58 

Korea (North), 150 

Korea (South), 85 

Koumbi Saleh, xix, 7, 8, 9 

Kuwait, 75, 146, 150, 174; economic as- 
sistance by, 31, 75 

Kuwait Foreign Trading, Contracting, 
and Investment Company, 94, 97 

Kuwait Fund, 95 



Labor Court, 132 



labor unions (see also strikes, UTM), xxi, 

178- 79; activity and integration of, 
25-65; federation of, 141-42 

La Guera, 36, 37 
Lamantin, 175 

Land Reform Act (1983), xxiii, 105, 

137-38, 180 
land tenure, xxiii, 104-6 
languages, 11, 51; conflict over, 66-67, 

179- 80 

Las Palmas, 85, 87, 109 
law, 177 

Law of March 4, 1968, 134 

League of Arab States. See Arab League 

legal system, 130-32 

Lemtuna people, xix, 6, 11 

Libya, 31, 35, 36-37, 149-50; econom- 
ic assistance by, 31; foreign relations 
with, 149-50; intervention in Mauri- 
tania by, 161, 163; naval training by, 
171 

lineage organization, 51-52, 55-56, 57, 
58 

literacy campaign, 72 
livestock, 81, 112 
Loi-Cadre, 20 

London Anti-Slavery Society, 68 
Louly, Mohamed, 33, 34, 35 
Luxembourg, 112 
Levrier Bay, 46 
Ly, Mamadou, 138 

Ma al Aynin (Shaykh), 14-15 

Madrid Agreements (1975), 29-30, 158 

Maghrib, 6, 8, 9, 65, 161; Mauritania 
as bridge between sub-Saharan Afri- 
ca and, 41, 121, 144, 145 

Mah, Mohamed Ould, 136 

Mali, xx, 3, 8-9, 21, 30, 45, 46, 56, 57, 
58, 99, 100, 101, 103, 109, 112, 121, 
144, 152 

Mali Empire, 7 

Mali Federation, xx, 22 

Maliki rite. See Maliki school 

Maliki school, 8, 58 

Manantali dam, 103 

Mande-Kan, 58 

Mande people, 9 

Manifesto of the Oppressed Black 
Mauritanian (Le Manifesto du Negro- 
Mauritanien Opprime), 139, 179 

marabouts, 14, 52, 54, 64-65, 69, 140 



210 



Index 



marine resources {see also exports; fishing), 
84 

Marrakech, 8 

marriage customs, 56, 57, 58, 68-69 
Maures (see also Arab- Berbers), xx, xxi, 
xxii, xxiv, xxv, 3, 4, 5, 11-14, 21, 22, 
24, 28, 29, 41, 42, 49, 50-51, 65, 70, 
84, 123, 124, 151, 161, 179; black and 
white, 52, 54-55, 65-66; distribution 
in Africa of, 52; societal structure of, 
52, 54-56 

Mauritanian-Soviet Maritime Resources 
Company (Mauritanienne-Sovietique 
des Ressources Maritimes: MAUSOV), 
85 

Mauritania: acquisition under Madrid 
Agreements of, 29; administrative 
structure under France of, 17-18; con- 
cept of Greater Mauritania, 29; as 
French protectorate, 16; inclusion in 
French West Africa of, 17; relations 
with Algeria, 35, 36; relations with 
France, 36; relations with Libya of, 36; 
relations with Morocco of, 35; 
representation in French parliament by, 
19-20 

Mauritanian Commercial Fish Company 
(Societe Mauritanienne de Commer- 
cialisation du Poisson: SMCP), 85, 87, 
88 

Mauritanian Entente, 20, 23, 28 
Mauritanian Iron Mines Company 
(Societe Anonyme des Mines de Fer de 
Mauritanie: MIFERMA) (see also Na- 
tional Mining and Industrial Com- 
pany (Societe Nationale Industrielle 
et Miniere: SNIM)), 25, 26, 90, 91, 
178 

Mauritanian Kadihine Party, 25, 26 

Mauritanian Livestock Marketing Com- 
pany (Societe Mauritanienne de la 
Commercialisation du Betail: SOME- 
COB), 100-101 

Mauritanian-Moroccan cooperation 
agency, 148 

Mauritanian-Moroccan defense pact, 
160 

Mauritanian Muslim Socialist Union, 
24 

Mauritanian National Liberation Front, 
158 

Mauritanian National Renaissance 
Party (Nahda), 23, 24 



Mauritanian National Union, 24 
Mauritanian Naval College, 171 
Mauritanian People's Party (Parti du 
Peuple Mauritanien: PPM), 5, 24, 25, 
31, 32, 126, 141, 142, 167, 171; con- 
trol by, 24-25; policy to foster national 
unity of, 140 
Mauritanian-Polisario peace treaty 

(1979), 175 
Mauritanian Progressive Union, 20, 22 
Mauritanian Refrigeration Company 
(Societe des Frigorifiques Maurita- 
niens: SOFRIMA), 87 
Mauritanian Regroupment Party, 22- 
23, 24 

Mauritanian-Romanian Fishing Com- 
pany (Societe Mauritanienne- 
Roumaine de Peche: SIMAR), 85, 88 

Mauritanian Workers Union (Union des 
Travailleurs Mauritaniens: UTM) (see 
also "Progressive" UTM), xxi, 141- 
42 

MAUSOV. See Mauritanian-Soviet 
Maritime Resources Company (Mau- 
ritanienne-Sovietique des Ressources 
Maritimes: MAUSOV) 

Mbeiirika, 165 

Mecca, 7, 59, 60, 61 

Mederdra, 70 

Medina (Yathrib), 59 

Mengistu Haile Mariam, 36 

Messufa people, xix, 6 

Middle East, 50 

MIFERMA. See Mauritanian Iron 
Mines Company (Societe Anonyme 
des Mines de Fer de Mauritanie: 
MIFERMA) 

migration, 29, 45, 49, 80 

Military Academy of St. Cyr, 164, 169 

military assistance: by Algeria, 149, 175; 
by France, 146, 148, 158, 159-60, 
163-65, 169, 172-75; by Morocco, 
159, 174; by others, 176; by Spain, 
158 

military budget, defense. See spending 
Military Committee for National Re- 
covery (Comite Militaire de Re- 
dressement National: CMRN), 32, 
122, 125 

Military Committee for National Salva- 
tion (Comite Militaire du Salut Na- 
tional: CMSN), xxii, 5, 33-35, 37, 
125, 128-29, 160, 160-61, 167, 175, 



211 



Mauritania: A Country Study 



177; Constitutional Charter of, 126, 
128-30; Permanent Committee in, 129 
military in society, 171-72 
military preparatory schools, 163-64 
military service program, 167 
military training, 167, 169, 171 
millet, 103 

Mining Company of Mauritania (Societe 
des Mines de Mauritanie: SOMINA), 
97 

mining industry, 26, 30-31, 79, 80, 81, 

82, 90, 94, 106 
Ministry of Defense, 157 
Ministry of Interior, Information, and 

Telecommunications, 157, 177 
Ministry of Rural Development, 100, 104 
Ministry of Trade and Transport, 180 
Miske, Ahmed Baba Ould Ahmed, 23 
Mohamed, Diallo, 165 
Moktar, Sidi el, 22 

Montpellier Infantry Instruction School, 
169 

Moroccan Alliance for a Democratic 
Mauritania (Alliance pour une Mau- 
ritanie Democratique: AMD), 136 

Morocco, xx, xxi, xxiv, 4, 5, 8, 14, 22, 
26, 27, 94, 121, 122, 143, 149, 157, 
174; acquisition under Madrid Agree- 
ments by, 29; concept of Greater 
Morocco, 15, 27-28, 29, 122; economic 
assistance by, 31 ; foreign relations with, 
142-49; recognition of Mauritanian in- 
dependence by, 26, 28, 144, 157; role 
in Western Sahara war of, 29-34, 36, 
37, 145, 146, 148, 174; threats to 
Mauritania by, 35, 36, 37, 148, 149, 
158-61 

mortality rates, 41, 48 

Moulaye, Lalla Mariam Bint, 141 

Mozambique, 27 

Muhammad, 59, 60 

municipal councils, 135 

Muslim groups, 6, 57, 58, 60 



Nahda. See Mauritanian National Renais- 
sance Party (Nahda) 
Napoleon, 16 
Nasir ad Din, 11 

National Assembly (France): representa- 
tion of Senegal in, 16; territorial 
representatives in, 19 



National Assembly (Mauritania), 24, 121, 
126-27 

National Civic Service, 167 
National College of Administration, 71 
National College of Sciences, 71-72 
National Consultative Council, 179 
National Corporation for Rural Develop- 
ment (Societe Nationale pour le 
Developpement Rural: SONADER), 
103-4 

National Council of Mauritanian Resis- 
tance, 22 

National Democratic Union, 136 

National Electricity and Water Company 
(Societe Nationale d'Eau et d'Electri- 
cite: SONELEC), 107 

National Front of Black Officers, 181 

National Gendarmerie, 157, 176, 177 

National Guard, 157, 176, 177 

National Health Center, 73 

National Import-Export Company (So- 
ciete Nationale dTmportation et d'Ex- 
portation: SONIMEX), 83, 103-4 

National Islamic Institute, 71 

nationalism, 19, 20, 22; of Sahrawi peo- 
ple, 27 

nationalization, 26, 82, 91, 94, 115 

National Livestock Department (Direc- 
tion Nationale d'Elevage: DNE), 100 

National Mining and Industrial Com- 
pany (Societe Nationale Industrielle et 
Miniere: SNIM), 26, 30-31, 82, 84, 
91, 94, 95, 96, 97, 106, 107, 108, 174 

National School for Training and Rural 
Extension (Ecole Nationale de Forma- 
tion et Vulgarisation Rurale: ENFVR), 
100 

National School of Nurses and Midwives, 
73 

National Training Center of Montlouis, 
169 

National Union of Mauritanian Teachers, 
142 

National Union of Mauritanian Women, 
141 

National Women's Movement (Mouve- 

ment National Feminin), 141 
navy, 167, 168 

N'Diayane, Mohamed Lemine Ould, 140 
N'Diaye, Sidi el Moktar, 20 
Netherlands, 11, 112 
New Fisheries Policy, 79, 85, 87, 88 
New York, 109 



212 



Index 



Niger, 178 

Niger-Congo language family, 56, 57 
Nema, 45, 50, 168 
nomadic society, 23-24, 41, 48, 68 
Nomad Security Guard (Camel Corps), 
157, 168 

Nonaggression and Mutual Assistance 

and Defense Accord, 152 
Nonaligned Movement, 122, 139, 179 
Nouadhibou, xxiii, 15, 31, 37, 46, 50, 54, 

84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 94, 95, 96, 106, 

107, 108, 109, 132, 137, 148, 149, 164, 
167, 168, 169, 171, 175 

Nouakchott, xxi, xxiii, xxv, 21, 23, 30, 
31, 43, 46, 48, 49, 50, 68, 70, 71, 72, 
73, 74, 91, 94, 97, 98, 100, 106, 107, 

108, 109, 129, 132, 134, 135, 141, 145, 
149, 152, 165, 168, 169 

Nouakchott- Nema Road, 109 

OAU. See Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) 

Occidental Petroleum Company, 97 

officer training, 163-64 

oil refining, 106, 108 

Omariya brotherhood, 64 

OMVS. See Senegal River Development 

Office (Organisation pour la Mise en 

Valeur du Fleuve Senegal: OMVS) 
OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum 

Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
OPEC Special Fund, 95 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), 

36, 128, 139, 145, 152, 179 
Organization of Mauritanian Nationalists 

(Organisation des Nationalistes Mau- 

ritaniens), 136 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting 

Countries (OPEC), 91, 109 
Ouadane, xix, 7, 11 
Oualata, xix, 7, 63, 70 
oualo, 101 

Oualo Kingdom, 12, 13 
ouguiya, 26, 82, 114 
Oujda Agreement (1984), 149 
Oumar, Diouf, 139 

paramilitary forces, 167 

parastatal companies. See state enterprises 

Paris, 109 

Paris Club, 115-16 

party congress (1968), 141 



Party of Mauritanian Justice, 25-26 
patrilineage. See kinship; lineage organi- 
zation 

Persian Gulf states, 146 

petroleum {see also oil refining); as energy 

source, 106, 107 
petroleum products, 106-7 
Petroleum Products Commercial Union 

(Union Commerciale des Produits 

Petroliers: UCPP), 94 
phosphate deposits, 27 
phosphate industry, 97 
Podor, 46 
police, 157, 176 

Polisario, xxi, 5, 27, 32, 125, 158, 
160-61, 167; guerrilla war of, xxii, 
29-32, 34, 36, 37, 94, 145, 146, 
148-49, 159, 167, 174 

political parties, 20, 25-26, 135 

political system: role of traditional rulers 
in, 140; attitudes toward, 122-24 

political violence, 139 

Pompidou, Georges, 148 

population: composition of, 50-52; den- 
sity and distribution of, 48-49; growth 
of, 41; heterogeneity of, 21; problems 
of, 50 

Port-Etienne, 15, 164 

ports {see also Friendship Port), 108, 150, 
167 

Portugal, 11, 27 

PPM. See Mauritanian People's Party 
(Parti du Peuple Mauritanien: PPM) 

PRA. See African Regroupment Party 
(Parti Regroupement Africain: PRA) 

Presidential Guard, 157, 176, 177 

presidential powers, 127 

price policy, 83 

prisoners, treatment of, 177 

privatization, 83 

"Progressive" UTM, 142 

public enterprises. See state enterprises 

public health. See health care 

Pulaar language, 57, 72 

Qadhafi, Muammar al, 36-37 
Qadiriya brotherhood, 63, 64 
qadis, 18 

Quran, 59, 60, 62 

racial differences, 125, 137 



213 



Mauritania: A Country Study 



racial tension (see also ethnic division), 21 , 
23-25, 31, 33, 42, 65-67, 121, 137-40, 
169, 179-81 

radio telephone service, 109 

railroad, 108, 167 

rainy season (hivernage), 42, 43 

Ramadan, 61 

Ras Nouadhibou, 11, 46, 47 

RDA. See African Democratic Rally (Ras- 

semblement Democratique Africain: 

RDA) 

Real Estate Construction and Manage- 
ment Corporation (Societe de Construc- 
tion et de Gestion Immobliliere), 74 

Red Crescent, 181 

reforestation program, 107 

regional administration, 134, 135 

regional division, 41, 134 

Reguibat Maures, 15, 158-59 

religious life (see also Islam), 58 

repatriation, xxv 

revenues, 115 

ribat, 7 

rice, 102, 103 
rioting, xxv 
road building, xxiv 
roads, 108-9 
Romania, 146 

Rosso, 50, 70, 73, 75, 109, 132, 168, 169 
Royal Air Maroc, 109 
Rufisque, 16 

rulers, traditional: role in political system 

of, 140 
rural economy, 98 
rural sector, 81, 82 



Saad Bu (Shaykh), 14-15 

SADR. See Sahrawi Arab Democratic 

Republic (SADR) 
SAFA. See Arab Iron and Steel Company 

(Societe Arabe du Fer et de l'Acier: 

SAFA) 

Sahara Desert (see also Spanish Sahara; 

Western Sahara), 3, 9, 42 
Saharan Zone, 98; climate of, 43-45, 49, 

98 

Sahelian Africa, 41, 47 

Sahelian Zone, 98; climate of, 45, 48, 98 

Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic 

(SADR), xxi, xxii, xxiv, 5, 34, 36-37, 

143, 145, 160 



Sahrawi people, 4, 26-27, 29 

Saint Louis, xx, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 19, 46 

Salek, Mustapha Ould, xxi, 32, 36, 122, 

179; regime of, 32-33 
salt mines, 7 

SAMIA. See Arab Metal Industries Com- 
pany (Societe Arabe des Industries 
Metallurgiques: SAMIA), 97 

SAMIN. See Arab Mining Company of 
Inchiri (Societe Arabe des Mines de 
rinchiri: SAMIN) 

Sanhadja Confederation, xix, 3, 6-7, 8 

Sarakole. See Soninke 

Sarr, Ibrahima, 138 

satellite stations, 109 

Saudi Arabia, 31, 35, 75, 146, 150, 174; 
aid to Mauritania, 31, 75 

Saudi Fund, 95 

schools, French, 70 

Second Republic (France), 16 

security forces, 157 

SEM. See Structures for Educating the 
Masses (Structures pour l'Education 
des Masses: SEM) 

Senegal, xix, xxv, 4, 13-14, 17, 21, 22, 

46, 50, 56, 58, 97, 99, 100, 101, 103, 

108, 109, 112, 151-52; as permanent 
French possession, 12; conflict with, 
xxv; relations of Mauritania with, 
151-52, 161; representation in French 
parliament by, 16 

Senegal River, xxii, xxiii, 3, 11, 42, 45, 

47, 48, 56, 57, 66, 81, 98, 100, 101, 

109, 138-39 

Senegal River Development Office (Or- 
ganisation pour la Mise en Valeur du 
Fleuve Senegal: OMVS), 103, 152 

Senegal River Valley (see also Chemama), 
xx, 9, 21, 49, 56, 70, 73, 178; climate 
of, 45-46 

Senghor, Leopold, 20, 33, 161 

sharia, 62, 68, 124, 128, 130, 131, 177 

Sharr Bubba. See Thirty Years' War 
(1644-74) 

shaykh, 64 

sheep, 99, 100 

Sidi, Ahmed Salem Ould, 34, 35 
Sidiya Baba (Shaykh), 14-15, 18, 63 
Sidiya brotherhood, 63 
Sijilmasa, xix, 7, 8 

SIMAR. See Mauritanian-Romanian Fish- 
ing Company (Societe Mauritanienne- 
Roumaine de Peche: SIMAR) 



214 



Index 



slavery {see also black Africans; Maures), 
xx, xxii, 9, 11, 21, 25, 34, 41, 55, 56, 
68, 104, 125 

slave trade, 7, 11 

SMC P. See Mauritanian Commercial 
Fish Company (Societe Mauritanienne 
de Commercialisation du Poisson: 
SMCP) 

SNIM. See National Mining and Indus- 
trial Company (Societe Nationale In- 
dustrielle et Miniere: SNIM) 

social structure, 65-69 

SOFRIMA. See Mauritanian Refrigera- 
tion Company (Societe des Frigori- 
fiques Mauritaniens: SOFRIMA) 

SOMECOB. See Mauritanian Livestock 
Marketing Company (Societe Mauri- 
tanienne de la Commercialisation du 
Betail: SOMECOB) 

SOMINA. See Mining Company of Mau- 
ritania (Societe des Mines de Mauri- 
tanie: SOMINA) 

SONADER. See National Corporation for 
Rural Development (Societe Nation- 
ale pour le Developpement Rural: 
SONADER) 

SONELEC. See National Electricity and 
Water Company (Societe Nationale 
d'Eau et d'Electricite: SONELEC) 

Songhai, xx, 3, 8-9 

Songhai Empire, 9 

SONIMEX. See National Import-Export 
Company (Societe Nationale d' Impor- 
tation et d' Exportation: SONIMEX) 

Soninke people, xxii, 57-58, 64, 66 

sorghum, 103 

Soviet Union, 28, 144; relations of 
Mauritania with, 150 

Spain, xix, 112, 145, 151, 157, 174; 
Christian and Muslim, 8; colonial rule 
of, 27; influence of, 11; provisions 
under Madrid Agreements for, 29-30 

Spanish Sahara, 14, 27, 29, 145, 157, 158 

spending, defense, xxiv, 30, 172 

spending, domestic, 114-15 

sports complex, 150 

standard of living, 41 

state enterprises, 82-83; poor perfor- 
mance of, 83; reform of, 83 

State Secretariat of Culture, Information, 
and Telecommunications, 72 

Status of Forces Agreement, 165 



steel, 94, 106 

Strait of Gibraltar, 8 

strikes, 25, 142, 178-79 

Structures for Educating the Masses 
(Structures pour l'Education des 
Masses: SEM), 36, 37, 125 

student protests, 34, 178 

Sao Tome, 11 

Sudan, 9, 121 

Sudan, western, 3 

Sufism, 62 

sugar plantations, 11 

Sundiata, 9 

Sunni Muslims, 58 

Superior Council for Women (Conseil Su- 

perieur des Femmes), 141 
Supreme Court, 128, 131, 132 
Supreme Defense Council, 31, 174 



Tagant, 9, 14-15, 63 
Tagant Plateau, 45 
Takrur, 56 
Tashfin, Yusuf ibn, 8 
tax, defense, 30 

Taya, Maaouiya Ould Sid 'Ahmed, xxii, 
xxiii, xxiv, 35, 37, 122, 123, 125, 135, 
136-37, 138, 140, 143, 145-46, 148, 
150, 151, 157, 160, 163, 177, 178, 181; 
Taya government, 137-38 

technocrat class, 140 

telephone service, 109 

television, 109 

Territorial Assembly (see also Constituent 

Assembly), 19, 20, 23 
Third Military Region, 32 
Third Republic (France), 17 
Thirty Years' War (1644-74), 11 
Tichit, xix, 7 
Tidjikdja, 15, 70 
Tijani, Ahmed al, 63 
Tijaniya brotherhood, 57, 63-64 
Timbuktu, 7 
Tindouf, xxiv 

Tiris al Gharbiyya, xxi, 29, 30, 32, 34, 

127, 134, 159 
Tiris Zemmour, 132 
Tiris Zemmour administrative region, 43 
Toucouleur people, xxii, xxiii, xxv, 6, 

56-57, 64, 65, 66, 131, 180; discontent 

of, 138, 139-40 
Toulon Navy School, 171 



215 



Mauritania: A Country Study 



trade (see also balance of trade; exports; 

imports), 109, 111-12 
trade, trans-Saharan. See caravan trade 
trade, pre-colonial, with Europe, 11-12, 

109 

Trans-Mauritanian Highway, 109 
transportation, 108-9 
Trarza: amir of, 12 

Trarza region, xx, 11, 12, 14, 18, 45, 63, 
74 

Treaty of Kayes (1963), 144 

Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1983), 

145, 149, 157 
Tunisia, 144, 145 



UAMCE. See Afro-Malagasy Union for 
Economic Cooperation (Union Afri- 
caine et Malagache de Cooperation 
Economique: UAMCE) 

UCPP. See Petroleum Products Commer- 
cial Union (Union Commerciale des 
Produits Petroliers: UCPP) 

UMOA. See West African Monetary 
Union (Union Monetaire Ouest Afri- 
caine: UMOA) 

Unas, Abu Bakr ibn, 8 

unemployment, 50 

Union des Transports Aeriens (UTA), 
109 

Union for Progress and Brotherhood, 136 
Union of the Inhabitants of the River Val- 
ley, 22 

United Arab Republic (UAR): recogni- 
tion of Mauritania by, 144-45 

United Nations (UN), 48, 68, 91, 128, 
152; admission of Mauritania to, 144 

United States, 112, 146; food aid by, 102; 
naval training by, 171; relations of 
Mauritania with, 150-51 

United States Agency for International 
Development, 74 

Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948), 126, 128 

University of Nouakchott, 72, 139 

urbanization, 41, 49-50, 65, 67, 91 



UTM. See Mauritanian Workers Union 
(Union des Travailleurs Mauritaniens: 
UTM) 

Vail, Ely Ould Mohamed, 176-77 
Vichy government, 18 
voting franchise, 19 

warrior castes. See hassani 

water management, 105 

West Africa, 12, 50, 72, 121 

West African Monetary Union (Union 

Monetaire Ouest Africaine: UMOA), 

26, 112 

West Atlantic language (subfamily), 56, 
57 

Western Europe, 50 

Western Sahara (see also Greater Maurita- 
nia), xxiv, 26-27, 46; Mauritanian 
policy for, 28-29; partition of, 29 

Western Sahara war, xxi, xxii, 4-5, 30, 
32, 33, 34, 36, 81, 91, 94, 115, 121, 
122, 134, 140, 146, 157, 158, 167 

wireless service, 109 

Wolof language, 72 

Wolof people, xxii, 6, 57, 58, 64, 65, 66 

women, 124, 140-41; in Islamic religion, 
61; role in Mauritanian society of, 68 

World Bank, xxiii, 49, 50, 72, 88, 90, 91, 
95, 106, 114, 115, 137; structural ad- 
justment program of, 83, 116 

World Health Organization, 73-74, 152 

Yassin, Abdullah ibn, 7, 8 

Yemeni Arabs, xx, 9, 11 

Yukong Limited (South Korea), 98 

Zaire: military training for Mauritanians, 
171 

zawaya, 52, 54, 65 
zenaga, 52, 54 
Zenata Almohads, 8 
Zouirat, xxi, 30, 31, 42, 50, 90, 91, 95, 
107, 108, 167 



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Cyprus 


550-161 


Mauritania 


550-158 


Czechoslovakia 


550-79 


Mexico 


550-36 


Dominican Republic/Haiti 


550-76 


Mongolia 


550-52 


Ecuador 


550-49 


Morocco 


550-43 


Egypt 


550-64 


Mozambique 


550-150 


El Salvador 


550-88 


Nicaragua 


550-28 


Ethiopia 


550-157 


Nigeria 


550-167 


Finland 


550-94 


Oceania 


550-155 


Germany, East 


550-48 


Pakistan 


550-173 


Germany, Fed. Rep. of 


550-46 


Panama 



217 



550- 


■156 


Paraguay 


550- 


•185 


Persian Gulf 1 


550- 


-42 


Peru 


550- 


•72 


Philippines 


550- 


-162 


Poland 


550- 


■181 


Portugal 


550- 


-160 


Romania 


550- 


-51 


Saudi Arabia 


550- 


-70 


Senegal 


550- 


•180 


Sierra Leone 


550- 


-184 


Singapore 


550- 


-86 


Somalia 


550- 


-93 


South Africa 


550- 


-95 


Soviet Union 


550- 


-179 


Spain 


500- 


-96 


Sri Lanka 


550- 


-27 


Sudan 


550-47 


Syria 


550- 


-62 


Tanzania 


550- 


-53 


Thailand 



550-89 Tunisia 

550-80 Turkey 

550-74 Uganda 

550-97 Uruguay 

550-71 Venezuela 

550-32 Vietnam 

550-183 Yemens, The 

550-99 Yugoslavia 

550-67 Zaire 

550-75 Zambia 

550-171 Zimbabwe 



218 



PIN: 006973 000 



